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The problem of historical method in Arnold J. Toynbee's A study of history.

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THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL METHOD IN ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S A STUDY OF HISTORY

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C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

> " . . . in knowledge, that man only is to be condemned and despised who is not in a state of transition."
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> Lord Acton's Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, 1895

In recent years historians have expressed a growing interest in the study of the history of historical thought. As early as 1938, James Shotwell of Columbia University had attempted to arouse interest in this task with his two volume History of History, and had taken a very strong position on the matter by defining the "history of history . . . [as] that part of the human story which one should master first if one would ever learn to judge the value of the rest."[1] In 1936 Charles Beard, deeply involved in controversy over historical method found it advantageous to define truly qualified historians as those "who try to comprehend the intellectual operations which they themselves are performing."[2] And his colleague in several of the controversies, Carl Becker, argued from the perspective of a life-time of historical work "Now that I am old the most intriguing

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[1]James Shotwell, The History of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 1.

[2]Charles Beard, The Discussion of Human Affairs (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 10.

aspect of history turns out to be neither the study of history [i.e., the mechanics of research] nor history itself [i.e., the significance of events] . . . but rather the study of the history of historical study."[3] Herbert Butterfield goes beyond these general arguments for the importance of this kind of study to suggest that "history of historiography may be better training for the young research student than the marshy ground of social and intellectual history."[4] His ideas on the use of the study of history as a training ground may be exemplified in several recently published books which contain analyses of a series of major historians.[5]

These arguments may be sufficient grounds for investigating the methodological odyssey of a contemporary historian such as Arnold J. Toynbee. They are supported by the fact that Toynbee's career and work has an intrinsic interest and importance for present day historians. Thomas Africa, historian from the University of Southern California,

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[3]Carl Becker, "What is Historiography," American Historical Review, XLIV (October, 1938), 20.

[4]Herbert Butterfield, Man on His Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), Preface xvi.

[5]For example, see: Herman Ausubel, J. Bartlet Brebner and Erling M. Hunt, editors, Some Modern Historians of Britain (New York: Dryden Press, 1951); S. William Halperin, Some 20th Century Historians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); Frederick Maurice Powicke, Modern Historians and the Study of History (London: Oldhams Press, Ltd., 1955); Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Some Historians of Modern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

describes Toynbee as "probably the most famous historian in the modern world."[6] Another historian, Roland Stromberg, in his book European Intellectual History says of the first half of the twentieth century, "If the future does not call it the age of Lenin and Hitler, it may decide to know it as the age of Toynbee and Sartre."[7] M. F. Ashley Montagu, albeit one of Toynbee's most vocal critics, assesses A Study of History as "undoubtedly the most widely known work of contemporary historical scholarship," and, "One of the most famous and most widely discussed books of its time." As a reason for editing a major collection of critical essays he advances the argument that "Toynbee is already, and will be for some time to come, a power in the world to reckon with."[8] This observation about the widespread influence of Toynbee has been put in a more perceptive framework by C. Vann Woodward when he comments that Toynbee's fame is assured by the "disturbance that he has caused," and by the "distinction of his critics."[9]

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[6]Thomas W. Africa, Richard E. Sullivan and J. K. Sowards, Ancient Times to 1648, Vol. I of Critical Issues in History, ed. by Richard E. Sullivan (2 vols.; Boston: D. C. Heath, 1967), p. 49.

[7]Roland Stromberg, European Intellectual History Since 1789 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 6.

[8]M. F. Ashley Montagu, ed., Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956), Preface vii.

[9]C. Vann Woodward, "Outstanding Books 1931-1961," American Scholar, XXX (Fall, 1961), 628.

Whether one takes an admiring or a hostile position on Toynbee, it is safe to say that he is a major figure in the history of historical writing in the twentieth century, and worth considerable attention from this perspective. One of the most judicious students of contemporary historical theory and of the Toynbee controversy, W. H. Walsh, remarks with regard to the recent spate of work on speculative philosophy of history that "Much of the discussion centres round the views of Toynbee, a knowledge of which is indispensible for intelligent contemporary evaluation of the subject."[10]

One could accept the argument that a surge of interest in historiography is now valid and necessary, and that Toynbee has gained considerable fame in the twentieth century without accepting the argument that we need a study of Toynbee's methodological struggles at this time. One could argue along with Harry Elmer Barnes in 1948 that the Toynbee effort is a dead-end street, the dying flicker of an older metaphysical and theological tradition in historiography. But this view of the Toynbee phenomenon may be regarded more as a self-serving hope than as a reasoned analysis of the current state of affairs. Barnes tended to see the culmination of the history of historical writing in his own "New History," and he quickly dismisses any deviation or radical departure

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[10]W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Hutchinson House, 1951), p. 170. (Hereinafter referred to as Philosophy of History.)

from his own criteria.

Fritz Stern suggests an alternative view of the resurgence of interest in the broad and comprehensive histories and the philosophies of history that are exemplified by Toynbee and others. He points to the sociological pressures on the historical profession in a time of crisis,

> . . . just as the historian was getting ready to become an academic monk, shut up in his study with his sources, the world about him sought him as a preacher.[11]

And this pressure from society is matched by a "demand from within the profession that history must once again become broader, more inclusive, more concerned with the deeper aspects of human history." All of which means, according to Stern, that "we are on the threshold of another period of reconsidering the purposes and methods of history."[12]

Walsh offers a similar description of the forces and pressures on the historian of the first half of the twentieth century, and seeks to explain Toynbee's work and popularity as the outgrowth of the need of man who when confronted with the spectacle of history needs to show that the miseries men experienced were not in vain."[13]

It is not my purpose to enter into a discussion of

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[11]Fritz Stern, The Varieties of History (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956), p. 12.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Walsh, Philosophy of History, p. 121.

the sociological and psychological forces which helped to shape contemporary historical writing and theory, as valuable as such a study would be. It is legitimate to argue that we are too close to these social and psychological forces to be able to evaluate the situation properly, but we can begin a fruitful study of the methodological changes which took place in the work of one of the very influential historians of the first half of this century. There is value and legitimacy in doing some of the spade work, so that later historians can hazard the more difficult task of re-constructing the psychological and social world which shaped Toynbee and to which he himself reacted and contributed.

In this study, I intend to examine changes in Toynbee's methodology by viewing him in relation to the crisis of methodology that emerges in British historiography in the opening decades of this century. As a participant in the struggle, he has been a catalyst around whom the methodological arguments group and re-group. Whatever men of the next century may have to say about the continuing or ephemeral influence of Toynbee's views, about the usefulness or unreliability of his "challenge and response," and whether it is worthwhile or not to consult his Study of History, it will still be important for them to review the methodological quest of Toynbee in order to understand what was occurring in the historical profession and in the nature of historical

thought in this century.

Any attempt to unravel the methodological shifts and changes in Toynbee's historical thought may easily slip into oversimplification on the one hand, or obfuscation on the other. If one uses a developmental approach, such as "early," "middle," and "later" views of Toynbee, the resulting account is mechanical and inaccurate. Such an approach would ignore the dynamics of the historian's struggle and must deliberately suppress the evidence of recurring "early" views in the later periods. In short, it presents a misleading view of the working historian--quite the opposite of what Marc Bloch urges historians to do. He advises them to turn away from the inhibitions caused by prejudice and false modesty and "to expose the honest gropings of our methods before a profane public."[14] The truth of the matter is that one cannot trace a simple change (from an early to a later position) in Toynbee during the twenty-seven year period in which he wrote A Study of History. Even in his use of the term "science of history" he goes through a process of defining, attacking, redefining, repudiating and reinstating which well illustrates Bloch's description of the "honest gropings" of

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[14]Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft, trans. by Peter Putnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 87.

the historian.[15] If, on the other hand, we use a chronological approach which would try to account for Toynbee's every shift in position, and every doubling back to readopt earlier views, we would only succeed in reproducing doubts and confusions already existing in the mind of the reader from his reading of the original text.

We may be able to gain an intelligible view of the methodological struggles of Toynbee by studying motifs in his work. A number of fine scholars working in intellectual history and philosophy such as Jaeger, Kristeller, Grunebaum and Dooyweerd have made excellent use of motif studies. Jaeger, in his study of Origen, states the matter as follows:

> If we really want to understand Origen, it will not help much to measure him by the single dogmatic issues (Trinity, Incarnation, and so forth) of the following centuries and to ask how far he has anticipated each of them or to observe how inarticulate or wrong he appears with regard to some of them. Nor is it sufficient to apply to him the good old-fashioned methods of nineteenth century Quellenanalyse and ask who are the philosophical authors who have influenced him most. Rather, we have to face the structure of his thought as a whole and to ask what is the function

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[15]Toynbee himself acknowledges how difficult it has been to keep track of his themes and ideas throughout the Study. In the last paragraph of Volume Ten, he expresses his thanks to his wife for preparing the three indexes to his volumes, which have given him a "fortifying sense of assurance that, after all, his book cannot be altogether nonsense, since some sense seems to have been made of it bona fide by a mind whose critical power is as well known to him as its charity." Vol. X, 242.

> that certain leading ideas have in it.[16]

These critics rightly protest against the common error of forcing our categories of thought on others, and the need to let the subjects speak for themselves. An example of this approach can be found in Kristeller's analysis of the Renaissance and in his argument that "a study of the self-interpretation of the Renaissance has shown us a way out of the impasse of the so-called problem of the Renaissance."[17] In a motif study of Toynbee we can account for his acceptance of viewpoints at various points in time and with varying degrees of acceptance; sporadic advances and abrupt changes rather than the systematic progress which we optimistically imagine is the norm for a professional historian. By a motif study, a tracing of the recurrent thematic elements, we may be able to account for the existential aspect of his work, as distinct from the discussions of the coherence of the inner principles of historical method in his work. A leading Dutch historian of this century, Pieter Geyl, whose views have been tempered by his experiences in the concentration camps of the second World War, expresses this existential aspect of historical thought:

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[16]Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 68.

[17]Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Changing Views of the Intellectual History of the Renaissance Since Jacob Burckhardt," in The Renaissance, ed. by Tinsley Helton (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), p. 36.

> History is often thought of as a study contentedly remote from the present, or as a hobby of scholars who have elected to fly from the world around them into the dead and gone past. The truth is rather that history is an active force in the struggles of every generation and that the historian by his interpretation of the past, consciously or half-consciously or even unconsciously, takes his part in them, for good or for evil.[18]

Although the critics of Toynbee frequently disagree about the strengths and weaknesses of A Study of History, there is considerable agreement about some of the more general aspects of his writing. Few fail to mention the dazzling procession of metaphors and similes which fill the ten volumes, and for good or ill, seem to be an integral part of Toynbee's thought processes. The problem of style in the Study is so important that undoubtedly it will draw the attention of later students of Toynbee, especially those who are concerned with literary aspects of historiography. Yet since our concern is primarily methodological, we will limit our discussion to those metaphors[19] and descriptive phrases

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[18] Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1955), p. 236.

[19] Several contemporary historians have successfully used a study of metaphors as a clue to the intention or meaning of a particular author. H. T. Wade-Gery, a life-long friend of Toynbee, has a very instructive study of the similes and metaphors in the Iliad (Poet of the Iliad) as a way of deciphering the problem of authorship. H. Stuart Hughes, in his discussion of Freud (Consciousness and Society) argues that "a thinker is, after all, partly judged on the basis of figures of speech he uses, and in Freud's case, the thought never got beyond a fairly simple vocabulary drawn from nineteenth century physics."

which Toynbee uses to express his own self-consciousness as an historian.

When we concentrate on the self-portraits which are repeated on many occasions, rather than the casual metaphor, four images come from the Study with enough clarity and forcefulness for us to say that Toynbee sees his role as that of an explorer, social scientist, student of life, and Christian historian.

In the discussion that is to follow, we will devote a major section to each one of Toynbee's self-designations, prefacing the whole with a brief account of the British historiographical scene of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

C H A P T E R II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCIENCES IN GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1870 TO 1910

> "I can look forward to some future meeting of this association when . . . the most conspicuous place on the programme will be assigned to some gifted young historical thinker who . . . will propound and explain to the satisfaction of all his colleagues some new and far-reaching law or laws of history. . . . "
>
> E. P. Cheyney's Presidential Address to the American Historical Association, 1923

Before beginning an analysis of Arnold Toynbee's methodological struggle it is important to consider the recent English historical trends which form the background of his life as an historian. Toynbee himself does not dodge the question of environmental influence, and indeed uses the question as the introduction to his Study when he asks whether the influence of the social environment on historical thought is absolute or can be transcended.[1]

It is difficult to select a defensible chronological point of entry into recent English historiography. If we choose Toynbee's date of birth in 1889 we act arbitrarily with regard to significant developments in English historical thought, in spite of the fact that 1889 marked a signifi-

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[1]Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), I, 16.

cant era in France with the death of Fustel de Coulanges (1830-89) and in Germany with the death of Doellinger (1799-1889). Again while it may be of general interest to note the birth of another noted contemporary like Adolph Hitler in 1889, or a more historiographical event such as the coming into being of the American Church History Society in the same year, we are still merely chronicling rather than locating the point at which an intelligible discussion of emerging trends may take place. It is necessary to go back to the decade of the 1870's to find the most reasonable chronological starting point for a survey of the English historiography which formed the background of Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History.

The student of history in the mid-twentieth century is apt to overlook the fact that historical work in its present form is of comparatively recent origin. The institutionalizing of "history" in universities, in seminars, in historical institutes, in journals, in associations and in congresses is for the most part a product of the late nineteenth century. These organs were regarded with considerable skepticism even into the early decades of the twentieth century by the literary and non-academically oriented historians. Only when one comes across the complaints of a non-academically oriented historian such as Toynbee, or goes back to the literary historians of late nineteenth century England can

one realize how recent in origin are many of the commonplaces of modern historical research. In 1913, G. M. Trevelyan (1876-1962), who could boast of at least two great literary historians in his ancestry, inveighed against the institutionalizing of history, although he himself found refuge in the academy fifteen years later:

> The last fifty years have witnessed great changes in the management of Clio's temple. Her inspired prophets and bards have passed away and been succeeded by the priests of an established church; the vulgar have been excluded from the Court of the Gentiles; doctrine has been defined; heretics have been excommunicated; and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets have been duly blackened by the new hierarchy.[2]

Disregarding the complaint of Trevelyan, his recognition of the "great changes in the management of Clio's temple" provides a useful introduction to our task of identifying changes in late nineteenth-century English historical thought. While one may use the general descriptive phrase the "institutionalizing of history" to designate these changes, it should be clear that the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of the modern science of history and its problems. By the term science of history, we mean the emergence of historical studies in its present systematic form, replete with a self-conscious methodology and some awareness of the structure and limits of its field. The

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[2]George Macaulay Trevelyan, Clio, a Muse (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), p. 140.

term includes several methodological subdivisions within English historiography, embracing primarily all those historians who used the term "scientific" in connection with their method, as a way both to gain the prestige currently being accorded the natural sciences and to distinguish themselves from their less scientific fellow historians.

This perspective on English historiography since the 1870's should enable us to see Arnold Toynbee's work in its proper light. We will not be inclined to dismiss him as a religious mystic, a pessimistic prophet, a manifestation of twentieth-century crisis hysteria, a speculative and charming journalist, or a disappointed ex-professional historian. All of these are possible interpretations of Toynbee, as demonstrated by the essays and articles of the critics, but they suffer from a highly selective view of Toynbee's thought and writings. It can be said that Toynbee's desire to appeal to a wide audience, his use of dramatic metaphors and penchant for predictions, often make these interpretations appear more plausible than they are. We begin to move from the realm of opinion and subjective reaction when we attempt to reconstruct the historiographical struggles of the time, and see Toynbee in terms of the developing science of history and the intense Methodenstreit which necessarily accompanied it.

The Institutionalizing of History in the British Universities

The decade of the 1870's may be regarded as the crucial era in the emergence of modern English historiography because it spans the years when historical science gained status in the universities, when historical research became increasingly institutionalized, when leadership began to move from the amateur to the professional historian, and when foundations were laid for the later profusion of historical societies and journals.

The 1870's witnessed a number of educational changes, some of which had a direct bearing on the development of the historical sciences. The Education Act of 1870 inaugurated a reform of educational practice and institution which was to have wide effect on the English scene. Ensor speaks of the decade as the start of a period which "saw the conversion of the English as a whole into a school-taught and literate people."[3] The Gladstonian reform of the universities in the Religious Test Act of 1871 opened the way for a reconsideration of the purpose and curriculum of Oxford and Cambridge. Herbert Fisher (1865-1940), Oxford scholar, then lecturer and historian of Modern European History, and finally Warden of New College, discussed the Oxford experience in his Unfinished

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[3]R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. xx.

Autobiography. Commenting on the restriction of the curriculum to the classics, mathematics, law, and theology, he notes the changes of the 1870's.

> Up until the later part of the nineteenth century a university career had always been regarded as something of a rich man's luxury. . . . Oxford and Cambridge . . . were until the abolition of religious tests in 1871 regarded as nurseries of the national church, and training-grounds for the landowning gentry.[4]

The fight to throw open the universities to the whole country irrespective of creeds was led at Cambridge and Oxford by the younger dons, enrolling such stalwarts as Dicey (1835-1922), Sidgwick (1838-1900), Bryce (1838-1922), G. O. Trevelyan (1838-1928) and Henry Jackson (1839-1921). These educational reforms helped to free the educational structure for the growth of new academic disciplines, although the impetus for historical science came from a new set of historical ideals advocated by a rising group of historians centered especially in Oxford and Cambridge.

The Oxford situation reveals much about the changes in English historiography. While there was official recognition of the place of history in the curriculum as early as the establishment of the Regius Professorship of Modern History in 1724 by George I, this bore little practical result until the brief tenure of Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) in 1841.

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[4]H. A. L. Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 113.

Charles Oman (1860-1946) has compiled an interesting and humorous account of the trials of the Regius Professors at Oxford, pointing out the chronic problems that afflicted the political incumbents of the office down to the formation of the new Honours School of Law and Modern History in 1850.[5] The new discipline did not gain enough strength to stand alone until the separation of Law from History in 1873.

Leadership for the "New History" was provided by Stubbs (1825-1901), Freeman (1823-92) and Green (1837-83), and can be dated with some accuracy by the appointment of William Stubbs to the Regius Chair in 1866. Mandell Creighton's experience at Oxford during the early years of Stubbs' teaching career offers considerable insight into the changes taking place. Creighton (1843-1901) had his earlier training in the School of Litterae Humaniores, but then in 1866 began to read for the School of Law and History. Examined by Bruce, Stubbs and others, he became a history tutor and took the initiative in the organization of the Association of Tutors in 1868-69. The changes in those two years involved the decision to open lectures in each college to the other colleges, the organization of tutors, and the systematic arrangement of lectures to cover the various fields of learning. By 1892, when Creighton had gained considerable

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[5]Charles Oman, On the Writing of History (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1939).

success as professor of ecclesiastical history at Cambridge, as editor of the English Historical Review, and as author of a notable History of the Papacy, his reflections on English historical studies included the observation that:

> With Stubbs began the scientific pursuit of modern history, as he impressed his views upon us younger men. We worked out among us a scheme of lectures covering the whole field, and were the pioneers of the 'Intercollegiate Lectures' which now prevail at both Universities.[6]

Gooch (1873-1968) calls Stubbs the first trained historian to hold the post of Modern History at Oxford,[7] and records the enthusiasm with which his work was received on the Continent as the leader of the "exact school of history" in England. What is of great interest to us is his role in the establishment of the methodological ideals of the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) in English historiography. By his assertion that "I don't believe in a philosophy of history," he tried to clear the epistemological ground for the historian so that "sovereign impartiality" might be the basis for his historical views. The Rankean ideal as employed by the English historians was largely negative, and expressed itself in boasts such as those made about

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[6]Louise Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1904), p. 61.

[7]George P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (2d ed.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p. 318.

Stubbs that although he was "steeped in clerical and conservative principles,"[8] no one could tell his politics from reading his books. Maitland (1850-1906) credits Stubbs with doing more to introduce the methods of German scholarship into England than any other man.

This self-conscious adoption of the pattern of Ranke led Creighton, one of Stubbs' disciples, to adopt a stance which was deceptively simple for himself, yet devastatingly critical of his predecessors. His wife sums up the "absolute impartiality" of the bishop in the phrase, "He did not wish to prove anything, to maintain any theories, to make any brilliant generalizations, his aim was simply and straightforwardly to tell what happened, to get at the truth."[9] Creighton elaborated his epistemological position in a conversation with a student in 1871 when he described historical methodology as the gathering of a number of detached facts, then come the principles which will seem to drive out the facts, until "finally you will find the facts will begin to cluster around the principles."[10]

York Powell (1850-1904), Regius Professor at Oxford from 1894 until his death in 1904, expressed this negative

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, p. 226.

[10] Ibid., p. 61.

ideal in his arguments against his predecessor James Froude (1818-1894). He insisted that history be distinguished from literature and ethics because it is an "absolute science." In his 1903 address on "A General Survey of Modern History," scientific method is described in the following way:

> . . . it collects and sifts facts, gets them down as correctly as it can, classifies, them, and then, making hypotheses, tests and tries these till it arrives at conclusions that stand every test and trial it can apply.[11]

York Powell shared with his Oxford predecessor, Freeman, an abhorrence of metaphysics, and a desire to "let the facts speak for themselves."[12] This version of the Rankean ideal was passed to his successor in the Regius Chair, Charles Firth (1857-1936). Firth's biographers speak of him in terms of the same negative ideal; as one who avoided judgments, who desired to tell the whole story without comment, to "let the facts speak for themselves." Firth is also described as one who never subscribed to any school of history and was not concerned with general ideas.[13]

James Bryce uses an interesting metaphor to express the ideal of the "passionless man" in his introduction in

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[11]Oliver Elton, Frederick York Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), II, 4.

[12]Ibid., I, 245.

[13]Eleanor Smith Godfrey, "Sir Charles Firth," Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. by Schmitt, pp. 146-147.

1901 to the English translation of Helmolt's History of the World. Comparing the encroachment of theory or presupposition in a working historian to a "seduction," he says that it is the business of the historian " . . . to set forth and explain the facts exactly as they are; and if he writes in the light of a theory, he is pretty certain to be unconsciously seduced into giving undue prominence to those facts which make for it."[14]

Before we shift our attention to the developing Methodenstreit which serves as an intelligible background for Toynbee's A Study of History, let us survey the career patterns of the new historians as they relate to this process of the institutionalizing and professionalizing of modern historical science.

Richard Lodge (1855-1936), first to be appointed to the Chair of History at Glasgow in 1894, entered Oxford in the stimulating decade of the 1870's to study under Stubbs, and listen to Jowett (1817-1893) and Ruskin (1819-1900). A list of student contemporaries helps to indicate the seed-bed characteristics of Oxford in relation to the rise of modern English historiography. With him were W. P. Kerr, R. L. Poole (1857-1939), H. Round (1854-1928), T. F. Tout (1855-1929), A. Toynbee (1852-1883), F. C. Montague (1858-1935),

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[14]Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography, p. 331.

C. H. Firth and G. E. Buckle (1854-1935).[15]

Lodge's career marks out a pattern that is representative of many who were trained in the "Oxford School." After Balliol and the influence of Stubbs, Lodge went to Vienna University, then returned to Oxford as a don and lecturer in Modern European History, and finally secured the post at Glasgow. Charles Firth entered Balliol in 1876, then studied in Germany, returning to Oxford in 1883 for twenty years of research and teaching in Modern European History until his appointment to the Regius Professorship in 1904. William Ashley (1860-1927) entered Balliol in 1878, went to Germany in 1880, '83 and '84 for methodological study, and returned to Oxford in 1885, where he remained until his appointment to Toronto and Harvard a few years later. Andrew G. Little (1863-1945), another great name among the English historians, entered Balliol in 1882, went to Dresden and Göttingen in 1886 for further study in historical method, then returned to Oxford for research until his appointment to Cardiff in 1892. Several others of equal fame followed the same pattern with the exception of the continental study. Thomas Tout had entered Balliol in 1874, studied under Stubbs, continued in Balliol as chaplain after 1876, then in 1881 he went to St. David's College in Wales to hold the his-

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[15]John Davis, "Sir Richard Lodge," Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. by Schmitt, p. 201.

tory post for nine years before beginning his famous career at Manchester. His fellow professor at Manchester, and equally responsible for the establishment of its outstanding school of history, James Tait (1863-1944), entered Balliol in 1884, heard that same day the inaugural lecture of Stubbs' successor Freeman, attended the Oxford seminars of Firth and York Powell, and then began his teaching career at Manchester in 1887. The same year that Tait entered Balliol, Herbert Fisher began his studies at New College, became a Fellow in 1888 along with Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), went to Paris in 1889, to Göttingen and Dresden in 1890, and returned to lecture at Oxford in 1891.

We will not follow the careers of other Balliol men such as H. W. C. Davis (1874-1928), R. H. Tawney (1880-1962), G. D. H. Cole (1889-1958), Arthur Lionel Smith (1850-1924) and G. M. Young who span the intervening years to 1907. But the above pattern of careers sheds a light on the institutionalizing of history and helps us to understand the climate of historical studies which prevailed when young Toynbee arrived at Oxford as a student in 1907.

While the "Oxford School" under the leadership of Stubbs, Freeman, and Green was beginning to provide an institutional framework for the new history in the 1870's, the necessary organs of publication were also beginning to emerge. The English Historical Review had its origins in the Oxford

circle as the result of the initiative of James Bryce and J. R. Green. Bryce had finished his undergraduate studies at Oxford, his continental studies at Heidelberg and had returned to lecture at Oxford by 1865. In an 1866 visit to the vicarage of J. R. Green (1837-1883), Bryce and the Reverend William Hunt (1842-1931) had discussed the possibility of establishing a historical journal with Green. By 1867, Green had discussed the matter in a letter to Freeman, and Bruce had consulted Stubbs and the publisher Macmillan. But the financial problems, the matter of competent contributors, the need for a trained reading public, as well as fear of competition from the North British Review chilled the enthusiasm of the would-be journalists. The same factors may be regarded as signs that the developing science of history was not yet ready to support a major publication venture. Throughout the decade of 1870 the project was frequently discussed, culminating in a gathering at Oxford in 1885 of Powell, Round, Tout, Firth and Archer (1834-1902).[16] Creighton speaks of a meeting in Bryce's home in which he, Acton, Dean Church (1815-90), A. W. Ward (1837-1924), and York Powell worked out some of the details. They asked Creighton to serve as the editor instead of the over-worked Bryce, with R. L. Poole as the sub-editor. Five months later, in

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[16]R. L. Poole, "The Beginnings of the English Historical Review," English Historical Review, XXXVI (1921).

January 1886, the first issue was published, and Acton's letter of congratulation to the editor noted that, "At least half the great names are there, and I discern the makings of a sacred band of university workers."[17]

The twenty years which elapsed from the first proposal of the Review in 1866 to the first issue in 1886 bespeaks the struggle to establish an autonomous science of history in England and to give the study an institutional framework and an organ of publication. Even with Acton's enthusiasm, Creighton " . . . doubted if there was a sufficiently large public to take an interest in purely historical questions."[18] His plea to Acton for an article in the first issue contained a very realistic evaluation:

> We must confess that we are not strong in historical method in England. Our work has all the advantages and all the disadvantages of amateur work. . . . You are one of the very few persons who can add any novelty.[19]

A glance beyond the English borders will give us an additional perspective on the English scene. In America in 1886 the two year old American Historical Association was engaged in publishing its own new journal, The American Historical Review. Ranke, the German methodological lodestar,

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[17]Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, p. 339.

[18]Ibid., p. 342.

[19]Ibid., p. 334.

had been made an honorary member and was invited to address the new society. In Germany, Ranke's illustrious career came to a close with his death in 1886. One year earlier the Dutch historians had organized their historical journal, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, patterned after the successful German Historische Zeitschrift, which had been founded in 1859 by Heinrich von Sybel. The Italians to the south had given organizational status to their historiographical efforts with the formation of the Istituto Storico Italiano in 1883.

Returning to the institutionalizing of modern historical studies in England, we find that the entrenchment and enlargement of the historians' work in the Universities and in the English Historical Review was followed several years later by the formation of national associations. One cannot suppose that a vacuum existed until the English Historical Association was formed in 1906. Local historical societies and the close ties between the historians provided by English University life promoted interchange of ideas, criticism, and research. The forming of over-arching organizations to unite geographically separated historians began before the end of the nineteenth century. Maitland rallied the historians of law around the Seldon Society in 1887; church historians formed the Church Historical Society in 1894. The early years of the new century with its series of International

Congresses of Historical Sciences in 1903, 1908, and 1913 precipitated the great number of specialized historical societies like the British Society of Franciscan Studies of 1907, and the Economic History Society of 1926. Specialized historical journals accompanied the new societies, and the ever accumulating and accelerating research was given some degree of order with the organization of the Institute of Historical Research in London in the year 1921.

Turning from Oxford to Cambridge, we find similar changes occurring in the study of history. In 1869 Seeley (1834-95) succeeded Kingsley as Regius Professor of Modern History and may be regarded as the transitional figure in the development of the historical sciences in that University. Seeley began his career at Cambridge by denouncing the dominant literary tradition of the "charlatans" Carlyle and Macaulay, and extolling the careful scholarship of Leopold von Ranke. He followed the lead of the Oxford dons by establishing the History Tripos in the University. But his own overwhelming interest in politics and political lessons, his indifference to reforms and to the rising dissatisfaction of the history tutors, meant that the leadership of the new science of history would pass from Seeley to Creighton. Seeley had been the only professor of history at the University, but in 1884 Creighton was appointed to the new post of Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History. Gwatkin (1844-1916),

Prothero (1848-1922) and other promising young historians in the University gathered around Creighton, and worked for the reforms as embodied in the recommendations of the Board of Historical Studies of 1885.

By 1888 F. M. Maitland was at Cambridge occupying the Downing Chair of the Laws of England, and thereby giving the University a man Acton called the "ablest historian in England," and Pollard referred to him as "the greatest that England has possessed." In 1895 Seeley was succeeded by Lord Acton as Regius Professor who further enhanced and strengthened the place of historical studies in the University. As in the historical school at Oxford, Cambridge witnessed a similar pattern of developing future strength from the returning history students. John Clapham (1873-1946) completed his Tripos in 1895, returned in 1908, and by 1928 had become the first Professor of Economic History at Cambridge. John Holland Rose (1855-1942), who entered Cambridge before Clapham, returned as lecturer and reader to climax his professional and professorial career in 1914 as the first holder of the chair of naval history at Cambridge. Harold Temperley (1879-1939) and Denys Winstanley (1877-1947) both had their historical training at Cambridge under Acton, Maitland and Bury (1861-1927), then traveled widely and returned as tutors, house masters, and as in Temperley's case, University Professor of Modern History.

If we turn to the situation at Manchester, we may again add to our understanding of the late nineteenth century historiographical changes. A chair of history was established there as early as 1854, but the undifferentiated state of historical studies is underlined by the fact that the incumbent, Richard C. Christie (1830-1901), was required to teach history, jurisprudence and political economy. By 1866 the disciplines of history and law were separated, and Adolphus Ward was appointed to teach history. The school began to grow under Christie and Ward, although its great reputation dates from the arrival of two Balliol men, Thomas Tout and James Tait, who had been strongly influenced by the Stubbs circle at Oxford. Tait came directly from his Oxford training to Manchester in 1887 as lecturer and by 1896 occupied the chair of history. Tout went to St. David's College in Wales for nine years before going to Manchester as Ward's successor in 1890. Advanced research facilities were established, chairs in economic history and modern history added, and Tout and Tait, "two of the most distinguished medievalists in England,"[20] led a community of historian scholars which included such men as George Unwin, Ramsey Muir (1872-1941) and H. W. C. David (1874-1928).

In the north, James Bryce, an Oxford historian whom

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[20]Powicke, Modern Historians and the Study of History, p. 32.

we have encountered in the Stubbs circle, and in the Manchester school as Christie's successor in 1869, started his career at Glasgow University. But his historical interests could hardly be grounded in this educational experience, for he explains, "History was not taught at all, there was no professor."[21] But by the year 1894, a chair of history was established at Glasgow, where a Balliol man, Richard Lodge (1855-1936), won the appointment. In the same year, Prothero of Cambridge won the new post established at Edinburgh University. A Scottish History Society had been established in Edinburgh as early as 1886, but its primary purpose was the discovery and printing of unpublished documents. By 1903, the Scottish Historical Review came into being to express the views and researches of the new science of history.

Flowering of the Scientific School of History in the First Decade of the Twentieth Century

While we can trace the growth of a science of history in England in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the flowering of that movement occurs in the first decade of the twentieth century.

The self-confidence or even dogmatism of the professional historians with their new Rankean tools and their dominance in the universities comes to expression in many

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[21]Herbert A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (London: Macmillan and Co., 1927), I, 25.

places and on many occasions. Trevelyan's plaintive note in 1913 that "doctrine has been defined; heretics excommunicated; and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets have been duly blackened by the new hierarchy" may be taken as a fairly accurate appraisal of the routing of all opposition from the amateur and literary historians of an earlier era.

Edwin Hatch's optimism might have been judged somewhat visionary and premature in 1889 when he argued that, "We may hear, if we will, the solemn tramp of the science of history marching slowly, but marching always to conquest. It is marching in our day, almost for the first time, into the domain of Christian history. . . . In front of it, as in front of the physical sciences, is chaos; but behind it is order."[22] But his optimism was reiterated and given a kind of official sanction and credibility in J. B. Bury's famous Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge in 1902. Bury reminds his audience that a revolution is taking place in the science of history, and that when Ranke's dictum "Ich will nur sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" has been fully implemented "though there be many schools of political philosophy, there will no longer be divers schools of history."[23] His concluding

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[22]Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 23.

[23]J. B. Bury, "The Science of History," Selected Essays of J. B. Bury, ed. by Harold Temperley (Cambridge: University Press, 1930), p. 12.

remarks bring together his methodological conviction of the objective scientific character of history and his astounding faith in the effects of this triumph of the science of history.

> . . . if, year by year, history is to become a more and more powerful force for stripping the bandages of error from the eyes of men, for shaping public opinion and advancing the cause of intellectual and political liberty, she will best prepare her disciples for the performance of that task, . . . by remembering always that, . . . she is herself simply a science, no less and no more.[24]

While Bury could not bring himself to make quite as extravagant a claim as his French contemporary Fustel de Coulanges', "Do not imagine you are listening to me; it is history itself that speaks,"[25] nevertheless he expresses the sense of culmination and triumph that English historians were experiencing in the first decade of the new century.

It is possible to see in the publication of the Cambridge Modern History a clear example of the authoritative voice of history imagined by the practitioners of the new science of history. In 1896 Lord Acton had been invited by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press to become general editor of a History of the World. Here was a possibility of writing a definitive history, of fact gathering by the

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[24] Ibid., p. 22.

[25] John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Modern History, ed. by J. N. Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London: Macmillan and Co., 1950), p. 12

experts, and of producing the absolutely impartial version of history. Acton's letter of direction to his contributors was sent out in 1898 with the strong admonition:

> Our scheme requires that nothing shall reveal the country, the religion, or the party to which the writers belong. . . . Contributors will understand that we are established, not under the Meridian of Greenwich, but in Long. 30 deg. W.; that our Waterloo must be one that satisfies French and English, Germans and Dutch alike; that nobody can tell, without examining the list of authors, where the Bishop of Oxford laid down the pen, and whether Fairbairn or Gasquet, Liebermann or Harrison took it up.[26]

Acton himself died in 1902 just before the first volume of the Cambridge Modern History was published, but the work continued on the text until the twelfth volume was published in 1910. By 1911 the first volume of the Cambridge Medieval History had appeared, and this series was followed by the Cambridge Ancient History and the Cambridge History of the British Empire.

By 1913, on the eve of the first World War, Gooch had written the last chapter of the last volume of the Cambridge Modern History on the topic "The Growth of the Historical Sciences";

> While historical science is thus extending its conquests in every direction, the philosophy of history lags behind.[27]

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[26]Stern, The Varieties of History, p. 249.

[27]A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes, eds., The Cambridge Modern History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1902), XII, 850.

That same year Gooch concluded his History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century with the identical statement concerning the triumphs of the new history. He added a concluding thought that might have given direction to Arnold Toynbee, then a twenty-four year old historian at Oxford, who had just returned from a year in Greece to become Ancient History tutor at Balliol. Gooch asserted that "though it is not yet possible to formulate laws explaining the purpose and the plan of human evolution, every true historian contributes equally with the student of science and psychology to the progress of our knowledge of man."[28] His hope that historians would soon reach a law-formulating stage may have provided the challenge to which Arnold Toynbee responded with years of research and four volumes of his A Study of History in an effort to elaborate those laws of human history.

It is interesting to hear the same hope more clearly articulated ten years later in the presidential address of the American Historical Association. E. P. Cheyney's yearning for the "gifted young historical thinker who . . . will propound . . . some new and far-reaching law or laws of history. . . . "[29] had some prospect of realization in the work

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[28]Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, p. 594.

[29]Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," The American Historical Review, XXIX (January, 1924), 248.

Toynbee was just undertaking in London in the same decade.

Tensions and Controversies Among the New Historians

Despite the steady process of the institutionalizing of historical studies after 1870 in the British Universities, and the flourishing of the many historical societies and journals, seminars and theoretical discussion grew more slowly. E. L. Woodward, in an address given in 1950 to the British Academy on "The Present State of Historical Studies," recognized the general aversion of British historical scholars to the theoretical aspects of historiography. As support for his own refusal to discuss "the fundamental problem of the nature of historical knowledge," he argues that "I am in good company if I evade a master problem of this kind, since nearly all English historians have evaded it."[30]

His estimate is corroborated by another British historian trained at Cambridge in the early years of the twentieth century. Sir Charles Webster recalls that when he was a student there was no systematic study of history, no research techniques, no "modern history," and no graduate instruction at Cambridge. Even though Bury and Westlake were leading the historical school, and producing monumental studies, the young historian had only "fleeting contact" with them, and received no systematic teaching in techniques of

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[30]Stern, The Varieties of History, p. 14.

historical research.[31]

When we go back to review the Oxford experience in historical seminars and theoretical discussion, we find further confirmation of Pollard's complaint of 1904, that, "There is no real school of research in history in any English University."[32] Freeman had attempted a seminar at Oxford on "Methods of Historical Study." Firth, in his inaugural address of 1904 complained that Oxford did nothing to train historians, and then spent the next twenty-two years of his incumbency trying to establish research methods and technical training there. His successor as Regius Professor of Modern History, H. W. C. Davis, credited Firth with the organization of the seminar, remarking that, "he has every right to be called the father of this new development.[33]

Even though the English scene did not witness the intense methodological debates that were carried on in Germany at the turn of the century by historian-theoreticians of the stature of Dilthey, Windelband, Troeltsch, Meyer, Meinecke, and Weber, it would be a mistake to suppose that the new history did not soon show signs of major methodologi-

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[31] Charles Webster, Fifty Years of Change in Historical Teaching (Pamphlet of the Historical Association, 1956), pp. 36-37.

[32] Ibid.

[33] H. W. C. Davis, The Study of History (Oxford: Inaugural Lecture of H. W. C. Davis, Clarendon Press, 1925), p. 8.

cal tensions.[34]

The problems which were inevitable in the simplistic epistemology of the English Rankeans were not immediately apparent to the sacred band of professional historians who were beginning to gather around Stubbs, Freeman, and Green at Oxford, Creighton and Maitland at Cambridge, and Ward, Tait, and Tout at Manchester. Yet difficulties lurked just below the surface in such factual narratives as Creighton's History of the Papacy. One example is the Anglican bishop's interesting interpretation of the Reformation which is not unlike certain Marxist interpretations of "real history." In a letter to Mrs. Green in 1884 he expresses mild concern about his own non-idealistic interpretation of the Reformation, adding:

> If the Pope could have left off pillaging Germany, I believe that 'justification by faith only' would have created only a languid interest. This is a very low view. I know that we ought to believe that mighty movements always swayed the hearts of men. So they have--when they made for their pecuniary interest. But I believe that ideas were always second thoughts in politics--they were the garb with which men covered the nudity of their practical desires.[35]

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[34]Collingwood observes that "In the main, English historians of the late nineteenth century thus went on their own way without often pausing to utter general reflections on their work; on the rare occasions when they did so, as for example in Freeman's book on The Methods of Historical Study (London, 1886), or here and there in inaugural lectures, nothing worthy of notice came of it." The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 144.

[35]Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, p. 267.

For a man who wanted simply to record what happened in the historical past, who had no theories to maintain and no philosophy of history, this rather surprising theoretical discussion emerges in his letters and was sooner or later to disclose the hidden postulates of the "neutral observer" position of the new school of historians.

Looking back at the performance of this first generation of English Rankeans one is impressed with their power to mesmerize both themselves and their defenseless amateur-historian opponents. G. P. Gooch accepts Stubbs' boast that "no one could tell his politics from [reading] his books," and further defines Stubbs' "remarkable impartiality" with the explanation that "his political and religious beliefs never obtruded in his work."[36] Yet this is the same man who in his public (1880) and printed (1887) Lectures on Medieval and Modern History does not hesitate to describe Turkey as "the curse of Christendom," and that "it [Turkey] means nothing, represents nothing but butchery, barbarism and the vilest slavery."[37]

Occasionally the internal methodological strains became quite evident as in the dramatic Acton-Creighton con-

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[36]Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, p. 318.

[37]William Stubbs, Lectures on Medieval and Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886), p. 275.

troversy of 1887. The "sacred band of university workers" which Acton discerned in the 1886 founding of the English Historical Review suffered sharp dissension in the ranks when Acton wrote a harsh review of Creighton's Papacy. Creighton had received very favorable reviews of his first two volumes from Acton. Consequently, as editor of the Historical Review, he sent Volumes Three and Four to Acton for what he hoped would be continued favorable reviewing from the one man in England he considered competent to discuss the volumes. To Creighton's great dismay, as disclosed in hurried correspondence to his colleagues, the Acton review contained a sharp attack on him for refusing to pass judgment on the Renaissance Papacy and the Inquisition. This controversy was not easy for the nineteenth century contemporary historians to understand, and has puzzled Acton and Creighton biographers since that time. But one needs to recall the tremendous moral and intellectual struggle through which Acton had passed as a loyal Catholic scholar in the Papal Infallibility controversies from 1859 to 1870. Kochan describes Acton's struggle as the "permanent compromise of his conscience,"[38] and Butterfield speaks of it as the soul-shaking experience of opposing and then submitting to the

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[38]Lionel Kochan, Acton on History (London: Andre Deutsch, 1954), p. 27.

Dogma of Papal Infallibility.[39] It is apparent that Creighton's discussion of the Inquisition touched on points in papal history of great importance to Acton. Creighton expected praise from Acton for the fact that a Protestant clergyman scholar could handle Catholic historical interpretations in such an "objective" or non-judgmental fashion. Indeed, Acton had noted the Rankean ideal of objectivity in Creighton's work:

> Nobody should stand better with Mr. Creighton than Ranke. The late John Richard Green used to complain that it was from him that he had learnt to be so dispassionate and inattentive to everything but the chain of uncoloured fact. In reserve of language, exclusion of all that is not history, dislike of purple patchwork and emotional effect, their ways are one.[40]

Instead, what emerged from his historicism adopted by Creighton, Stubbs and many of their contemporaries was an ethical relativism that was anathema to Acton because it undermined his concept of progress--the growth of liberty. This passage from Acton's review is an indication of how in Acton's eyes Creighton's virtue could by degrees become a vice, how impartiality could be a mask for moral indifference, how recording and observing could lead to superficial chronicling. Of Creighton, Acton says:

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[39]Herbert Butterfield, Lord Acton (London: Historical Association Pamphlet, 1948), p. 8.

[40]John Acton, Book review in English Historical Review, II (1887), 572.

> He is not striving to prove a case, or burrowing towards a conclusion, but wishes to pass through scenes of raging controversy and passion with a serene curiosity, a suspended judgment, a divided jury, and a pair of white gloves.[41]

And he adds at the close:

> He describes the things that vary rather than the things that endure. . . . The system, the idea, is masked by a crowd of ingenious . . . characters. . . . The inner mind of the papacy has to be perused. . . . Without reversing his views, or modifying his statement, he has yet to disclose the reason, deeper and more interior than the . . . corruption of ecclesiastics, which compelled the new life of nations to begin by a convulsion.[42]

What the Protestant clergyman-historian deemed fair-mindedness in his desire to put the Inquisition in the best possible light, the Roman Catholic historian deplored as application of a sliding scale, as a lowering of the standard of moral judgment. Acton argued that:

> If we may debase the currency for the sake of genius or success or reputation, we may debase it for the sake of a man's influence, of his religion, of his party. . . . Then history ceases to be a science, an arbiter of controversy, a guide of the wanderer; . . . it serves where it ought to reign. . . .[43]

Creighton's response to the attacks of a man he regarded with such high respect as a historical scholar, and with equal bewilderment as a Catholic historian was the confession that,

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[41] Ibid., p. 573.

[42] Ibid., p. 580.

[43] Creighton, Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, p. 372.

"Perhaps the effort to rid myself of prejudice has left me cold and abstract in my mode of expression and thinking."[44]

This controversy offered an early expression of the Methodenstreit that was bound to occur as historical scholars began to work out the implications of their new history. In this case, Creighton and Acton were two of the most brilliant early leaders who agreed on certain basic epistemological principles which had come into English historiography from the Rankean school. One can say that the controversy marked the limits of their theoretical agreement. Although they agreed on the negative ideal as a first phase in the new history as it worked itself out into written history, Acton recognized the damage it was doing to his other historiographical principles such as his concept of development. They had shared an epistemological faith in the "passionless man"--that true history would come from the historian who divests himself of passion, prejudice, philosophy, and points of view. Indeed, Lord Acton's early faith was exemplified in the "joint-stock history" undertaken in the Cambridge History series, in the hope that the various authors would not be visible behind the chapters, that the satisfied reader of any nationality would not be able to detect where one author left

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[44] Ibid., p. 375.

off and another began.[45]

But the shared ideal of Creighton, Acton, Stubbs and the growing band of fellow-professionals was primarily negative, usually expressed in negative terms, and was most often employed as a polemic against the conventional history of the nineteenth century English historiography. The three editors of the first edition of the Cambridge Modern History could exult that "the long conspiracy against the revelation of truth has gradually given way; and competing historians all over the civilized world have been zealous to take advantage of the change."[46] But they seemed as oblivious to the explosive problems beneath the surface of their new methodology as their contemporaries in statecraft were to the fast approaching first World War.

In 1913 when Gooch, the first major historian to describe the rise of the modern science of history in England, and one who shared in the faith and enthusiasm of the movement, turns from narrative to the evaluation of a given historian, he repeatedly uses a negative criterion of the sort mentioned above. Speaking of Ranke's religious views, he

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[45]Charles Oman, the author of the chapter on Waterloo in the Cambridge Modern History, later recognized how impossible the negative ideal was, and how the "individualities peep out" even in the most rigorously objective sections. On the Writing of History, p. 27.

[46]A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and S. Leathes, "Preface to the First Edition," Cambridge Modern History, vi.

dismisses them with the judgment, "Though a thin film of theology floated on the surface, the main body of the work was unaffected."[47] When referring to the strong views of Stubbs on the value of Christianity, Gooch defensively adds, "But his political and religious beliefs were never obtruded in his work."[48] In a discussion of Gardiner's political and religious allegiances, he uses the familiar phrase, "but no one could tell from his work to what Church or party he belonged."[49] Of Acton's Catholicism, Gooch extravagantly remarks, "He practiced what he preached, and he never wrote or uttered a word as Regius Professor which revealed him as a member of one Church rather than another."[50] Mosheim is admitted to the modern school of history on the same negative grounds of having written "without passion or unction," and Gooch notes approvingly that the result of the "winning of ecclesiastical history for science" at Göttingen was that "No one learned at Göttingen to love Church history or to reverence the saints."[51] Hefele is commended for passing the negative test at the end of his work on Church councils;

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[47]Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, p. 74.

[48]Ibid., p. 318.

[49]Ibid., p. 339.

[50]Ibid., p. 362.

[51]Ibid., p. 491.

for "Looking back on his seven massive volumes he repeats that he is not conscious of any bias."[52]

The early attacks on modern empirical historiography did not center on the question of whether it was indeed possible to carry out the epistemological ideal derived from Ranke of the perfectly neutral, objective, reporting of the facts. That is to say, the problem of selecting the significant facts from the vast number of other facts, the question of representative facts, and the problem of an inescapable point of view did not emerge immediately as part of the English Methodenstreit. The Creighton-Acton controversy had tended to pose, rather, the problem of the adequacy of the Rankean epistemological ideal. It is evident in Acton's critique of Creighton in which he states that Creighton sees only the "passing figures," the "life and action," rather than the "deeper and more interior" reason, the "inner mind of the papacy."

What troubled the two protagonists was the danger that the ideal of wanting to show only "what really happened" might result in an inadequate or superficial view of the past. In light of their long struggle to establish the new methodology and an autonomous historical science free from the traditional biases of the nineteenth century, it seemed

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[52] Ibid., p. 505.

most disconcerting to find that the victory might end in intense internal strife.

Upon closer examination of the controversy, one can see that Acton's challenge to Creighton concerns the second problem of the working historian--what principle of development to use. One might verify empirically some facts, but to move from simple chronicling to historical explanation involved some concept of development and, on this issue, Acton was not content to follow the Creighton view that somehow the facts would tell their own story. Acton hoped to avoid the relativism and scepticism which he felt was inescapable in Creighton by holding to an absolute standard of ethics as a criterion for his concept of development. In his Inaugural Address of June 1895, Acton argues that, "All that we require is a work-day key to history."[53] His description of the new school in historiography which is controlled by the "dogma of impartiality," indicates his admiration but also his growing sense of its inadequacy.

> I speak of this school with reverence, for the good it has done, by the assertion of historic truth and of its legitimate authority over the minds of men. It provides a discipline which every one of us does well to undergo, and perhaps also well to relinquish. For it is not the whole truth.[54]

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[53]John Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 37.

[54]Ibid., p. 42.

Acton goes on to recapitulate his earlier argument against Creighton, and his earlier assertion that "it is the office of historical science to maintain morality as the sole impartial criterion of men and things." He reaffirms Froude's declaration that "History does teach that right and wrong are real distinctions. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity."[55]

Acton himself had held to the first principle of the new historical school;[56] to the "dogma of impartiality," but the more he labored with the second problem of a concept of development--an Archimedean standpoint that would escape the relativising of historicism--the more he insisted upon the need and the right of the historian to exercise moral judgment. In the summary of his Inaugural Address at Cambridge University, Acton, after acknowledging his divergence from the then dominant position of Creighton, states his own final "cardinal proposition."

> But the weight of opinion is against me when I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the

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[55] Ibid., p. 51.

[56] See Herbert Butterfield's discussion of Acton's changing view in Lord Acton,

power to inflict on wrong.[57]

Acton was correct, at least, in his first assessment--that "the weight of opinion is against me." In the decades that followed, few English historians were willing to assume with Acton that the "first of human concerns is religion,"[58] that progress towards freedom is the key to history,[59] and that this progress is concomitant with the doctrine of Providence and rests upon an absolute morality.[60] Few historians were willing to surrender a hard-won sovereign impartiality for Acton's insistence that "The inflexible integrity of the moral code is, to me, the secret of the authority, the dignity, the utility of history. . . . "[61]

But one should not dismiss the Acton attack on the Rankeans as totally out-dated and irrelevant. The question of the relation of moral judgment to history has become a major problem to a generation of European scholars who lived through the second World War. Meinecke's distress over raison d'etat in his important study Machiavellism: the doc-

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[57]Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, p. 48.

[58]Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Modern History, p. 8.

[59]Ibid., p. 12.

[60]Ibid., p. 11.

[61]Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, p. 336.

trine of raison d'etat and its place in modern history,[62] and Georg G. Iggers' recent study of the relation of German historicism to a nationalistic philosophy of violence[63] are only two examples of contemporary re-thinking of this problem in historical studies. It is also important to note the renewed interest in Acton as a historian, as evidenced by the recent studies of Himmelfarb, Kochan, Butterfield and Mathew. While Acton's position does not appear to be gaining many adherents, his insights into the problems of the Rankeans were very perceptive and quite in advance of his time.

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[62]Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: the doctrine of raison d'etat and its place in modern history, trans. by D. Scott (London: Routledge, 1957).

[63]Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).

C H A P T E R III

TOYNBEE THE EXPLORER

> "We have not found the quarry which we are hunting, but we have fought our way through the thicket and have come out on the other side into the open country."
>
> Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume One (1933)

With this survey of British historiography as a background we may turn immediately to the work of Arnold Toynbee in an attempt to understand the formation of his methodological position and its subsequent changes. A good starting point is to focus on Toynbee's frequent identification of himself as an "explorer." The explorer motif is, to be sure, subdued in the early volumes of A Study of History, and made quite subordinate to the notion of the historian as social scientist. Yet it is the startling growth of the explorer motif that gives a clue to the breakdown of Toynbee's initial scientific methodology, and enables us to see his life-long experiences as both a struggle for a proper historical methodology and a religious odyssey. Therefore, we will use an examination of the explorer metaphor to clarify and establish the notion of a change.

In Chapter Four we will move backward in time in order to pick up the earliest evidences of Toynbee's methodological struggle, then follow its formulations in his suc-

cessive self-identifications as "social scientist," "student of life," and Christian historian.

Dual Use of the "Explorer" Metaphor

The image of the historian as an explorer has several variations, but they appear to be minor variations of a general theme. Sometimes the traveler is on land, at other times on the high seas. On one occasion the explorer may be cutting his way through the jungle, and then again he may simply be walking through a "wonderland." Also, it may be noted in a preliminary way that the image has two major applications which sometimes blend or merge into one. Toynbee speaks of his personal role as an explorer of historical events. In this usage the jungle or turbulent sea is really the multiplicity and chaotic appearance of past events. Occasionally the chaos is enlarged to include the jungle of interpretations and hypotheses advanced by other scholars. The second major application of this explorer-image is one in which Toynbee emphasizes the aimless wandering of Western civilization. In this case, the historian is the advance scout, or the "Moses," or the navigator in the chart-house who ought to be proposing a new solution to his distraught fellow-voyagers. In this situation the jungle, wilderness, or trackless ocean may appear as mankind's moral irresponsibility, or the culmination of his wrong choices, or simply the vastness of time.

This dual use of the explorer-image is related to Toynbee's insistence, as discussed in the next chapter, that the historian is at once an impartial observer and a fellow human being. The problem of how to gain detachment from the bias of one's own time and place, and yet not develop the sterile intellectualism of detachment, must be numbered as one of the basic issues in Toynbee's Study. Our immediate concern, however, is to trace the use of this image in Toynbee's work.

Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role in A Study of History

Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of the explorer role in Toynbee's Study is its infrequent appearance in the early volumes as compared with its repeated use in the later volumes and essays of Toynbee.

One may argue that the image of the historian-explorer is implied in the title of the book and in a remark made in the Preface to the First Edition (dated sixteenth of May, 1933). Toynbee calls his work A Study of History and indicates in a rather modest note that this book "is an attempt to expound and illustrate a system of ideas, . . . "[1] This introductory hesitation is soon set aside in the following four volumes as Toynbee applies his "well-trained empiri-

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[1]Arnold Joseph Toynbee, A Study of History (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1948), I, Preface.

cal method" to the task of demolishing other systems of ideas which are a priori, unscientific, or transcendental, and in developing his universal 'laws' which are non-transcendental, empirical, scientific[2] and demonstrable by an empirical survey.[3]

There are two instances in Volume One where Toynbee suggests that the historian works as an explorer. In the highly developed simile of the civilizations as mountain climbers, a simile which appears to be a master pattern in Toynbee's original view but is later quietly dropped in his radical reorientation, he says,

> . . . while we, for our part, may liken ourselves to observers whose field of vision is limited to the ledge and to the foot of the upper precipice and have come upon the scene at the moment when the different members of the party happen to be in these respective postures and positions. At first sight we may be inclined to draw an absolute distinction between the two groups, acclaiming the climbers as athletes and dismissing the recumbent figures as paralytics; but on second thought we shall find it more prudent to suspend judgment.[4]

In the process of developing this simile Toynbee compares the uncertainty of the explorer with the unknown thousands of ledges which stretch out in the past darkness of the abyss from which Life came, and to the finite or infinite number of

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[2] Ibid., I, 426.

[3] Ibid., V, 359.

[4] Ibid., I, 193.

ledges yet to come. In spite of the fact that the heights which tower above us are quite beyond our powers of estimation,[5] and the fact that the other ledges are "outside our field of vision,"[6] Toynbee does not allow relativism to replace his faith in the availability of an absolute standpoint from which a rhythm or pattern is discernible. To support his argument, Toynbee notes that three other observers, General Smuts, Gerald Heard, and J. Murphy all testified that such a rhythm is "fundamental in the nature of the Universe."[7]

The second instance of the explorer-image in the early volumes is found in Toynbee's discussion of the various theories purporting to explain the genesis of civilizations. The major hypotheses of environment and race are compared to thickets which have hindered the historian's search.

> We have now drawn the covert of Environment, and we have had the same experience as when we drew the covert of Race. We have not found the quarry which we are hunting, but we have fought our way through the thicket and have come out on the other side into open country again. . . .[8]

This instance could be written off as simply a stylistic device except for the fact that Toynbee goes on to argue that

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[5] Ibid., 196.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., 197.

[8] Ibid., 270.

this method of examining various hypotheses may itself be mistaken. He refuses to allow the metaphor to be dismissed as a stylistic device or to be interpreted solely in terms of the scientist who examines and discards hypotheses.

> A new way of knowledge is needed by the explorer in order to get out of the riddle of conflicting theories. In making a final attempt to solve the riddle that has been baffling us, let us follow Plato's lead and try the alternative course. Let us shut our eyes, for the moment, to the formulae of Science in order to open our ears to the language of Mythology.[9]

However, it is not until we reach the all-important turning point in Volume Five that the explorer-image begins to be used more freely. In the preceeding volumes Toynbee had worked out very carefully the "intelligible field of historical study,"

> In the preceeding investigation we have established the existence of societies which (unlike their articulations called states) are independent entities in the sense that each of them constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of historical study'.[10]

He had confidently set out to collect all the species of these "social atoms." History appeared to be a fairly straight-forward pursuit once the parochial elements like nationalism had been properly removed from the historian's method and vision.

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[9] Ibid., 271.

[10] Ibid., 51.

> In the light of these conclusions on matters of historical fact, we can draw certain other conclusions regarding History as a humane study. Its true concern is with the lives of societies in both their internal and external aspects.[11]

Now however, in Volume Five, the whole attempt is suspect because it appears as though "our approach to the identification of our twenty-one representatives of this species of societies was subjective as well as empirical."[12] Parochialism has corrupted the whole process, and the nation state which was the historian's earlier unit of intelligibility was not completely discarded, but was simply replaced by civilizational myopia.

> By enlarging our field of operations from the nation to the civilization of which the nation is a fragment, we have found it possible to make a study of History in terms of civilizations and their careers--from genesis to growth and from breakdown to disintegration. But the 'relativity of historical thought' has now caught us out in our turn, as we have seen it catch out the historians who have allowed their horizon to be determined by the narrower frontiers of some single national community or city-state; . . .[13]

Although Toynbee hastens to assure the reader that this mistake was necessary because we could not start our study except from within "the prison-house in which our modern Western souls are incarcerated,"[14] he well realizes the

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[11] Ibid., 46.

[12] Ibid., V, 373.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

implications of the new starting point.

> This point about the study of 'higher religions' is simple and self-evident; but--all the more imperative on that account--it compells us to make a radical new departure; for it requires us to relinquish the basis on which this Study has so far been built up.[15]

Toynbee is at the half-way point in his projected ten volume Study and the realization that 'history' may be something other than a "true concern with the lives of societies" now makes the remainder of the Study quite speculative.

> The best that we could do was to peer over the battlements and extend our field of vision, beyond the imprisoning walls, as far as the eye could reach. But we have come now to a parting of the ways in this mental voyage of exploration.[16]

In this crucial discussion about the change of standpoint, Toynbee repeatedly calls upon the explorer-image to explain the transition. The "parochial standing-ground"[17] upon which he has so far worked is compared to the "squat battlements of a national prison-fortress."[18] Then the metaphor is expanded to include the "falling walls of Jericho" (describing the failure of contemporary historical method), and the argument that the historian should emulate St. Augustine by springing

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[15] Ibid., 372.

[16] Ibid., 374.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 375.

out "of the shattered prison-house of the City of Man into the infinite liberty of an inviolate and inviolable City of God."[19] In order to strengthen the contrast between the old parochial and the new oecumenical standpoint which he wished to adopt, Toynbee puts himself back in the position of a national historian, a position which he had long labored to discredit in Volume One. Contrary to the boast of Volume One that this Study was not to be limited by the nationalism that had afflicted contemporary historians, and was to be a universal history, it now appears as though all this time Toynbee himself has been a nationalistic historian.

> The mental--or rather spiritual--feat that is required of us is to burst the cramping bounds of our English or French or German or American social prison-house--whichever of the nationalisms it may be that has been holding us hidebound--and to re-occupy the place that belongs to us in a greater kingdom which was Augustine's by right of spiritual conquest and is still ours today by privilege of cultural inheritance. If once we can escape from the parochial standpoint of an American or German or French or English member of a Western brood of nations. . . .[20]

The illusion under which the first four volumes was written is now clearly revealed, for the single civilization which "has worn the appearance of a fully intelligible field of study," shrivels up, in its turn, into an unintelligible fragment of some far larger whole.[21] Now the place of obser-

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[19] Ibid., 374.

[20] Ibid., 375.

[21] Ibid.

vation is not a ledge upon which the climbers have fallen, but is the "mountain-heights of one of the higher religions."[22] And it should be observed in this changed simile that Toynbee is not merely shifting the actors in the mountain climb from civilizations to universal churches or higher religions. This new use of the simile borrows only the language of the old master simile. The higher religions are not climbers but are the mountain-heights themselves. The higher religions provide the escape from the relativity of any parochial institution to the objective universal standpoint.

To round out the imagery of the historian as an explorer, there is a corresponding epistemological shift as the historian moves into the new territory and sees the past and present with a wider vision. The new standpoint does more than merely add in a quantitative way to the territory under surveillance; the mental voyage of exploration and the mental feat of shifting standpoints involves a "spiritual" feat. This shift in the historian's epistemology is compared to the adding of a new spiritual dimension to life, and is surprisingly enough accomplished "almost without noticing what we have been doing." The culmination and summary of this amazing tour-de-force in Toynbee's spiritual voyage is best conveyed in his own words:

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[22] Ibid.

> In a mental voyage of discovery which takes its departure from a church and not from some parochial political community, it is evident that the 'intelligible field of study' will be of an altogether higher order of magnitude than that of the single civilization which has sufficed us hitherto. Possibly we shall find that our new field also extends into a different spiritual dimension--but this is a possibility which we can now examine at our leisure; for, almost without noticing what we have been doing, we have chosen and taken our course. The Pillars of Hercules are behind us, and the sea on which we are sailing, is no longer the familiar land-bound Mare Nostrum.[23]

In Volume Six Toynbee introduces the imagery of the historian as a sailor who plots a course.[24] On this occasion the "course" is not identified with the historian's work as a historian but refers to the action of the whole society in which the historian functions. Here again the limitations of the historian because of his standpoint are clearly emphasized. Every historian is on a particular ship. He cannot predict the present position nor future fortune of the ship in any accurate and comprehensive way because he is limited by the fact that he lives within her gunwales. The relativity of time and place, implied in this metaphor, however, cannot have the final triumph and Toynbee turns to the task of explicating those patterns and rhythms which seem to be a fundamental part of the nature of the universe.

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 375-376.

[24] *Ibid.*, VI, 313.

> . . . may there not be some rough-and-ready means by which even we, here and now, can reckon, within a margin of error that will not be excessive for practical purposes, approximately where we stand? And may not a clue have been put into our hands by the acquaintance with the standard run of the disintegration-rhythm that we have gained. . . . [25]

Although the point will be discussed in another connection, it is obvious in this passage that Toynbee hesitates to apply his empirically established conclusions to Western Civilization. Whenever it would appear that the rhythms of disintegration are at work in Western Society, Toynbee avoids the normal conclusion of his premise and analysis by advancing the belief that an entirely new situation could develop and Western Civilization might yet be granted a reprieve.

In Volume Seven Toynbee's inquiry turns from the more prosaic comparative study of civilizations to the "necessary yet hazardously speculative quest" of investigating the relation between churches and civilizations.[26] The explorer-image is again appropriate because of the uncertainties involved in the task. Toynbee reminds himself that "error lay in wait here to ensnare observers born into this generation."[27] There is not only the limitation of time that hampers the historian at this point; there is the difficulty of

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[25] Ibid., pp. 313-314.

[26] Ibid., VII, 506.

[27] Ibid., 507.

"reading the significance of the Churches' past."[28] This, of course, involves the historian in a judgment of value and allows him to make only an "inevitably tentative judgment."[29] By looking for the "significance" of past events, the historian must go beyond the limits of an empirical approach, so again Toynbee uses the explorer-image to describe the historian's search for the spiritual dimension in history. Both Head and Heart must be persuaded to concur in this reading of the significance of the Churches' past. At this point, Toynbee no longer appeals to empirically verified conclusions but seems to appeal to certain extra-rational considerations which would make it possible for him to proceed to the last part of the Study.

> If a generation born into the twentieth century of the Christian Era might dare to look forward to a day when Heart and Head would have been reconciled by a unison of charity, insight, and faith, they might also hope to persuade Heart and Head to concur in a reading of the significance of the Churches' past; and if our findings on that point were agreed, they would provide a starting-point for entering on the last stage of our inquiry into the relation between churches and civilizations.[30]

One other use of the explorer-image in Volume Seven is of great importance in our attempt to understand Toynbee's

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[28] Ibid., 506.

[29] Ibid., 507.

[30] Ibid., 506.

Study. In an annex discussion of the place of the Bible in higher religions, Toynbee and Martin Wight become involved in one of their footnote battles. Toynbee quotes and seems to assent to an argument by Edward Meyer to the effect that the contents of sacred books are a matter of complete indifference to any fully developed religion and that "any book in the world may become a sacred book through some freak of chance."[31] Wight argues that this scepticism if adopted by Toynbee would be inconsistent with other assertions about the value of revelation in Christianity. Toynbee's retort is a lengthy "so what if it is!" in which he again employs the picture of the historian-wanderer. This tension between Head and Heart is a necessary part of the historian's quest, for "the painfulness of a tension between unreconciled dictates of Heart and Head gives Dipsychus no warrant for evading the pain by opting exclusively for one or the other of these two conflicting masters, so long as the price of thus cutting the knot is the deliberate sacrifice of sincere convictions."[32] Toynbee's basic uncertainty is heavily underlined by an elaboration of the explorer metaphor. The explorer-historian is compared to Moses who consummated a lifetime of toil and frustration with only a glimpse of the Promised Land. Here

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[31] Ibid., Annex, 754.

[32] Ibid.

Toynbee equates his own methodological dilemma with the spiritual dilemma of Western Man in the twentieth century and seems to suggest that his role as an historian is inextricably tied up with the task of finding a way out of the House of Bondage for his contemporaries.

Volume Eight contains a sustained use of the explorer-image by Toynbee in which he tries to harness the role of the explorer with the labor of the scientific historian. This section in the Study deals with encounters between contemporary civilizations, and their complicated relationships seem to the historian to be a "formidably intricate maze of history."[33] Indeed the thicket is so dense because of the large number of encounters to be surveyed that Toynbee searches for some favorable point of entry. He finds this point of entry in the recent experience of Western Society, for "this literally world-wide impact of the West may serve our turn as a 'bulldozer' for forcing an entry into the historical jungle of intertwined cultural entanglements which we have set ourselves to explore, . . . "[34] With this bulldozer the tangled terrain could then be broken up into manageable tracts, and a general map of the landscape could then be constructed.[35] So

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[33] Ibid., VIII, 106.

[34] Ibid., 116.

[35] Ibid., 114.

at this point the mere fact of the vast numbers of events does not prohibit an empirically verifiable survey being made. The element of uncertainty that does intrude itself in the process however, is the knowledge that this "preliminary survey of the facts" will be of less avail for our purpose when we move from arrangement of facts to the "ulterior purpose of attempting to analyze first the plot of the play, and then the process of psychological action and reaction in the relations between the actors."[36] Here is then a need for an explorer-historian who will go beyond the prosaic ascertainment of fact to the deeper questions of the meaning and significance of history.

There is another curious and complicated use of the explorer-image by Toynbee in Volume Eight when he debates the question of the "Relativity of the Units of Classification" with Prince Obolensky. The issue was not at all settled by Toynbee's heroic first volume attempt to find a unit of study which would not be subject to the relativisms of place and national consciousness. The criterion of intelligibility seemed to resolve itself into the question of whether a unit in history appeared to be independent and self-explanatory to the mind of the historian observer, or dependent on a larger whole. Toynbee says: "In the preceeding investigation we have established the existence of societies which . . . are

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[36] Ibid., 116.

independent entities in the sense that each of them constitutes by itself an 'intelligible field of historical study.'" Not only did this attempt at classification come in for sharp criticism by contemporary critics like Sorokin, but Toynbee himself disclosed its weaknesses at crucial points in his later volumes. The question of the significance of one of these "social atoms," a matter of utmost importance to Toynbee, did not appear to have an answer unless the historian could find a greater unit of classification to serve as a criterion for these civilizations. Thus the significance of a civilization was measured in terms of its contribution to the advance of higher religions in history.[37] The appearance and disappearance of the social atoms in past time did not suggest pessimism to Toynbee, indeed, "the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in a perpetual to-and-fro is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly 'a progress towards an end' and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own action."[38]

Toynbee had also raised doubts about the usefulness of these units of classification when in Volume Five these civilizations which were so proudly 'intelligible fields of study' now shrivel up in their turn "into an unintelligible

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[37] Ibid., IX, pp. 410-411.

[38] Ibid., IV, 34.

fragment of some far larger whole. . . . "[39] Hence, it is not a complete surprise to find at the end of Volume Eight an annex devoted to the relativity of these units of classification. Prince Obolensky and B. H. Sumner have challenged Toynbee's division of Christendom into three separate civilizations: Russian Orthodox Christian Civilization, the main Orthodox Christian Civilization, and the Western Christian Civilization. The arguments as to the limits of these particular units are not our immediate concern but Toynbee's response with the explorer-image is important. The explorer role is combined with the scientific role in this dual picture of the resourceful researcher exploring the "wonderland of History."

> The lesson appeared to be that all such classifications, analyses, and dissections were keys which were useful in so far as they served the practical purpose of opening locks. Any one of them would have proved to be a genuine key if it did effectively unlock a door; and some of these keys were good for opening more doors than one; but there did not seem to be any master key that rendered all its fellow keys superfluous by unlocking all doors alike; and therefore a resourceful researcher who had been moved by his curiosity to explore the wonderland of History would keep on adding to the bunch of keys on his key ring. Whenever he ran into a closed door barring the way to further progress in his intellectual quest, his first recourse would be to try whether any of the keys already on his ring would turn this next door's lock; but, if none of them proved to fit, he would neither try to force the door nor despair of succeeding in opening it, but would set about casting a new key to fit a

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[39] Ibid., V, 375.

> lock that had been proved by experiment to be one of a novel structure.[40]

In this imagery the "key" refers to the method of the historian. Toynbee seems to be arguing that history has a certain order and regularity to it (in this case the historian's problems are doors and not jungles) and that his empirical method has limited applicability. The novel or uncertain elements in the historian's task are accounted for by the reference to exploring "the wonderland of History" and the possible need for "a new key."

Toynbee the explorer-historian is very much in evidence in the Volume Nine inquiry into the "Prospects of the Western Civilization." Again the "exploration" has bearing on the problem of asking questions about a civilization which is still alive and therefore not accessible to the usual techniques of the historian.

> Thus in A.D. 1950 an intellectual prospector could enter on a mental exploration of the Western Civilization's future with rather more confidence than that he could have felt in A.D. 1929; . . . and the writer's own distaste for his present subject ought therefore to have been appreciably diminished by the intervening passage of two enlightening additional decades of history if it had been merely a recoil from the risk of a hazardous intellectual adventure.[41]

But Toynbee goes on to argue that his uncertainty is not caused by the unpredictable nature of history, but by the

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[40] Ibid. VIII, 673.

[41] Ibid., IX, pp. 409-410.

fact that his definition of what a historian is might be invalidated if he attempted to make predictions about the future of Western Civilization. The historian-pilgrim had been fleeing from the parochialism of his fellow historians for the two decades he had spent on this Study. The pilgrimage had taken him from the "naively vulgar native Western egocentric prejudice"[42] on a voyage of intellectual revolt,[43] which was also a spiritual discipline,[44] to the place where he hoped to "catch and communicate even a glimpse of the truth."[45] The pole star for steering the author on this intellectual and spiritual journey was the axiom "that all the representatives of any species of human society are philosophically on a par with one another."[46] Toynbee is convinced that his pilgrimage has been a success even though the axiom was later proven to be false when these civilizations were discovered to be "unequal as a matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in which the touchstone had been the part played by the breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of Religion. . . . "[47]

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[42] Ibid., 411.

[43] Ibid., 410.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., pp. 410-411.

We seem to have reached another one of those places in the Study where even Toynbee has a difficult time in keeping his value judgments from erupting through the facade of his empirically-established views of history. The imagery of the explorer seems to be used to convey the impression that Toynbee is a researcher who has been forced to make these normative statements by the inescapable logic of his long mental exploration.

In the brief but important tenth volume of the Study, Toynbee attaches the explorer-image to the question of methodology. While this volume might be dismissed as a "catch-all" for items which were irrelevant to the main body of the text, the discussion of the "Inspiration of Historians" has a great deal of relevancy for this investigation into methodological and procedural problems. Two sections are of special interest to us. In the first reference Toynbee carries out a distinction hinted at earlier in the Study. He divides the historian's task into two discrete functions with corresponding methods of obtaining knowledge. The task of assembling the data belongs to the historian as social scientist, and the task of ascertaining the meaning behind the facts belongs to the explorer-mystic. While the methods of the scientist may be adequate for the gathering of the data, the higher method of poetry is necessary because: "the meaning behind the facts of History towards which the poetry

in the facts is leading us is a revelation of God and a hope of communion with Him."[48]

At this point Toynbee sees his earlier intellectual difficulties of correctly reading the vast complexity of past events as a spiritual infirmity of trying to read history from a "disillusioning anthropocentric angle of vision."[49] One can say that the methodological problems of the youthful Toynbee are only solved in this "quest for a Beatific Vision."[50] This quest for an ever wider angle of vision has left far behind the superfluous appearance and disappearance of civilizations like the West which to Toynbee turned out to be "a vain repetition of the heathen,"[51] and in turn has provoked the sharp attack by Toynbee's critics on his anti-Western attitudes.[52] In this connection one may recall Geyl's charge of blasphemy[53] or Sorokin's criticism of Toynbee as the "undertaker of history."[54]

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[48]Ibid., X, 126.

[49]Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid., VII, 445.

[52]Douglas Jerrold, "Counsels of Hope," London Times, April 23, 1954.

[53]Pieter Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (April, 1955), 274.

[54]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 228.

The last use of the explorer-image in the Study appears in the "Acknowledgements and Thanks" section of Volume Ten.[55] In this passage he directs his thanks to Plato who taught him that he could go beyond the limits of Reason by using other faculties of the human personality. It might correctly be interpreted as expressing thanks to Plato for showing him a way to escape the relativism with which his contemporaries were afflicted, the blindness of an early twentieth century Western Zeitgeist.

Appearance and Meaning of the Explorer Role in His Post-Study Writings

When we turn to the lectures and writing of Toynbee since the completion of the major volumes of his Study, the evidence points to a continued and more emphatic use of the explorer-image.

A Study of History was completed on June 15, 1951 (at 8:25 p.m. according to Toynbee's precise notation) but the publishing of the last four volumes had to wait until October, 1954. In that same month Toynbee wrote an article for the Royal Institute of International Affairs to be published in the journal International Affairs. The title of the article was provocative and certainly relevant for he called it "A Study of History, What I Am Trying to Do." The leading argument is in harmony with the explorer-image and seeks to

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[55] Ibid.

emphasize the modesty, and the tentative nature of the conclusions of the massive Study.

> . . . we find ourselves moved, in our time, to take a new look at the new face of history as a whole. This is the origin of my book A Study of History. It is one person's impression of history in the new light in which we can now see it; and of course a number of other people have been tempted, by the same opportunity, to take their look and form their impressions. Each of these individual views will show the new picture in a different perspective; and since it has only lately become possible to take this panoramic view of history, the first attempts (of which mine is one) are sure to be revised and corrected and superceded as time goes on and as more people turn their minds to this exciting intellectual enterprise.[56]

But despite this elaborate disclaimer, Toynbee notes that at least one of his conclusions will "continue to hold good." The conclusion is that the Late Modern Western view of history has been wrong.[57] It is wrong because it was founded on a Jewish-Christian-Muslim view in which history "had appeared to be an act of God beginning at the Creation and destined to end in the Last Judgment, while Israel (or Christendom or Islam) had been singled out as being the people chosen by God for carrying out His purposes."[58] This view of history had been appropriated by historians of the eighteenth century to the present day with but two changes. The successors of Bos-

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[56]Arnold J. Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I Am Trying to Do," International Affairs, XXXI, pp. 1-2.

[57]Ibid., p. 2.

[58]Ibid.

suet had eliminated God from the picture and had transferred the role of "Chosen People" to their own particular West European nation. Toynbee argued that this view was now obsolete and a new view had to be introduced. The old view, "the beanstalk pattern of history," must give place to the new view, "a tree pattern, in which the civilizations rise, like so many branches, side by side."[59]

This argument of clearing away an old view led Toynbee to a discussion of the comparative treatment and allowed room for a review of the use in the Study of his "well-tried empirical method." It would seem that this comparative view Toynbee has proposed is the new view needed for, "This comparative treatment can be extended to the whole of history; and it is, in fact, the method of the human sciences."[60] Thus the new comparative treatment avoids the parochialism of the "Chosen People" view and allows room for all civilizations to be examined. Toynbee argued that "the human sciences, like the natural sciences, make a comparative study of their data in order to discover the structure of the facts and the events."[61] At this point in the article the argument developed in quite a deceptive, or at least very misleading manner. If one takes the paragraph at face value, Toynbee

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[59] Ibid., p. 3.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

has now committed himself to the comparative method and he uses the present tense to emphasize his faith in it. It is not as though he argued that: "I once thought that the comparative treatment could be extended to the whole of history; and it was, in fact, the method of the human sciences."

My argument is that in this case Toynbee is trying to gloss over a basic shift in his methodology by talking as though he is using the comparative treatment, which in fact he had relinquished earlier. The attempt to gloss over the shift in viewpoint is located in the verbal footwork of the passages in which Toynbee implies that he has used the comparative method successfully except in a few dark corners of historical study where he has had to go a little beyond empiricism by means of imagination. For example, this is the implication of the succeeding passage when he says that, "One of my aims in A Study of History has been to try out the scientific approach to human affairs and to test how far it will carry us."[62]

It would seem that Toynbee cannot argue both of these positions at the same time. On the one hand he argues that the "tree pattern" or the comparative method is the way to escape from the weaknesses of the old beanstalk pattern and that this pattern "is suggested by" the fact that in this age

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[62] Ibid.

our Western civilization has collided with all the other surviving civilizations all over the face of the planet.[63]

On the other hand he argues:

> My own belief is that there are some things in human affairs that have no pattern because they are not subject to scientific laws. One such thing, I believe, is an encounter between two or more human beings. I believe that the outcome of such an encounter would not be predictable, even if we had a complete knowledge of all the antecedent facts. I also think that the poetry and the prophetic vision that well up out of the subconscious depths of the human soul are not amenable to law. I think, in fact, that here we are in the presence of genuine acts of creation, in which something new is brought into existence, and this leads us back towards the Biblical view of history. . . .[64]

If an encounter between two or more human beings has no pattern the question arises, "why should an encounter between civilizations have a pattern and be subject to a scientific approach to human affairs"? Toynbee ruled out the validity of this distinction by his original definition of a society to the effect that, "the Macrocosm [the Society] is apprehended and acted upon by the Microcosm; and the action which is the theme of human history is the action of individual human beings on that common ground of their respective fields of action which we call a society?"[65]

With a trace of cynicism one might note that the

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., p. 4.

[65] Toynbee, A Study of History, VI, 230.

argument now comes round full circle from the old "beanstalk" approach of the Jewish-Christian-Muslim pattern of history through the tree pattern and its comparative method of study and back to the beanstalk approach with a few modifications. Or can some other interpretation be given to his concluding remark that "this leads us back towards the Biblical view of history which was accepted in the West from the fourth century till the end of the seventeenth."[66] In its simplest form the methodological situation could be expressed in the question: "Can Toynbee reconcile the beanstalk pattern of history with the tree pattern"? It would seem that Toynbee clearly adopted the beanstalk approach when he discarded the "axiom that all representatives of any species of human society are philosophically on a par with one another"[67] for the counter-position that the "value of the civilizations known to have existed up to date had been found to be unequal as a matter of historical fact on the evidence of an assay in which the touchstone had been the part played by the breakdown and disintegrations of civilizations in the history of Religion."[68]

It would be unfair to the whole argument not to

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[66]Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I Am Trying to Do," p. 4.

[67]Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 410.

[68]Ibid.

acknowledge the change Toynbee makes in the Jewish-Christian-Muslim beanstalk pattern. He tries to preserve his original pose as the neutral observer by stressing that the religious position he has now adopted is not the narrow-minded Jewish-Christian-Muslim standpoint but the broad-minded "Indian standpoint." He seeks to equate the "Indian standpoint" epistemologically with the comparative method of the early volumes of the Study by arguing that the Indian religions "allow for the possibility that there may be alternative approaches to the mystery of Existence."[69]

If this is the implication in the last paragraph of Toynbee's explanation of "What I Am Trying to Do," it is of course a specious argument. The touchstone of the value of the civilizations is still "higher religions," and the change is simply from the Jewish-Christian-Muslim beanstalk to the Jewish-Christian-Muslim-Indian beanstalk.

In a published lecture given at the University of Minnesota on November 6, 1955, Toynbee proposed to deal with very live issues for today's historians. The lecture was entitled: "The New Opportunity for Historians."[70] After introductory remarks about the distorting influence of time upon any student of the past, he comes to the crux of the

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Arnold J. Toynbee, "The New Opportunity for Historians," Printed by the University of Minnesota, (1956).

discussion when he argues that: "This new possibility of studying human life as a unity ought to enable us to embark on mental voyages of discovery that have hardly been practicable in the past."[71] To indicate that this use of an old and familiar figure of speech is not accidental, the two sentences following this quotation speak about "one of our first enterprises" as acts of exploring and discovering. Toynbee seems to be thinking of himself as an explorer in two senses in this curious essay. He is an explorer first in terms of methodology of history and then as a healer of the nations. As is customary he distinguishes himself from the more pedestrian historians of the present when he declares that: "For the first time in history, we now have a chance of seeing two things. We can now begin to see the history of the civilizations . . . as a whole, instead of being limited, as our predecessors were, to a partial vision of bits and patches of it."[72]

These historians who are interested only in the "academic exercise of disinterring apparently long-since dead and buried national histories . . . " are not only obsolete but are actually dangerous.[73] After a passing reference to the guilt of historians whose act of disinterring national

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[71] Ibid., p. 12.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid., p. 14.

histories "was one of the major causes of the eventual break-up of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy,"[74] Toynbee poses the rhetorical question:

> What are these particularist-minded nineteenth-century historians' grandchildren going to do for us in our generation? Are they going to drop on us intellectual bombs that will blow up the whole world, as the Hapsburg Monarchy was blown up by the academic activities of some of their grandfathers?[75]

If then Toynbee is not willing to be numbered among those historians who formerly were just obsolete and parochial but have become dangerous to the future of Mankind, he must break out a new path for historians. The "new history" is "to see all aspects of human life as so many facets of a unitary human nature, instead of having, like our predecessors, to approach the study of Man departmentally, by breaking it up artificially into a number of separate 'disciplines': history, sociology, economics, psychology, theology and the rest."[76] This declaration seems to be an open acknowledgment by Toynbee that he is in favor of a major change in the classical discipline of history. It represents the culmination of a dissatisfaction which was revealed in the early writings of Toynbee, and which was expressed in his view of himself as the explorer-historian.

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[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., p. 15.

[76] Ibid., p. 12.

Although we have not yet treated systematically the sources of Toynbee's dissatisfaction, we have pointed out that the general area of uneasiness centered around the problem of the standpoint of the historian. In this particular essay he argues that the new methodology he employs is "four-dimensional."

> When the parties to the encounter are not individuals but are societies, this four dimensional picture has to be provided by the historians; and at this critical moment in history, much may depend on the pictures that the historians are going to draw for us . . . and on the prospects for the future that they are going to open out before our eyes.[77]

The "fourth dimensional" view is also called a "spiritual dimension" in the essay and involves us in the nagging semantical problem of Toynbee.

We noticed earlier[78] that the "mental voyage of exploration" was frequently described as a spiritual quest, indeed as a flight beyond reason. In this essay the semantical indecision remains. Even though the exploration is described as an intellectual pursuit, it involves faculties of the soul, and must depend upon both poetry and religious inspiration.[79]

The second sense in which Toynbee functions as the

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[77] Ibid., p. 14.

[78] Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, 506; V, 375.

[79] Toynbee, "The New Opportunity for Historians," p. 12.

explorer-historian is in the relationship and obligation he bears to his own society. The historian has the possibility open to him of spinning "mental webs that will weave the tribes of Man together into a single worldwide family."[80] On the other hand, the historian's work may "heighten our inherited sense of being mutual strangers. . . . "[81], a situation so dangerous as to be compared with the dropping of an intellectual bomb "that will blow up the whole world."[82] One might conclude that Toynbee had finally capitulated to the relativism of "every man his own historian." Is it true that one should "write up" the past in terms of its good or bad influence on one's contemporaries? Even though Toynbee's overpowering desire for the vision of one world makes this capitulation a strong temptation, he does attempt to limit the relativism of the historian's judgments to the area of emphasis. In this mental web that the historian spins in order to bind man together, the facts are not to be tampered with in order to construct the web but the historian has a personal choice of emphasizing one or another trend in the past.

> The historians can emphasize past divergences and can present these as precious heritages

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[80] Ibid., p. 14.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid., p. 15.

> which ought to be preserved, even at the price of heavy sacrifices; or, alternatively, they can emphasize present convergences and can commend these to us as valuable innovations which ought to be fostered and promoted, even at the cost of considerable risks.[83]

One can sympathize with Toynbee's hope that the general effects of historians' work will ultimately be beneficial to international understanding, but the distinction between "facts" and "emphasis" does not appear to be a clarifying or a fruitful one to make. In summary, a reader of this essay might well conclude that if he follows Toynbee in his exploration of a new historical methodology, he will likewise become a great benefactor to mankind as one of mankind's explorers in the universal search for unity.

In a more recent discourse on the problems of historical methodology Toynbee discusses "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge."[84] It may be that the horde of "captious critics" has evoked this kind of response from the author of the Study, or may simply be the continuation of his previous attempts to overcome the problems of relativism. The format of the article makes it clear that the explorer role of the historian is of key significance for it is the culminating picture in the discussion. Toynbee proposes to set forth the

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[83] Ibid., p. 14.

[84] Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge," London Times Literary Supplement #2810, January 6, 1956, p. 4.

various limitations of the contemporary historian. One by one he identifies the items; the development of better techniques which have opened up vast new fields of research, the expansion of the historian's vision to include unlimited social and non-political areas of experience, and the overwhelming wealth of new material from the archives of government and business. These difficulties might have a solution, Toynbee argues, if the historian could use team work as devised by the natural scientists, or the computing machines in order to "read the secrets of human minds and hearts."[85]

If the historian tries to understand an historical event without being able to understand the thoughts and feelings of the participants, he is divorcing it from its historical context and hence making it unintelligible. But to comprehend the thoughts of the participants is virtually impossible for: "If the thoughts and feelings that occur in a single soul in a single moment could be recorded in full, the record might surpass, in quantity, all the documentation that has been manufactured since civilization began."[86] Eventually the historian is face to face with infinity because "below that circumscribed documentary surface there opens up an unfathomable psychic abyss."[87] Into this situa-

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

tion where the historian's ignorance is incurable because it is infinite, Toynbee reintroduces the explorer-historian.

> What is the moral that we historians should draw? It is, I think, that we should feel humble and at the same time be bold. We should feel humble in face of the revelation of the radical imperfection of our intellectual powers. We should be bold in continuing, nevertheless, to ask the perennial questions that historians are always trying to answer for the benefit of their fellow-men. . . . There is always a need for all of them, for all of them are necessary operations in mankind's never-ending task of trying to take its bearings in a mysterious universe. In full consciousness of the infinity of our ignorance, we must have the audacity to go on questioning.[88]

Even though the explorer-image has on occasion been made to suggest that the explorer is somehow reaching universally valid conclusions, in this case, "empirically justified conclusions" are seriously disavowed. According to Toynbee, "The kind of question on which each historian concentrates in his own work will be determined by his personal temperament and cast of mind."[89]

This modesty in the face of an "incurable ignorance" is difficult to reconcile with the assured tone of Volume One where Toynbee seemed to know the correct questions to ask.

> Our method in this study is empirical; . . . In our survey of societies, we have spent some time and trouble in rounding up twenty-one representatives of the species; and now that we are going to put our mustangs through their paces, are we

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid.

> to disqualify nearly half the stud before we have seen how they run? We prefer to let them alone and go ahead.[90]

Nor can this statement that the "kind of question on which each historian concentrates in his own work will be determined by his personal temperament and cast of mind," be brought into harmony with Toynbee's insistence in Volume Five that the questions he was asking were genuine and universal. These questions did not depend on the temperament of the historian but were somehow present in the nature of the historical experience.

> At that point we found ourselves contrained to pause in order to consider whether we were setting ourselves a genuine problem. . . . In this previous case we found that our impulse to dismiss a problem summarily on the strength of an abstract argument a priori was checked--as soon as we took our customary precaution of exploring the ground empirically--by an immediate discovery of concrete evidence which showed, in the mere fact of its palpable existence, that our problem was not an empty formality after all. The problem of the growths of civilizations was found to be raised in practical terms by the enigmatic but substantial presence, in the historical landscape, of five arrested civilizations, . . .[91]

While one can trace in this essay on the "Limitations of Historical Knowledge" the arguments that Toynbee has used to convince himself of the hopelessness of the scientist-historian's task, it is interesting to note that there is a

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[90]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 146.

[91]Ibid., V, 1.

suggestion that an objective historical view might yet be obtained. Even though the questions asked by individual historians reflect the subjective temperament of those historians, Toynbee seems to suggest that in the totality of the questions asked by the historians of different temperaments, there might emerge an objective view. After stating that the specific questions are subjective, he adds the argument that:

> It is fortunate that people's characters and intellectual interests vary, for this insures that historical questions of all the various kinds will continue to be asked. There is always a need for all of them, for all of them are necessary operations in mankind's never-ending task of trying to take its bearings in a mysterious universe.[92]

In following the imagery used by Toynbee to describe himself as an explorer and traveler, we have a final source to consult. It is his book, An Historian's Approach to Religion.[93] Up to this point, we have tried to follow as closely as possible the chronological order of Toynbee's writings in order to watch the comparative importance of the explorer role in Toynbee's thinking. This source complicates the chronological development. The frontispiece (Title page) indicates that the book was "based on Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the years 1952 and 1953." The preface indicates that these lectures in turn

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[92]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 4.

[93]Arnold J. Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

were based on some of the material covered in A Study of History. According to the footnotes attached to the chapters of the book, chapters three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and nine are based on the more detailed work in A Study of History. This information raises a question as to the formulation of the views in chapter one, which is the chapter pertinent to our present inquiry. Its composition falls somewhere between the Gifford Lectures of 1952-1953 and the completion of Toynbee's manuscript for the book An Historian's Approach to Religion which he has dated as December 1955.

The argument of chapter one has a studied inconclusiveness about it that probably reflects Toynbee's continued perplexity as to the historian's role and method. The traveler or pilgrim image is asserted at the two pivotal points of his discussion on "The Historian's Point of View." In the first stage of the argument Toynbee deals with man's place in the universe which he describes as follows:

> . . . every living creature is striving to make himself into a centre of the Universe, and, in the act, is entering into rivalry with every other living creature, with the Universe itself, and with the Power that creates and sustains the Universe and that is the Reality underlying the fleeting phenomena.[94]

The self-centeredness that is a necessary penalty of being born in space and time is in Toynbee's view also a moral

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[94] Ibid., p. 4.

error. So, "every living creature finds itself in a life-long quandary."[95]

This dilemma of every living creature is not made the basis for a profound pessimism by Toynbee for he hopes to escape that conclusion by attaching the dilemma to the traveler motif. Even though we are in this life-long quandary there may be hope in the deliverance of time. One might notice parenthetically that Toynbee's choice of a title-page quotation is T. S. Eliot's enigmatic phrase: "Only through time time is conquered." But to return to the use of the motif of a traveler, Toynbee declares;

> A living creature can keep itself alive only in so far, and for so long, as it can contrive to steer clear both of suicide through self-renunciation and of euthanasia through self-renunciation. The middle path is as narrow as a razor's edge, and the traveller has to keep his balance under the perpetual high tension of two pulls towards two abysses between which he has to pick his way.[96]

The pilgrimage of mankind in this simile is described as "Man in Process of Civilization." This phrase is not new in the Toynbee corpus and was, in fact, the commonly used phrase in the early volumes of the Study. But its appearance in his post-Study book on religion is surprising. To examine the reasons for the shift in phraseology about mankind's pilgrimage would at this stage be premature and would also tend to

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[95] Ibid., p. 5.

[96] Ibid.

sidetrack the primary investigation of this chapter, but it is relevant to take notice of the shifts in the pilgrimage simile. The initial volumes of A Study of History had many references to "Man in Process of Civilization" and the major similes were those of the climbers on the side of the mountain,[97] and the motor-cars on a one-way street.[98] As long as Toynbee was convinced that civilizations were an intelligible unit of study, and that a higher religion was the chrysalis out of which new civilizations could be born, the description of "Man in Process of Civilization" was adequate. Up to this point the process of civilization was significant and had a legitimate goal.

> Yet the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time in a perpetual to-and-fro is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly 'a progress towards an end' and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own action. This we know from our empirical study of the outcome of Yin-and-Yang and Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return in the histories of civilizations.[99]

Once "civilizations" become no longer intelligible as fields of study, the use of the term "Man in Process of Civilization" loses its right to be a descriptive term for Mankind's pilgrimage. At first Toynbee concludes that any fur-

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[97] Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 192.

[98] Ibid., 176.

[99] Ibid., IV, 34.

ther pursuit of civilization is merely vain repetition.

> If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion, and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as a good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this higher religion to birth before that civilization had finally fallen to pieces, then the civilizations of the third generation would appear to be 'vain repetitions' of the heathen.[100]

Once Toynbee turned to this standpoint, "civilizations" as a goal of man's pilgrimage soon became not only superfluous but a tragedy.

> It would be a supreme tragedy, on the face of it, if a fully-fledged higher religion were to compromise its own future for the sake of bringing a civilization of the third generation to birth, because it would be sacrificing itself to secure the reproduction of a secular institution which was not only intrinsically inferior to its religious chrysalis but was now also superfluous.[101]

So the argument moves from the discovery that any civilizations beyond the second are meaningless repetitions, to the position that these civilizations are actually destructive of the real goal of history. If "Man in Process of Civilization" continues in this search in preference to what Toynbee might call "Man in search of religion," then he is involved, in Toynbee's own words, in a "second Fall."

> Both the need and the opportunity for the epiphany of the higher religions had sprung from the failures of Fallen Man's mundane civilizations of the first and second generations, and Man's subsequent abandonment of his allegiance to a

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[100] Ibid., VII, 445.

[101] Ibid., 447.

> saving higher religion in order to go a whoring after a mundane civilization of the third generation wore the aspect of a second Fall.[102]

Toynbee concludes the argument with an attempt to distinguish between civilization as a goal of mankind's pilgrimage and the Commonwealth of God. He sees a "great gulf fixed between 'the open society' of the Commonwealth of God and 'the closed society' that is exemplified not only in primitive societies but in civilizations, . . . "[103] If this is a serious distinction in Toynbee's system, then it is difficult to understand why he reverts in his latest volume on An Historian's Approach to Religion to the descriptive phrase "Man in Process of Civilization."

In summarizing the first stage of the argument in An Historian's Approach to Religion we have seen the importance of the explorer-image to Toynbee's whole scheme of History, for mankind is caught in a cosmic quandary and his only hope of escape is to live and move as a pilgrim in the constant tension of two pulls towards two abysses. The second stage of the argument is the identification of the historian as a pilgrim through this constant tension of all mankind. The historian is the leader in this attempt to break out of an inherited self-centeredness because "the historian arrives at his professional point of view by consciously and deliber-

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[102] Ibid., pp. 762-763.

[103] Ibid., 510.

ately trying to shift his angle of vision away from the initial self-centered standpoint that is natural to him as a living creature."[104]

The constant tension which the historian shares with the rest of mankind is expressed in the statement that while the historian's goal is unobtainable, yet he can make some gain.

> The self-correction through self-transcendence, which is the essence of his profession, no doubt always falls short of its objective; yet, even so, it is something to the good; for to some extent it does succeed in shifting the mental standpoint, and widening the mental horizon, of an innately self-centered living creature.[105]

When we translate this conclusion into the language of the earlier discussion, we can say that Toynbee's faith, that he has discovered the rhythm of history which was somehow in the very nature of reality, has been badly upset by the evidence that the "shimmer of relativity" is not merely in the foreground. This shimmer of relativity, after more than twenty years of study, has now become an inescapable "human plight."

> When a human being looks at the Universe, his view of the mystery cannot be more than a glimpse, and even this may be delusive. The human observer has to take his bearings from the point in Space and moment in Time at which

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[104]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 4.

[105]Ibid.

> he finds himself; and he is bound to be self-centred; for this is part of the price of being a living creature. So his view will inevitably be partial and subjective.[106]

Consequently Toynbee's faith has been narrowed to the modest hope that "by comparing notes and putting individual and professional experiences together, the Collective Human Intellect can widen Man's view a little, for the benefit of each and all."[107]

There is a strong similarity between this argument and the one used by Toynbee a year later in the article on "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge." As noted in an analysis of the explorer-image in that essay, Toynbee greatly strengthens and elaborates the arguments for relativism and subjectivism in historical studies in this ignorance which is "incurable because it is infinite."[108] But he reserved, at the conclusion of the essay, the right to hope that because there are all types of people that "this ensures that historical questions of all the various kinds will continue to be asked. There is need for all of them, for all of them are necessary operations in mankind's never-ending task of trying to take its bearings in a mysterious universe."[109]

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[106] Ibid., p. 3.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Toynbee, "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge," p. 4.

[109] Ibid.

One other statement of his methodological dilemma ought to be noted in this survey of the explorer role in Toynbee. It is found in the closing arguments of the chapter on "The Historian's Point of View." The explorer-historian must choose between two alternative ways. These alternatives are views of history corresponding to the two abysses which confront mankind. The one view is the Buddhaic-Hellenic approach to history which "assures that the apparent rhythm of the stellar cosmos is the fundamental rhythm of the Universe as a whole."[110] To choose the astronomical view of History "provides a radical correction of the bias toward self-centeredness that is innate in every living creature." This would seem to be the answer to Toynbee's life-long search to become "an impartial Western observer."[111] It was expressed in the conviction of his early volumes that "all civilizations are philosophically equal" and the historian's task was to look for patterns or rhythms in the histories of these social atoms. When the crisis was reached in this search for the patterns of disintegrating civilization, Toynbee introduced the touchstone of religion by which the historian could evaluate the progress or regression of a civilization.[112] This turning point in Toynbee would appear to

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[110]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 10.

[111]Toynbee, A Study of History, VIII, 259.

[112]Ibid., IX, 410.

allow personal values to enter into the historian's task but Toynbee hoped to outwit the charge of subjectivism by arguing that he was open to any religious revelations which did not claim to be exclusive. He thought this could be done by adopting the "Indian standpoint" which allowed "for the possibility that there may be alternate approaches to the mystery of Existence."[113]

It is obvious that this argument of the "Indian standpoint" cannot be seriously advanced by Toynbee to convince the reader that he is still proceeding on an empirical basis. Although there is a superficial similarity between the position of "philosophic equality" adopted in the first four volumes and the opening of the mind to the possibility of truth in several religions, Toynbee is really saying in the second case that he will be open-minded to any religion which holds his values of the unity of mankind in the fellowship of God, and which denies any divisive or exclusive claims. But whether it be the Buddhaic Hinduism, Mahayana or the Himayana it has assumed certain values for life and for history past.[114] If this description is a correct description of what went on in the massive A Study of History, then the following statement by Toynbee must be considered as a summary of the conclusions he reached at the end of the Study.

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[113]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do,", p. 4.

[114]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 224.

> This astronomical view of History provides a radical correction of the bias towards self-centredness at the price of taking the significance out of History--and, indeed, out of the Universe itself.[115]

The other choice which the historian could make was to adopt the Judaeo-Zorastrian view of history. As he argues: " . . . on this view the fundamental rhythm of the Universe as a whole is assumed to be identical with the rhythm in the career of an individual human being. It is assumed to be a drama that has a beginning and an end, that is punctuated by crises and by decisive events, that is animated by challenges and responses, and that unfolds a plot like the plot of a play."[116] This view of history promises to give significance to past events and thus the societies which have held this view have rated the study of history at a high value. But the Judaeo-Zorastrian view offers us an "escape from one evil at the price of involving us in another."[117] The abyss which opens up for the historian who adopts this view is to relapse into self-centeredness.

Although two secondary views of history are proposed, discussed, or dismissed by Toynbee, he leaves the methodological dilemma unresolved and reiterates the theme of the

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[115]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 10.

[116]Ibid., p. 13.

[117]Ibid.

explorer-historian who must find a way between the two temptations.

> Confronted with a choice between these two alternatives, we may find ourselves shrinking from choosing either of them when we have observed the sinister side of each. Yet these are the two fundamental alternative views that have been accessible to human souls so far; and today a majority of Mankind holds either one of these two views or the other. The dilemma presented by the choice between them will haunt us throughout our inquiry.[118]

Summary of the Usages of the Explorer Role in the Changing Methodology of Toynbee

To summarize, let us recall our initial purpose of tracing the self-awareness of Toynbee in his historical works as he describes himself in the role of the explorer-historian. The use of this imagery in the early volumes was infrequent and highly tentative. Toynbee thought of himself as an explorer in the sense that he was breaking out of obsolete historical methods which were inadequate, a priori, and subjective. As an explorer-historian who now possessed "intelligible fields of study" the old parochial and nationalistic limitations could be broken. The "shimmer of relativity" could be pierced by the empirical method to enable the historian to grasp those rhythms or patterns of history which were in the nature of things. But as we traced the explorer-image we found Toynbee using it much more frequently and

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[118] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

significantly as the arguments for relativity appeared to grow stronger in Toynbee's thinking.

As the axiom for philosophic equality of civilizations is reluctantly surrendered for the criterion of religion, the explorer-historian now must employ a four-dimensional view of history and the work of the historian becomes a highly speculative quest. The historian must go beyond the task of the social scientist who assembles the data, to the task of searching for the meaning behind the facts. To ascertain "meaning" involves poetry which comes from the heart rather than the head of the historian. The difficulties of the explorer-historian are increased by the dangerous results that may follow from the historian's published study. So the explorer-historian ought to emphasize those things which will bind men together with a mental web.

Finally, the explorer-image becomes dominant in the most recent of Toynbee's essays as he is confronted with the haunting dilemma of choosing between the two views, both of which offer an escape from one evil at the price of involving him in another. The problems of relativism from which the early Toynbee was confident he could escape are now discovered to be part of the existential or ontological situation--it is an incurable, infinite ignorance. It is now part of the price of being a living creature. This is not to say that the later Toynbee is pessimistic about this methodologi-

cal dilemma. He seems to have the hope that even though the historian is a prisoner of time and space, somehow the "collective Human Intellect" will find a universal view of the past and present. Or, as it might be expressed, if all of the historians continue to ask all of the questions which in themselves are determined by personal temperament and cast of mind, the totality of the subjective questions might produce an objective answer to mankind's task of taking his bearings in a mysterious universe.

In the light of Toynbee's first volume observation that he was pitting an English empiricism against Spengler's German transcendentalism,[119] it is interesting to notice the transition in Toynbee as he pushes his methodological problem back to a problem of Head and Heart in the historian and finally back to a dilemma which resides in the nature of the universe. His hope rests now in some form of "self-transcendence." In its simplest form the "egocentric illusion" of Toynbee's fellow historians in Volume One, which he so strongly repudiated, has come back to haunt Toynbee himself who now declares that the historian is "bound to be self-centred; for this is part of the price of being a living creature."[120]

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[119]Toynbee, A Study of History, III, 382.

[120]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 3.

C H A P T E R IV

TOYNBEE THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST

"In the light of the political laws which we have analyzed above, we can see objectively that this ['dwarfing' . . . of Europe] is the natural and indeed the inevitable result. . . . "
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Three (1934)

Use of the Term "Social Scientist" as a Self-Characterization

Our attempt to understand the historical methodology of Arnold Toynbee through the metaphors and descriptive phrases by which he clarifies his own role, leads us to a second image--that of the "social scientist." In the first image of "Toynbee the explorer," we followed the passages in which he saw himself as a traveler in new methodological territory, and in which he emphasized the uncertainty and limitlessness of the data handled by an explorer-historian. In this new phrase we move to a discussion of Toynbee's specific objections to traditional historical methodology and to the new methodology which he proposes under the title of a "science of human affairs."

Even a casual glance at Toynbee's major work is sufficient to recognize the duel carried on in the text and footnotes between Toynbee and a variety of historians past and present. This duel, initiated by Toynbee, has been

enthusiastically continued and intensified by the historians who have been able to respond, as well as by several regiments who were not at first so engaged.

Some of the major engagements were with H. G. Wells,[1] Oswald Spengler,[2] R. G. Collingwood,[3] H. A. L. Fisher,[4] Edward Gibbon,[5] and Martin Wight.[6] But these conflicts are hardly comparable with the skirmishes in which Toynbee challenges whole armies of historians. The parochial historians, national historians, neo-pagans, Late Modern Western rationalists, antinomian historians, pedestrian historians, modern liberals, and humanists are one and all the object of attack in the course of the Study. Indeed, the struggle does not always continue in an unemotional atmosphere, for on several occasions Toynbee turns on his critics with such thrusts as "a chorus of derisive voices assails our ears"[7] and "an arrogantly hypercritical school of latter-day Western historians"[8] and "these notoriously captious critics."

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[1]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 4.

[2]Ibid., IV, pp. 11-12; IX, 66, 168, 700, 756; X, 213.

[3]Ibid., VIII, 100; IX, 64, 726.

[4]Ibid., IX, 195.

[5]Ibid., IV, 59; VIII, 80; IX, 426.

[6]Ibid., see footnotes throughout Vol. VIII.

[7]Ibid., VI, 149.

[8]Ibid., IX, 19.

After the completion of the ten major volumes, the controversy tended to increase rather than decrease. Few figures in the academic world have aroused controversy in so many and so varied quarters as he. Toynbee found responses not only in the historical but also the philosophic, sociological, religious, anthropological, scientific and popular journals as well, to say nothing of the many public debates occasioned by his publications.

There is some evidence that Toynbee was surprised at the vehemence of the response to his challenge, but he philosophically accepts it in his post-Study reflections by regarding the response as the necessary consequence of his radical methodological innovations.

> . . . the first attempts (of which mine is one) are sure to be revised and corrected and superseded as time goes on and as more people turn their minds to this exciting intellectual enterprise.
>
> There is, though, one negative observation that will, I believe, continue to hold good. As soon as one looks at the new panorama of history, one sees that it bursts the bounds of the current framework within which our Western historians have been doing their work for the last 250 years.[9]

The question of vital importance is: how does Toynbee in the role of a student of the "science of human affairs" propose to "burst the bounds of the current framework" of Western historians of the last two hundred and fifty

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[9]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 2.

years? Even a casual reader of the Study is likely to be impressed with the scientific apparatus, tone and proof that is offered in these volumes. Our task will be to verify this first impression of Toynbee's work, find out what he means by a "science of human affairs," and then observe him in action with this "sovereign methodological clue."

Recognition of Toynbee's "Scientific" Claims by the Critics

Not only is the role of the "social scientist" so prominent that the casual reader is greatly impressed, but the critical reviews and essays on Toynbee's work deal frequently and at length with some aspects of this role. For example, Pieter Geyl has made a persistent attack on the "pretense" of empirical investigation in the Study. Repeatedly he returns to a methodological criticism which he believes is fundamental to any consideration of Toynbee's effort. Geyl speaks of "the pretense of a scientific argument,"[10] or "the pretense of an empirical investigation,"[11] that Toynbee "has pretended to investigate the phenomena of communal life."[12] Geyl's criticism comes close to being a charge of hypocrisy. On one occasion he says that "Toynbee's

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[10]Pieter Geyl, Debates With Historians (London: B. T. Batsford, 1955), p. 158.

[11]Ibid., p. 159.

[12]Ibid.

refreshingly frank confession now implies agreement with that view [Geyl's argument that the Study cannot supply us with forecasts having universal validity]. I say 'implies' for in spite of his refreshing frankness he does not go so far as to admit that his work is not really the scientific investigation for which he has all along tried, and is in the face of his change of front still trying, to pass it off."[13]

Another critic of the Study hinges his discussion on Toynbee's claim to have developed a scientific view of civilizations. Like Geyl his criticism is that Toynbee's claim to scientific objectivity is not substantiated in the text. In concluding his analysis he observes that:

> Perhaps the lasting significance of Toynbee's study will be found in the stimulus it may provide, whether as science or fiction, for a creative response to our present challenge. Nevertheless, for want of recognizable modern miracle workers, the average human must work out his destiny with the best equipment at hand. It will not help him in meeting the present challenge if he guides his response by generalizations based on confusion, in the mistaken belief that they have been objectively and scientifically established.[14]

The same question of the validity of Toynbee's scientific method becomes the focal point of the criticism in the Times Literary Supplement of October 22, 1954, when the

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[13]Ibid., p. 165.

[14]John William Blyth, "Toynbee and the Categories of Interpretation," The Philosophical Review, LVIII (July, 1949), 370.

critic observes, "Such a diversity of explanations might not be unsuitable to a disconnected series of impressionistic essays, where they could be valued for their suggestiveness rather than their validity. But in a work that purports to be systematic, comprehensive and empirical the effect on the reader can only be one of bewilderment."[15] The same anonymous critic observes that "when we attempt to evaluate Dr. Toynbee's central thesis and to test its empirical validity, we find that we have set ourselves an impossible task."[16]

If these excerpts from the critics are sufficient to indicate that this is a major issue in the study of Arnold Toynbee's methodology, it is important to give close attention to Toynbee's claims to write history in a scientific fashion.

Definition of "Scientific" History

Any study of Toynbee's methodology is faced with the problem of gaining a precise definition of the terms he uses. One must not move too rapidly from the appearance of the word "scientific" to the conclusion that the meaning of the term is self-evident. The first and perhaps most innocuous use of the term "scientific" is to link it with an attitude or

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[15]Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 104.

[16]Ibid., p. 105.

spirit. Certainly Toynbee would wish to qualify himself as a scientific scholar in this general sense of the word. For example he states in Volume One that "our attitude should be not fanatical but scientific, and our method not dogmatic but empirical."[17] Again late in the Study he uses the word "scientific" in the same modest way to describe his spirit or approach to history. Replying to the objection of his anti-nomian colleagues that the empirical method is unsuccessful because the data is insufficient, Toynbee says of himself, "an importunately scientific-minded student of history might have found himself constrained to admit that an unconditional surrender was the only honest response to an agnostic-minded historian's challenge if this had been delivered . . . some four hundred years earlier."[18] It would seem that although Toynbee might agree with historians such as Herbert Butter-field who emphasize the value and importance of the scien-tific attitude,[19] he himself would apply the term scientific to a particular method for the historian.

As can be noticed from the Volume One excerpt above, Toynbee links together the terms scientific and empirical. On several occasions he speaks of "science's empirical method

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[17]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 246.

[18]Ibid., IX, 213.

[19]Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1952), p. 157.

of inquiry by a process of trial and error."[20] The multi-volume Study abounds with references to his favorite method. At first it is simply "our empirical method"[21] but in the process of the study it becomes "our well-tried empirical method."[22] The regularity of its appearance[23] is certainly part of the explanation why Professor Geyl reacts with such obvious emotion to the "pretense of an empirical investigation."

We have not yet reached a clear understanding of Toynbee's scientific method simply by noticing its close relationship with "empirical." To define "empirical" or "scientific" as objective observation in opposition to subjective a priori is certainly implicit in Toynbee's view but hardly exhaustive. There are passages in the Study in which Toynbee seems to define a scientific historical method much as it has been described in standard texts such as Langlois and Seignobos.

> Thus the domain of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that is, single and objective, exposition began to compete with the rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or philosophical ideals

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[20] Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, 489.

[21] Ibid., II, 18.

[22] Ibid., 101.

[23] See IV, 126; V, 1; VI, 261; VII, 2; VIII, 2; IX, 440.

of antiquity.[24]

Toynbee occasionally uses the term empirical in the sense of merely "observing." For example, he asks his readers in Volume One to content ourselves, "with observing, empirically, the phenomena of Challenge-and-Response in each particular instance, without postulating uniformity or expecting to discover a scientific law."[25]

On another occasion he attacks Collingwood's views of the Renaissance by turning to empirically-minded historians like J. B. Bury. In this case the word "empirical" is used in the sense of "factual" as opposed to dogmatic or a priori historical thinking. Toynbee says he agrees with the view of Spengler rather than the view of Collingwood but that, "this will not be because we have taken the hierophant's oracular dicta on faith; it will be because we have been convinced by the reasoning of soberly empirical-minded historians who have not disdained to argue their case by appealing to the relevant facts."[26]

There are other cases in which Toynbee uses the word "empirical" in the sense of observing facts or events. For

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[24]Ch. V. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos, Introduction to the Study of History, trans. by G. G. Berry (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1898), p. 300.

[25]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 302.

[26]Ibid., IX, 67.

example he seems to divide the historian's method into the "findings" and the "interpretation" of the findings, and in this case the term "empirical" is attached to the first step. On another occasion he says, "In any case, however cautiously and conservatively we may feel it wise to interpret the findings of the empirical survey that we have just been attempting to make, . . . "[27]

One final illustration of this use of the word scientific or empirical may be sufficient. Occasionally Toynbee uses the term empirical as the antithesis of dogmatic or a priori when he answers his critics by saying, "Wait and see. Our method in this study is empirical; and there is no particular reason at this point for proceeding a priori."[28]

But Toynbee's definition of "our well-tried empirical method" goes far beyond these occasional references to a scientific spirit or a method of observation, and it is only on this deeper level of definition that one can understand his whole polemic against traditional historiography. Two significant sections of the Study contain Toynbee's arguments about the use of a scientific method. In Volume One and Volume Nine he combines and explains the role of explorer and social scientist. The explorer-historian discards traditional historical methodologies and the social scientist

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[27] Ibid., V, 8.

[28] Ibid., I, 146.

supplies a new and more effective law-making technique for the modern historian.

In the Volume One discussion he characterizes the contemporary historiography which he is discarding as the popular view,[29] and as the antinomianism of modern historians.[30] Toynbee describes it as a nineteenth and twentieth century view which grew out of eighteenth century philosophy.

> . . . for the subsequent evolution of the film of a Late Modern Western Weltanschauung brought on to the screen the spectacle of nineteenth and twentieth century Western historians still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-century philosophers' tenet that History does not make sense.[31]

In a further description of traditional historiography, he labels it as "Late Modern and post-Modern," and applies it to the "predominant" school of modern historians.

> General statements, such as this and those that follow, about the tenets, views and attitudes of Late Modern and post-Modern Western historians are, of course, merely descriptions of what, as the present writer saw it, was the predominant school of thought among them; and therefore these statements, even if they were found to be correct in the main, would never be more than approximately accurate in the sense of being all embracing.[32]

Despite Toynbee's modest claim to be describing only

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[29] Ibid., 441.

[30] Ibid., IX, 173.

[31] Ibid., 183.

[32] Ibid.

the "predominant" school of modern historians, he manages to include a high percentage of historians among the traditionalists. It would seem from his hypothetical case, a few pages after the above disclaimer in Volume Nine, that most of the professional or academic histories are to be numbered among his opponents.

> It might be added that, in all Western universities mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era, officially established chairs of Logic. Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy, and Sociology were to be seen 'parked' side by side with no less officially established chairs of History, without any apparent recognition of the academically awkward fact that, if the intellectual creeds of either the professors of History on the one side or the professors of the Sciences of human affairs on the other side were to be taken at all seriously by the academic authorities, a decent regard for intellectual integrity would constrain them to rase from the parquet of their aula either one or the other of these two rows of professorial cathedrae.[33]

This frequent mention of the sharp antithesis between his work and modern Western histories in general is most noticeable in Volumes One and Nine. In the Volume One discussion of the very grave effects of the environment on modern historians, Toynbee sharpens the distinction when he says "This thesis of 'the Unity of Civilization' in this sense is a misconception into which our modern Western historians have been led by the influence of their social environment on their thought."

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[33] Ibid., 189.

Also in Volume One Toynbee relates the story of a "meeting of the Board of Studies in History of a prominent and cosmopolitan Western University." He stresses the prominence of the University on the one hand and the parochialism of the subjects offered and accepted for research on the other. The meeting was suddenly lifted from an insignificant to a symbolic incident for Toynbee when the Secretary read out a proposal to investigate the social and political conditions of India in the age of the Guptas.

> This train of thought, which went through my mind in a flash, was cut short by a titter which ran round the Board. 'May we ask the Secretary to read that name again?', said a member on my left; and, at the repetition of the word 'Guptas', the titter turned to loud laughter. I found that I was laughing too--at the laughter of my colleagues--and, glancing round the room, I caught the eye of an Orientalist, sitting opposite. Silently we signalled to each other that we were enjoying a private joke of our own.[34]

The "private joke" between Toynbee and the Orientalist served to emphasize Toynbee's sense of opposition to the traditional and academic view of the majority of contemporary historians who have been subject to the "egocentric illusion."

Added identification of traditional historiography comes from a comparison of passages in Volumes One and Ten. On this occasion the descriptive term is "encyclopaedism" or "the pedestrian historian." The mistake of the Modern Western historian is to apply the analogy of a post-industrial

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[34] Ibid., I, pp. 163-164.

Western factory to the task of historical research. He works then by "piecing together scraps of information, produced by a division of intellectual labor, in an intellectual assembly plant . . . "[35] The great illustration of this contemporary historiography is, of course, the Cambridge History series, a symbol to Toynbee of the "industrialization of historical thought."[36]

A final characterization of the representatives of contemporary historiography is that of "parochial" or "nationalist historians." Again the mistake of traditional historiography is the result of environmental influences. The Modern Western historian shares the egocentric illusion of his time, for "In the Western World of our day, almost every Englishman, Frenchman, Czechoslovak, and Lithuanian is influenced in his political feelings, thoughts, and actions by the irrational assumption that his own national state is a more precious institution than his neighbor's."[37]

An interesting corollary of this argument that the Modern Western historian has been led astray by dominant tendencies of our time, is the hopeful note sounded in the first volume that because the tendencies of our times are again changing "we may expect to witness in the near future

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[35] Ibid., X, 28.

[36] Ibid., I, 5.

[37] Ibid., 160.

a change in the outlook and activities of Western historians."[38] The change that he professes to see is a change from a dividing nationalism to a unifying ecumenicalism. A critic looking for regularities in the Study might put this optimistic prediction alongside a whole list of the author's once-mentioned predictions. Certainly this initial optimism that Toynbee expresses--the opening of a new era by means of his exploratory methodological journey--has been dissipated by the time he writes the ninth volume and sourly describes "the majority of his fellow historians as an arrogantly hypercritical school of latter-day Western historians."[39] Toynbee identifies specific representatives among the parochial, national, pedestrian, encyclopedic and antinomian historians. To him traditional historiography in its encyclopedic and manufactured aspect is represented by Ranke, Mommsen,[40] and Lord Acton.[41] In its nationalistic aspect it is represented by Monsieur Camille[42] and H. W. V. Temperley[43] among many others. In its antinomian aspect, traditional

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[38]Ibid., 14.

[39]Ibid., IX, 19.

[40]Ibid., I, 4.

[41]Ibid., 46.

[42]Ibid., 11.

[43]Ibid., 13.

historiography has two great spokesmen, H. A. L. Fisher[44] and R. G. Collingwood.[45]

There appear to be three reasons for the peculiar characteristics of the predominant school of modern Western historians. First Toynbee offers a psychological explanation. In the case of the parochial historian, Toynbee says that his Western misconception has psychological roots which are deeper than the temporary influence of a particular social environment. He argues that "at bottom, the misconception is founded on an egocentric illusion which is always and everywhere ingrained in human minds." While this statement may sound like the conclusions of a convinced relativist, in context it is greatly modified. What Toynbee apparently means in Volume One is that everyone has an ingrained tendency toward an egocentric illusion. This interpretation of Toynbee's statement is justifiable on the basis of the contextual argument in which he himself says that "we have learnt to overcome this illusion in our Study of the stellar universe."[46] His argument continues, "We have taught ourselves to discount the false appearances arising from our accidental point of observation"; and a little later, "Again, in our personal relations with other human beings, we have learnt,

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[44] Ibid., V, 414; IX, 195.

[45] Ibid., 199.

[46] Ibid., I, 160.

if not to overcome the illusion, at least to be on our guard against it."

In Volume One (1927) Toynbee is rather confident that the egocentric illusion can be dispelled by exposing its ridiculous assumptions, and by showing how the fallacy first developed. Toynbee devotes several pages to ridicule, introducing his samples by saying, "The best cure for such insanity is ridicule, and we can apply it by observing how exquisitely ridiculous our 'Anglo-Saxon' attitude looks when it is struck by other people."[47] But he rests his strongest hope that this egocentric illusion can be conquered on a new historiography. It can be said that his primary motivation for the lengthy study is his conviction that the "shimmer of relativity in the foreground" of all traditional historical thinking can be dispelled by a more rigorous application of the scientific method.

Toynbee's second explanation for the views held by contemporary historians is that these men have unwittingly absorbed strong elements of nationalism and parochialism from the two dominant institutions of the Western world--the Industrial System of Economy and Democracy.[48] But this argument that contemporary historiography takes its impress from two dominant institutions of the modern western world is

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[47] Ibid., 161.

[48] Ibid., 16.

double-edged, and hence is difficult to reconcile with the third explanation of Toynbee as he develops it in Volume Nine.

Here one must realize Toynbee is dealing with the philosophical roots of traditional historiography. He is trying to account especially for the antinomian aspect of it. The explanation begins with a discussion of the inadequacies of eighteenth-century philosophy.

> Late Modern Western minds that had risen in rebellion against the alleged arbitrariness of God now found Man usurping a prerogative that the Deity was deemed to have forfeited; for, if this was Reason's hour, it was also the power of Darkness. Even these ingeniously rational minds had not the wit to make the sovereignty of Nature affective in every nook and corner of a Universe throughout which they had now abrogated the sovereignty of God; and one of these newly created residual Alsatias which eighteenth-century Western philosophers ruefully found themselves compelled to abandon to the anarchy of Chaos and Ancient Night was the field of human history. . . .[49]

Toynbee argues that an inadequate ontology in the eighteenth century led to a defective epistemology, and this in turn made it virtually impossible to do anything with the study of history other than to dismiss it as unintelligible chaos.

> . . . but the Late Modern Western philosophers had now swept off the altar of Destiny a living cloth woven on a divine pattern; and, in hastily setting themselves to cover a shockingly denuded surface with their own blue-print of 'the laws of nature', they were disconcerted to find this

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[49] Ibid., IX, 182.

> paper substitute could not be stretched, however mercilessly they might rack the scientific imagination, to extend over the particular field of events that concerned Man more than any other in virtue of its being in the field in which Man's own life was at stake.[50]

After completing this discussion of the philosophical background of the eighteenth century, Toynbee describes the nineteenth and twentieth-century Western historians as men, "still clinging, in the name of Science, to the eighteenth-century philosophers' tenet that History does not make sense."[51] This third explanation, so difficult as we noted above to reconcile with the earlier explanations of Volume One, turns on the assertion that the quaintness of the traditional Western historians "lay[s] in their apparently weather-proof imperviousness to the influence of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-century changes in the climate of thought in their own Western intellectual milieu."[52]

The two explanations thus pivot on rather contradictory charges. In the Volume One explanation traditional historiography is at fault because it mirrors the general conditions and tendencies of the modern West, the Industrial System, and Democracy. These dominant institutions attained

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[50] Ibid., pp. 182-183.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., 183.

a supremacy according to Toynbee "at the close of the age preceding our own,"[53] which is designated in the footnotes as the two decades between 1860 and 1880. Thus, the "industrialization of historical thought"[54] and the "spirit of Nationality" have combined to make the historian the "slave of his clay."[55] It should be understood in this "explanation" of Volume One that the "industrialization of historical thought" is equated with the application of "modern Western scientific thought" to a study of human activities.

> The same method, however, has latterly been applied in many realms of thought beyond the bounds of Physical Science--to thought which is concerned with Life and not with Inanimate Nature, and even to thought which is concerned with human activities. Historical thought is among these foreign realms in which the prestige of the Industrial System has asserted itself; and here--in a mental domain which has had a far longer history than our Western Society and which is concerned not with things but with people--there is no assurance that the modern Western Industrial System is the best regime under which to live and to labor.[56]

In brief this application of the "scientific method of thought" to historical thinking is best demonstrated by the work of historians, who, patterning themselves after Mommsen and Ranke, "have given their best energies to the 'assem-

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[53] Ibid., pp. 183-184.

[54] Ibid., I, 1.

[55] Ibid., 7.

[56] Ibid., 3.

blage' of raw materials--inscriptions, documents, and the like--in 'corpora' es and periodicals; and, when they have attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into 'manufactured' or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have had recourse, once again, to the Division of Labour and have produced synthetic histories like the several series of volumes now in course of publication by the Cambridge University Press."[57]

A further explanation of what it was to employ the "scientific method of thought" to historical thinking is indicated by Toynbee's description of the seminar or 'laboratories' in which the major task is the "discovery or verification of some fact or facts not previously established."[58]

Toynbee's cure for traditional historiography as given in his opening volume is to discard somehow the impress of nineteenth and twentieth-century tendencies on historical thinking. Hence Toynbee's argument "has been leading us up to the point of calling in question the analogy between historical thought and industrial production altogether."[59] This faulty analogy has been most dangerous in the area of method, so Toynbee declares:

> In the world of action, we know that it is disastrous to treat animals or human beings as though they were sticks and stones. Why should

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[57] Ibid., 4.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid., 7.

> we suppose this treatment to be any less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why should we suppose that the scientific method of thought--a method which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature--should be applicable to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures and indeed of human beings? When a professor of history calls his 'seminar' a 'laboratory', is he not wilfully expatriating himself from his natural environment?[60]

Toynbee's objection is further specified in his argument that, "No practical man, however, would think of conducting a nursery garden on the principles of a factory or a factory on the principles of a nursery garden; and, in the world of ideas, the corresponding misapplications of method ought to be avoided by scholars."[61] Another term for this misapplication of the scientific method to historical thought is one suggested to Toynbee by Bergson, "the mechanism of our intellect."

All of this activity of the traditional historian laboring under the misapplication of methods to his field is, however, to entitle the historian in his own eyes to the honorable banner of "scientific historian." Indeed it is this very drive to earn the title which opens the door for the nationalistic spirit.

> To grapple with 'Universal History' on industrial principles is so evidently beyond the compass even of the most gifted and the most vigorous individual that, for a scientific historian, the

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[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 8.

> admission that unity could not be found in anything short of 'Universal History' would be tantamount to removing unity of vision altogether. . . . If, however, he could seize upon a unit of historical thought which was of more manageable proportions . . . and such a solution appeared to be offered by the Principle of Nationality.[62]

The explanation of Volume Nine rests on another charge against traditional historiography. If in Volume One traditional historiography is at fault because it mirrors too closely a nineteenth and twentieth-century social environment, in Volume Nine traditional historiography is at fault because of its "apparently weather-proof imperviousness to the influences of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-century changes in the climate of thought in their own Western intellectual milieu."[63]

In fact the charge is not merely that historians are "impervious" to the radical changes going on around them, but that they do not even observe these changes. The revised version of the plight of modern historiography is stated in this fashion:

> From this antique base, between the opening of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era and the middle of the twentieth, Western conquistadores [Late Modern Western Scientists] whose war-cry was the vindication of Nature's legitimate rights had already reclaimed and annexed at least four further polders from the Modern

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[62] Ibid., 10.

[63] Ibid., IX, pp. 183-184.

> Western no-man's-land of human affairs without being challenged, or perhaps even observed, by contemporary Western listeners.[64]

If the two analyses or explanations for the shortcomings of traditional historiography are based on the alternate charges of "too much influence," from the present, and "too little change" from an antiquated past, is the situation the same in the remedies Toynbee proposes in Volumes One and Nine?

In Volume One Toynbee protests against the misapplication of the scientific method of thought to the world of ideas. In Volume Nine the remedy for the ills of modern historiography is quite different. Here Toynbee asks the historian to follow the lead of anthropology. If anthropology had been so successful then "a scientific method of ascertaining laws of human affairs that had justified itself empirically by proving to be valid in this field of ex-primitive culture would also be, to say the least, a promising line of scientific attack upon the study of societies of the species, known as civilizations. . . ."[65]

Unlike the Volume One situation in which Toynbee expressed the confidence that the dominant note of our new age--the sense of being part of some larger universe, would bring about a change in the activities and outlook of the

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[64] Ibid., 185.

[65] Ibid., 186.

Western historians, by Volume Nine these historians appear to be beyond help.

> Mid-way through the twentieth-century of the Christian Era, most Western historians seemed still to be contriving to turn as blind an eye to the social scientists' successive trespasses on the historians' pointedly placarded preserve as a Neville Chamberlain had turned in A. D. 1938 to the Third Reich's successive aggressions in the Western World's political arena. In an era of appeasement the historians were allowing the economists to rob the Antinomian World of an Austria, and the sociologists to rob it of a Czechoslovakia, from under the Antinomians' eyes, without betraying, by even the flicker of an eye-lid, any consciousness of these impudent depradations that were being committed at the historians' expense.[66]

So Toynbee concludes that the typical antinomian latter-day Western historian is a relic of an old-fashioned-looking eighteenth-century Western intellectual environment, who ought either to "retire from the field or else change sides."[67] If he were to change sides he would begin by entertaining the contemporary Western scientists' hypothesis that "there are 'laws of Nature' governing the history of Man in Process of Civilization."[68] The way of remedy is for individuals not to hug technological chains but to follow the example of the social scientists.[69] There is little hope for

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[66] Ibid., 193.

[67] Ibid., 201.

[68] Ibid., 202.

[69] Ibid., 209.

traditional historiography for the real battle has already been fought and won. The culminating and crucial passage in the argument of Toynbee as to the remedy is the last paragraph of the section in which he attacks the dominant school of modern Western historians.

> Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the intellectual battle on this field had been won for Science by the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-combatant orientalists' support. As he saw it, the archaeologists had played here the decisive part that the Prussians had once played on a military battlefield on which their British allies had been bearing the heat and burden of the day. At Waterloo an Anglo-Prussian conjunction of military forces had proved irresistible, and the united intellectual forces of the orientalists and the archaeologists had similarly put the historians to rout. Under a twentieth-century spectator's eyes, these picturesque antinomian warriors had gone down to as ignominous a defeat at the hands of the disciplined champions of Science as their prototypes the Egyptian Mamluks had suffered on the 21st July, 1798, in the Battle of the Pyramids, when they had been mowed down by the well-timed fire of Napoleon's efficiently manoeuvring Janissaries. The impression made on the writer by the spectacle of this decisive intellectual battle was the experience that had moved him to attempt a study of History; and his answer to the challenge of the agnostics is presented, not solely in the present passage, but throughout the present work.[70]

We have deliberately sharpened the contradictory aspects of the two explanations of traditional historiography as found in Volumes One and Nine in order to clarify one of the methodological ambiguities of the Study. The contradic-

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[70] Ibid., 216.

tion appears to have two parts. It involves a contradictory historical explanation and a contradictory remedy for the dilemma of traditional historiography. The first contradiction may be partially resolved by seeing Toynbee's analysis as an explanation on two levels; one a psychological and the other a philosophical explanation. The second contradiction concerning the remedy for traditional historiography, a contradiction which revolves around Toynbee's "scientific" proposals, is in our view largely a semantical difficulty which can be obviated by a more careful analysis.

One may notice that the two explanations for the errors of traditional historiography are reducible to the charges that (a) traditional historiography mirrored, or borrowed, the scientific ways of the dominant institutions of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and (b) that traditional historiography has been impervious to the influence of a number of radical nineteenth-century and twentieth-century changes since accepting in the eighteenth century a false distinction between the "natural" and the "accidental" events in life. The contradiction may be reduced in part by observing that "a" is in the nature of a psychological account of traditional historiography while "b" is an explanation in terms of the philosophical roots of traditional historiography. But some contradictory aspects remain when the matter is posed as a question, "If historical studies do

reflect their social environment, (which was the axiom for explanation "a") why then are the traditional historians of explanation "b" so obdurate, blind and impervious to the influence of the radical changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?" While it seems impossible to adjust the two accounts in order to harmonize them, it may be possible to offer an explanation of their presence. The first account depends upon a derived motif which appears only in Volume One, and is there employed twice. It does not find a full flowering in the Study and gives place to the major motif of Toynbee's Study--the application of scientific method to the history of civilizations.

The two occasions on which Toynbee expresses opposition to the scientific tradition and a rejection of the scientific method have been quoted in an earlier chapter. In both cases he relies on insights from Bergson in striking out at the application to historical thought of the "scientific method of thought--a method which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature. . . . " On the first occasion he observes that we have picked up this fallacy from an industrial environment, and warns himself against falling victim to it. This warning was part of the initial chapter of Volume One. On the second occasion, late in Volume One, Toynbee revives his warning and then asks the question, "Have we not been guilty of applying to historical thought, which is a

study of living creatures, a scientific method of thought which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature?"

It seems apparent that Toynbee does not intend to develop a full scale antithesis between science and history. He opposes the scientific method if it means dissection, mechanicalness, and fragmentary treatment in place of the romanticists' emphasis upon synthesis, life, and unity of vision. Casting around in the immediate environment for an explanation of its origin he finds it in the contemporary industrial environment. Later on he quietly drops the theory of environmental influence on traditional historiography in favor of the philosophic explanation.

The second part of the contradiction between the Volume One and Volume Nine explanation of traditional historiography is considerably reduced when one realizes that the term "scientific" is defined in several ways in the Study. Toynbee objects to the scientific method as employed by traditional historians because they wish to limit it to "the idea of ascertaining the facts of Nature" while he sees a proper scientific method as capable of inferring the laws of Nature from an unprejudiced, accurate, and exhaustive study of the facts. Hence the bandying about of the term "scientific" on opposing views of the remedy should not mislead one into supposing that an ultimate contradiction exists, when a further analysis of the definitions of "scientific" can

resolve the difficulty.

The New Methodology Based on the Role of the Social Scientist

It is possible to see what Toynbee's new methodology will be by following his direct assertions on the role of the social scientist, and by observing his use of metaphors which describe the functions of the historian-social scientist. The annex of Volume One contains a crucial discussion of the new science of history that Toynbee is seeking to implement and exemplify in the Study. The lengthy argument, drawn largely from Teggart as will be subsequently noted, is directed against the "popular view" that historians are objective and scientific because they deal only with the facts as they are.

> Our survey has perhaps sufficiently disproved the accuracy of the popular equations between the employment of certain literary techniques and the study of certain phenomena of human life. Each of the three techniques--the ascertainment and record of 'facts', the elucidation and formulation of 'laws', and the creation of 'fiction'--is employed on occasion in each of the three studies: in the study of social life in civilizations which is popularly called 'history', in the study of social life in primitive societies which is the province of anthropology, and in the study of personal relations in the branch of literature which comprises plays, novels, and biographies. This shows that there can be nothing in the intrinsic nature either of the studies or of the techniques to equate any one study with any one technique a priori.[71]

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[71] Ibid., I, 451.

Using this scale of three stages, Toynbee argues that anthropology has now left the fact-gathering stage for the second, that of "law-making,"

> Now six or seven hundred instances of a phenomenon, while far from necessitating the employment of the technique known as 'fiction', are just enough to enable students to make a beginning in the elucidation and formulation of general laws; and this is, as we have seen, the stage which the infant science of anthropology has reached today.[72]

The question then arises, has "history" moved out of the fact-gathering to the law-making stage? To this question Toynbee answers:

> We have discerned that this smallness of the quantity of the integral 'data' that are to be found in this field up to date will account for the fact . . . that in the study of civilization hitherto the technique of fact-finding has been predominantly . . . employed.[73]

The future in Toynbee's eyes is fairly promising, for to the question "In the study of institutional relations in civilizations, where the known number of integral facts of the highest order has not yet risen above the modest figure of twenty-one, can we seriously hope to apply the comparative method without having to stultify our efforts by eliminating all certainty from our results?", Toynbee answers, "Wait and see. At our own peril, we intend to hazard the attempt."[74]

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[72] Ibid., 455.

[73] Ibid., 458.

[74] Ibid., 459.

In thus bringing together the role of explorer and the role of the social scientist, Toynbee manages to give a note of tentativeness to his methodology, but it is a tentativeness based not on a feeling of doubt about the validity of the scientific method but on the question of whether or not the study of civilizations is quite ready for the law-making technique. The proof of this assertion is in the argument which follows the suggestion of tentativeness in the "wait and see." He says that if the quantity of 'data' available for the study of civilizations grows beyond the present modest figure and accumulates ad infinitum, it will "not only become possible, without question, to employ in this study the comparative law-making technique; it will eventually become patently impossible to employ any technique except that of fiction."[75]

Before passing to later assertions about the use of the law-making technique in the study of history, it would be well to note the arguments Toynbee uses to support the new methodology. He argues by means of analogies with other studies that it is possible to begin a "science of human affairs." For example he points out that, "a science which makes a comparative study of primitive societies exists under the name of Anthropology; and no one doubts that primitive societies are really susceptible of being studied in this

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[75] Ibid.

way."[76] From this basis he goes on to argue that "the onus of proof surely lies with those who assert that the 'facts' and 'events' in the histories of one particular manifestation of Life--the species of societies called civilizations--are exceptions to the prevailing rule in being incomparable not merely in some respects, but in all respects whatsoever."[77]

In the same context, and arguing by analogy, Toynbee introduces an argument that has evidently been very forceful in fixing his enthusiasm upon the law-making technique. The argument appears in Volume One only in the briefest form, and with the most emphatic and enthusiastic conclusion drawn from it. He argues:

> While our Western historians are disputing the possibility of making a comparative study of historical facts, our Western men of business are all the time making their living out of a comparative study of the facts of life around them. The perfect example of such a comparative study for practical ends is the collection and analysis of the statistics on which the business transactions of insurance companies are collected and averages are taken for the purpose of making forecasts, is at the basis of almost all profitable business enterprises in the Western World nowadays. Now if, in practice, a comparative study of the facts of life in a civilization is being made with such effect that business transactions based on it yield profit, while business transactions that neglect to make it are apt to result in loss, this is surely conclusive and indeed superabundant proof that a comparative study of such facts is theoretically

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[76] Ibid., 179.

[77] Ibid., 180.

> possible . . . and in this adventure, at any rate, we need not hesitate to follow the lead of our latter-day masters.[78]

It should be observed that this argument runs counter to the three-stage development which supposedly distinguishes the three possible techniques. Toynbee had insisted that the only distinction which marked out the correct method to be used in the study of the phenomena of human life was that of quantity of data. History might differ from anthropology simply because it did not as yet have enough data to provide an accurate basis for the elucidation and formulation of laws. If it picked up enough data, it could then move to the law-formulating stage. However, if the data continued to pour in, the subject of History would move out of the law-making stage into the technique of "fiction." As he expresses it, "The form of artistic creation and expression known as 'fiction' is the only technique that either can be employed or is worth employing where the 'data' are innumerable."[79] Encouraged by this theoretical analysis, Toynbee does not hesitate to draw the conclusion that, "without question . . . it will become patently impossible to employ any technique except that of 'fiction,'"[80] if the quantity of data available for the study of civilizations continues to

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[78] Ibid., 179.

[79] Ibid., 452.

[80] Ibid., 459.

grow.

Toynbee tries to carry off this theoretic analysis by the hypothetical case of a future historian who had specimens of civilization to the number of 1,743,000,000. The conclusion is that "In this situation, the integral, intelligible facts in the histories of civilizations would really have become as unmanageably numerous as our present historians . . . erroneously suppose them to be now."[81] The clinching part of the argument then follows; "To require a specialist in universal states to identify our actual Roman Empire among the 1,743,000,000 extant specimens of the institution would be to set him Psyche's task. To ask him to formulate the laws implicit in the workings of universal states would be to assume him capable of a synoptic vision beyond the capacity of human intelligence."[82] Perhaps at this point in the exposition even Toynbee, who is obviously greatly enamored with the theory of three stages and the quantitative distinction, began to see that quantity of data does not have a fatal effect on "law-making technique." So the argument almost imperceptibly shifts to hitherto unannounced conditions. From the statement that it would be impossible to formulate the laws implicit in the workings of universal states [if the historian had 1,743,000,000 cases under

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[81] Ibid., 463.

[82] Ibid., 464.

review], Toynbee shifts to the question, "Then by what technique could this hard-driven latter-day historian communicate the results of his studies to his contemporaries' minds?" And Toynbee supplies the answer to his own question, which curiously enough fills out perfectly his theoretical three stages; "only, perhaps, by the technique called 'fiction' which our dramatists and novelists employ. . . . "[83] He has shifted from the quantity of data needed "to study" a phenomena of life to the quantity of data involved in "communicating" it.

This surely is an odd conclusion to reach--that "history" will someday become "fiction" because of the unnumerable data. It would seem from other references that Toynbee at this point is caught in the machinery of his own theory. He grinds out an answer to protect the theory even though in other passages where the theory is not at stake he draws no such radical conclusions. A situation of the other sort in which he is not trying to protect his theory is his use of the analogy of the businessman to the historian. Toynbee argues that if a businessman can formulate laws from his study of business affairs, then certainly the historian ought to be able to formulate laws in his field.

According to his theory of the three stages, the

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[83] Ibid.

businessman should be dealing with highly fictional situations, but instead of that conclusion Toynbee argues that the data can be handled by statistical studies.

> In embarking on our survey of apparent evidences of an amenability of human affairs to 'laws of Nature', it might be convenient to take our first soundings in the ordinary affairs of private people, since in this tract, in which fishing rights had been venturesomely claimed and profitably exercised by latter-day Western historians, the number of the data was apt, as we have noticed, to run into comparatively high figures, rising from thousands to hundreds of millions, and figures of these orders of magnitude are high enough, and at the same time not too high, to allow of accurate and subtle statistics. Statistically established uniformities and recurrences are capable, not only of being visualized in mathematical curves, but also of being verified by being put to the test of being taken as bases for prediction; . . .[84]

In the important preface to Volume Seven, Toynbee links together the work of the first two batches of the Study with the third and final group of volumes. The occasion calls for a reference to the method followed in the first six volumes, which Toynbee produces in this fashion:

> And happily in this case we are in a position to proceed straight from the formulation of our question to an attempt to answer it, without having to go through the laborious process of seeking, sifting, assembling, and comparing those historical facts that are indispensable raw materials for the empirical method of investigation that we are following in this Study.[85]

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[84] Ibid., IX, 220.

[85] Ibid., VII, 2.

This description of what he has been doing might appear to be the sort of process he has condemned in his initial attack on traditional historiography in Volume One. There he condemned as the "industrialization of historical thought" historians who "have given their best energies to the 'assemblage of raw materials--inscriptions, documents, and the like--in 'corpus' es and periodicals; and, when they have attempted to 'work' these materials 'up' into 'manufactured' or 'semi-manufactured' articles, they have had recourse, once again to the Division of Labour and have produced synthetic histories . . . "[86] The difference between the process which Toynbee adopts and the one he condemns as "industrializing" historical thought, is found in the phrase "and comparing those historical facts." If he had followed Dilthey in this Volume One attack on the scientific method beyond the irritation he shares with Dilthey over the treatment of historical facts as though they were "raw materials," he would never have been able to describe his method in Volume Seven as the "process of seeking, sifting, assembling and comparing . . . the raw materials." Instead he would have sought some method by which he could get inside the facts through "an intimate communion of the self with the mind of the individual studied"[87] or through a re-enactment of the

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[86] Ibid., I, 4.

[87] William Klubock, Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 80.

thoughts of the past in his own mind.[88] However we have argued that the Dilthey influence is a derived motif which Toynbee briefly considers but never allows to flower in his own methodology. Toynbee's romanticism is channeled by Bergson into an attempt to find the "laws of Nature' in an evolutionary framework rather than a mechanistic, life-less chain of laws.

In Volume Eight Toynbee provides a fairly clear-cut description of the way in which he sees himself functioning. The reference is located in an opening section called, "A Plan of Operations," under the sub-heading, "A Survey of Encounters Between Contemporary Civilizations." As he surveys the data to be used in this investigation, Toynbee asks himself whether or not the modern West would provide a good specimen for a comparative study. He observes:

> On this showing, a twentieth-century student of human affairs might expect to find the history of the encounters between the Modern West and its contemporaries comparatively unilluminating, for the same reason that had condemned the domestic history of the Western Civilization to be comparatively unilluminating for a study of the species of societies of which it was one representative.

Then follows the "social science" characterization;

> An imperfect specimen is manifestly not the best choice for the purposes of scientific observation and research; and, in the science of human affairs, there is this blemish of imperfection in

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[88] R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 282-283.

> any historical episode in which less than the whole story is within the historian's knowledge.[89]

In Volume Nine the argument about the feasibility of the application of the "law-making technique" is reintroduced, and serves to underscore Toynbee's conviction that he is developing a "science of human affairs." The reference reads:

> In thus establishing a third kind of contact between one civilization and another, the Modern Western archaeologists had done contemporary Modern Western historians the invaluable service of raising the number of known civilizations to a figure at which it had become just feasible to make this species of human society a subject of comparative study.[90]

The question of how much data the historian needs to cross the boundary between the fact-finding stage and the law-making stage goes through several rounds of inquiry. In Volume One Toynbee was not sure but that "students of a phenomenon of which only one dozen or two dozen instances are known can hardly do more than tabulate the facts."[91] By Volume Nine, his doubt on this issue seems to have been allayed. Toynbee is sure that "history" had passed from the fact-gathering stage to the "law-making technique":

> In the present writer's personal judgment, a stock of twenty-one significant data was just

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[89]Toynbee, A Study of History, VIII, 124.

[90]Ibid., IX, 118.

[91]Ibid., I, 455.

> sufficient to warrant a search for 'laws of Nature' in the history of Man in Process of Civilization; and, twenty years after the publication of Sir Llewellyn Woodward's book, this judgment had been fortified by the authority of Sir Charles Darwin.[92]

The comforting assurance of Sir Charles Darwin was that "a number no higher than ten would prove sufficient for a comparative study and for the induction of 'laws of Nature.'"[93] The assurance bolsters Toynbee's confidence to such a degree that he is able to mark out the year and the day on which the battle was won--the day on which "history" could have moved from a fact-gathering to a law-making study. His point is that the agnostic historian might have had a chance of winning the battle "as late as A.D. 1798, if his book had been out of the printer's hands before the 2nd July of that intellectually momentous year."

The opportunity of the agnostic after that day was lost, for, "Thereafter, in the present writer's view, the intellectual battle on this field had been won for Science by the intervention of the archaeologists in the long-since-combatant orientalists' support."[94]

In Volume Ten Toynbee includes a long list of "Acknowledgements and Thanks" and at this time tries to

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[92] *Ibid.*, IX, 216.

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] *Ibid.*

account for the origin of his science of human affairs. The most arresting note for this study of the role of the social scientist in Toynbee's methodology is the recognition of the influence of F. S. Teggart. While the entry is brief, and comparatively obscure in a long list of acknowledgments, it can hardly be overestimated in terms of a methodological study. Two aspects of the acknowledgment are important. First Toynbee speaks of Teggart as the one who rescued him from an initial methodological wilderness. He says of Teggart's Theory of History that "it showed me where to find the entry into my subject after I had been groping for it without succeeding in discovering it by my own native lights."[95] In a footnote reference to this period of "groping" Toynbee speaks of the original method that he tried in the summer of 1920 as a "false move" and a "failure." According to his description this failure was an attempt to cast his ideas in the form of a commentary on the second chorus on Sophocles' Antigone.

Teggart's contribution was methodological in nature, as Toynbee recalls, "The baffling obscurities in my initial problem of method and procedure were illuminated for me by Teggart's dicta. . . . "[96] It is sufficient at present to

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[95]Ibid., X, 232.

[96]Ibid.

notice that the method supplied by Teggart "proved to be a sovereign clue which has not only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through it."

Further discussion of the Teggart influence can best be undertaken in its own integral argument later in this chapter.

A look outside the Study tends to confirm the assertion that Toynbee constructs his break with traditional historiography around the role of the social scientist and the law-making technique. In the essay "What I Am Trying to Do," Toynbee observes that:

> This comparative treatment can be extended to the whole of history; and it is, in fact, the method of the human sciences: the theory of knowledge, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics. The human sciences, like the natural sciences, make a comparative study of their data in order to discover the structure of the facts and the events; and I believe that here the historians ought to take their cue from the scientists. The academic diversion between history and the social sciences is an accidental one which is an obstacle to the progress of understanding. We need to break down the traditional partition, and to throw history and the social sciences into a single comprehensive study of human affairs.[97]

Perhaps this sequence of claims will serve to demonstrate the frequency and constancy of the role of "social scientist" in Toynbee's thinking, and at the same time serve to sharpen the methodological trail-blazing that he envisages

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[97]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 3.

himself as accomplishing in a historical world dominated by traditional historiography.

In order to see whether the argument for the science of history as a law-making technique is more than a temporary polemic or a minor theme it would be well to explore the Study for examples of the new methodology in actual practice.

At the conclusion of a lengthy inquiry in Volume Two into the reason for the growth of a civilization, Toynbee summarizes:

> We have reached a point at which we can bring our present argument to a head. We have ascertained that civilizations came to birth in environments that are usually different and not unusually easy; and this has led us on to inquire whether or not this is an instance of some social law which may be expressed in the formula: 'the greater the challenge, the greater the stimulus.' We have pursued this inquiry by our customary empirical method.[98]

A little later, while on the same line of questioning, he comments:

> After finding, by our empirical methods of study, that, in diverse instances and variations of the movement of Challenge-and-Response, 'the greater the challenge the greater the response' appeared to be a working 'law', we then set out to discover whether this 'law' which we had traced inductively were valid absolutely, . . .[99]

In Volume Three the topic of inquiry is the criterion of growth. Toynbee discards the notion that the criterion of

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[98]Toynbee, A Study of History, II, 259.

[99]Ibid., 393.

growth is the geographical expansion of a "civilization," and in the process he develops a law which relates geographical expansion to social disintegration. He argues that: "This is perhaps the explanation of the law, which we have inferred from empirical observation, that social disintegration is a more favorable condition than social growth for geographical expansion."

Dealing with the reverse side of the coin, in an investigation of the disintegration of civilizations, Toynbee again refers to the law that he has found by an empirical method; "and this accounts for an apparent 'law'--which has been revealed in another context by an empirical survey--to the effect that the geographical expansion of a civilization is apt to go hand in hand with its social disintegration."[100]

Later in Volume Five two laws emerge from an empirical survey of the process of disintegration. The conclusion of the investigation reads:

> It will be seen that this history of Islam is a special case which does not invalidate the general results of our inquiry. In general we are evidently justified in concluding from an empirical survey that, for external proletariats and for dominant minorities alike, an alien inspiration is a curse . . . [101]

The footnote to the above passage more precisely identifies

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[100] Ibid., V, 200.

[101] Ibid., 359.

the "general results" as social 'laws', for in the words of Toynbee, "The history of Islam is also a special case in respect of another social 'law' to the effect that religions bring ruin on themselves by going into politics."

In the annex of Volume Five which contains supplemental studies on the above inferred laws, he comments at greater length on the relation of religion to politics. Without entering into the merits of the argument it is still possible to observe Toynbee's intention of bringing a "rule" or proposition or social law from the empirical survey. He says:

> The diversity in the fortunes of the several fractions of the Western Christian Church in the Modern Age of our Western History is a piece of evidence which would appear to complete our empirical proof of the proposition that a religion stands to lose far more than it can hope to gain by asking for, or submitting to, the patronage of the civil power. There is, however, one conspicuous exception to this apparent rule which will have to be accounted for before the rule can be allowed to pass muster; . . . [102]

An additional methodological note in the same discussion emphasizes the intention of the author to develop a rule without exceptions. After laboring through an extended explanation of why Islam appears to be an exception to the social 'law', he concludes that in reality it is not, "If the facts that have now been set forth may be considered to

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[102] Ibid., 672.

account satisfactorily for the exception which Islam might appear at first sight to present to our empirically established general rule, . . . "[103]

The Volume Six investigation of the process of disintegration leads to a further formulation of the laws of history. With regard to the attempts of "would-be saviours" to rescue their disintegrating society by means of a program of Archaism or Futurism, Toynbee enters into a long survey, with the following results:

> After this review of would-be saviours with the 'time-machine' who have taken the direction of archaism, we must complete our present survey by reviewing their futurist counterparts; . . . To begin with, we have seen that it is in the very nature of Archaism to defeat itself by breaking down into Futurism; and we have just been giving ourselves an empirical demonstration of the working of this historical 'law' in our survey. . . . [104]

In the discussion of the attempts of the Futurist to borrow some cultural element from another civilization in order to save his own society, the distraight Futurist is face to face with another law already examined by Toynbee.

> The impossibility of borrowing this or that element of an alien culture at choice, without eventually making an unconditional surrender to the intrusive alien force, is a fundamental law of the contact of cultures which is examined in this Study in other places. In the present context we are only concerned with this 'law' in so far as it throws light upon the

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[103] Ibid., 679.

[104] Ibid., VI, 228.

> cause of the change of orientation from Archaism to Futurism . . . [105]

The footnote to this passage refers to an earlier survey in which Toynbee felt he had discovered another historical law. The note reads, "For the particular operation of this law in the intercourse between an external proletariat and a dominant minority across the stationary frontier of a universal state see . . . Vol. V, pp. 459-80. . . . "[106]

In a Volume Seven discussion of the causes of regression from a higher religion to a secular civilization, Toynbee again tries to frame the results of his survey in terms of historical laws.

> We have noticed that the successive milestones in Man's spiritual advance that are inscribed with the names of Abraham, Moses, the Prophets, and Christ all stand at points where a surveyor of the course of secular civilization would report breaks in the road and breakdowns in the traffic; and the empirical evidence has given us reason to believe that this coincidence of high points in Man's religious history with low points in his secular history may be one of the 'laws' of Man's terrestrial life. If so we should expect also to find evidence of the working of a converse 'law' that the high points in secular history coincide with low points in religious history.[107]

The issue of behavior in a disintegrating civilization is raised once again in Volume Eight. The context of the discussion is the question of the consequences of encoun-

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[105] Ibid., 229.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., VII, 551.

ters between civilizations. When an aggressive culture encounters a civilization in the process of disintegration, it stimulates various kinds of responses, among which, according to Toynbee's calculations, are the Zealot and Herodian types of responses. Toynbee now begins a survey of the Zealots and Herodians similar to his Volume Six survey of would-be saviours. In the course of the survey he makes references to an "empirically established social law" of an earlier investigation. The substance of the argument is interesting but not relevant to the present task. As part of the argument he seeks to gain Owen Lattimore's concurrence in the judgment that "the latter-day Japanese importers of Western cultural wares were deceiving themselves in so far as they seriously expected to succeed, by the sophisticated means of a nicely calculated and strictly regulated dole of cultural rations, in eluding our empirically established social 'law' that, when once a society's defences have been penetrated by the radiation of an intrusive alien culture, 'one thing leads to another' inexorably until, willy nilly, the assembled party has to resign himself to adapting the assailant's way of life in toto."[108]

It may be instructive also to observe that these historical laws are reflections of the workings of law in the

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[108] Ibid., VIII, 594.

realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature. The identification is made in the same discussion examined above, when Toynbee sets out a plan of operation.

> It will be convenient to examine the working of these two apparent 'laws' of cultural radiation-and-reception in the order in which we have just introduced them; and in considering first the 'law' that a culture-element which has been harmless at home is apt to work havoc if it is isolated and exported, we may begin by observing that the operation of this law is familiar to us in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature.[109]

The examples of this law in the realms of Physical Life and Inanimate Nature are poorly chosen, and only superficially analogous to the laws of the social structure. For example Toynbee sees in the splitting of the structure of the atom an illustration of the law that "one man's meat is another man's poison." In the matter of civilizations the social 'law' comes into effect when the besieged society "borrows" an element from the besieging society. In the illustration from nature as given by Toynbee there is the possibility of comparing the social situation to the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in which case one would have to argue that the Japanese "borrowed" one element of a "hitherto innocuous substance" and therefore "our meat became their poison." The other possible analogy is to think of the integral atom as the "elixir of Life" as

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[109] Ibid., 530.

long as it remained in its structural pattern--in an equilibrium of forces; but as a Pandora's box when the latent physical energy was released through the splitting of an atom. Both of these possible explanations of Toynbee's social-natural law are difficult to accept. In the first case the splitting of the atom can be either disastrous or beneficial, whether the splitting is done by the Japanese or the Americans. It can hardly be the working of a law to the effect that what is one man's meat is another man's poison. In the second case the same antithesis of "meat" and "poison" breaks down. If society is like the structure of an atom, and if the splitting of the atom is disastrous for itself as well as anything in the neighborhood, then it follows that if a neighboring society "borrowed" an element from an intact society it would blow up both the besieged and the besieging societies. The splitting of the atom in this case is "poison" for both.

One final instance of Toynbee's search for historical laws by means of an empirical survey may be found in Volume Nine. In the "Plan of Operation" section the usual methodological explanation is stated as follows:

> Let us first see how many instances we can collect of renaissances within the meaning of the term as we have now defined it, and then let us go on to use the results of this survey as the basis for an analytical study of this species of encounter by

means of the comparative method of investigation.[110]

In this attempt to test the full meaning of Toynbee's role as a social scientist, it is relevant to examine not only the direct assertions of his "scientific" methodology but to look at the series of metaphors Toynbee uses to describe his fact-gathering and law-making technique.

An approach to these scientific "images" may well be made through an attack which Toynbee launches on contemporary Western historians. He explains that the "distracted latter-day Western historians" are so badly off because they are prisoners of an obsolescent technique and a delusion. The situation is simply that the historians think they have too many facts. In Toynbee's words, "The more confident they became of their technical ability to handle the facts, the less confident they remained of their intellectual ability to apprehend these facts, not to speak of making any sense out of them; and these two conflicting psychological forces found their resolution in a concentration on professional technique both as an end in itself and as a mental city of refuge."[111] The close relationship between the illusion of the modern historian to the effect that he was confronted with a "universe of an incomprehensible complexity" and the old methodology of "fact-gathering" is explained by Toynbee. Actually

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[110] Ibid., IX, 6.

[111] Ibid., 208.

the obscurantist technique seems to be the cause of the contemporary antinomianism. This is expressed rather plainly in the statement that:

> The nightmare vision of Reality from which they were seeking shelter in the sand-heap of technique was an illusion generated by this obscurantist technique itself. The apparent dissolution of a once stable world into a Protean chaos of infinitesimally small vagrant electrons, which would re-form into an infinitely complex universe if they were ever to re-form at all, was not the apocalypse of an appalling Reality; it was the illusory optical effect of a distortingly diffractive lens.[112]

Against this distortion and delusion of traditional historiography Toynbee posits a "single" solution. In his words, "the nightmare could be dispelled in an instant by the single salutary act of dropping this delusively sophisticated apparatus and reverting to the effective use of the naked eye."[113] One would like to believe that it were this simple, but of course the antithesis in the passage is largely rhetorical. What Toynbee evidently refers to is not the adoption of some extreme form of naive realism, but that the historian ought to look for the integral fact rather than the complexity of numberless events. Agreement on the "integral fact" is assumed by Toynbee in this recommended solution for the distraught Western historian. Throughout the Study this "simple salutary act" of "reverting to the effective use of

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[112] Ibid., 209.

[113] Ibid.

the naked eye" is employed in a number of interesting methodological metaphors.

One of the first to appear is a comparison of civilizations with mustangs in a performance test. The historian in this instance is an observer and the image carries the clear implication that objectivity and law-making are natural results of observation.

> In our survey of societies, we have spent some time and trouble in rounding up twenty-one representatives of the species; and now that we are going to put our mustangs through their paces, are we to disqualify nearly half the stud before we have seen how they run? . . . Whatever may happen, we shall learn more about horseflesh by watching each and all of them in action, seeing how they shape, and comparing their performances than we can expect to learn if we make an arbitrary selection beforehand on points.[114]

The use of this social science imagery suggests that the new historiography is not concerned with the gathering of facts about the mustang as an individual animal, but rather in a comparative study or "law-making" study about mustangs in general. Of course the assumption that civilizations are the true "integral facts" and are therefore as comparable as a herd of mustangs underlies the whole passage.

A second interesting simile of the social science variety is located in Volume One. The simile is introduced in order to avoid value judgments in assessing the worth of

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[114] Ibid., I, 146.

civilizations. "Value," to Toynbee "is intrinsically subjective,"[115] and he wishes to avoid any form of the egocentric illusion. His escape from this egocentric illusion is gained by turning to the comparative method. He reasons that "In order to obtain a value-scale for civilizations which, instead of being simply relative, is in some sense absolute, we must compare them in respect of value, not only with one another, but also on the one hand with the common goal of their endeavors, and on the other hand with the primitive societies from which they are distinguished by a common specific difference."[116] The simile which expresses this comparative study, again implies that the historian need only observe and compare the respective performances of the "integral facts" of the past. In this case the civilications are pictured as motorcars on a "one-way street." The comparison follows:

> If we apply this simile to our twenty-one civilizations, we see that none of them to our knowledge, has ever yet succeeded in travelling over the whole length of the street and passing out through the exit; and that fourteen of them have come to grief by reversing, in defiance of the rule, before they had completed their transit and then either colliding with one another or being warned off the road as dangers to the public.[117]

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[115] Ibid., 175.

[116] Ibid., 176.

[117] Ibid.

The assumption implicit in this simile is that the "common goal of civilizations" is somehow empirically determined and universally agreed upon. In the light of Toynbee's later radical reversal of view that civilization's raison d'etre is to give birth to higher religions and then to disappear, this early view about his ability to avoid value judgments is somewhat optimistic and naive.

A third simile of methodological significance is introduced in Volume One and developed in Volume Three. In line with the two common features of these similes, as noted above, Toynbee expresses the objectivity of the scientific observer, and the hope of developing a comparative study of civilizations in the simile of the rock-climbers. The simile has many applications for the author of the Study which are not relevant to our methodological interests. It is important to notice the relation of the "observer" to the civilizations rather than the action of the civilizations themselves. The simile is as follows:

> Primitive societies, as we know them by direct observation, may be likened to people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountain-side, with a precipice below and a precipice above; civilizations may be likened to comparisons of these 'Sleepers of Ephesus' who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb on up the face of the cliff; while we, for our part, may liken ourselves to observers whose field of vision is limited to the ledges and to the foot of the upper precipice and who have come upon the scene at the moment when the different members of the party happen to be in these respec-

tive postures and positions.[118]

This simile is in most respects a companion to the "one-way street" simile, especially with regard to the relation of the historian to his history, for as Toynbee comments, "We are watching, here, under a new guise, the same spectacle that we watched before when we saw civilizations in the likeness of drivers seeking to pass out through the exit from a one-way street."[119]

In Volume Three the rock-climber simile takes even a stronger methodological turn. Here it is employed to stop a trend toward relativism which has been developing throughout the section on "Differentiation Through Growth." Toynbee had been bringing together in this section numerous instances of variety in the experience of different civilizations.[120] Turning from the varieties of historical studies to the variety of artistic styles in the different civilizations, he finds himself in agreement with Spengler that "every Society in process of civilization creates a unique and unmistakable artistic style of its own." Toynbee finds it difficult to resist the surging relativisms of Spengler who "maintains that the relativity which we have recognized in the domains of Art and of Historical Thought is also recognizable in the

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[118] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

[119] Ibid., 193.

[120] Ibid., III, 378.

domains of Mathematics and of Physical Science; and he even imports his dogma of relativity into the Kantian Categories of Thought in general, and into the realm of Ethics into the bargain."[121] The counter-attack is directed against Spengler's claim that civilizations have an absolute qualitative difference, a position which would wreck the foundations of Toynbee's "comparative, law-making technqiue." So Toynbee checks the "magnificent logic" of this "formidable antagonist" with the assertion of his own position:

> If a civilization is a movement from one kind of being to another, and it is not a thing in itself, then surely, again, it cannot be absolutely unique. Logic or no logic, we cannot follow Spengler as far as this.[122]

Toynbee concludes Volume Three, which was published with Volumes One and Two as the first major installment of the Study, with a statement of confidence in his scientific methodology.[123]

His optimism in the opening chapter of Volume One to the effect that there must be "some constant and absolute object of historical thought" behind the "shimmer of relativity," is reintroduced by an expression of the same hope of outwitting relativity through the law-making technique. He introduces the simile of the rock-climbers with the plea:

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[121] Ibid., 380.

[122] Ibid., 383.

[123] Ibid., 390.

> Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point once again, [that the study of history is governed by the dominant tendencies of time and place] we should be ending this part of our Study on a false note; for, as we have observed in our critique on the concept of Race, the variety that is manifested in Human Nature and in human life and institutions is a superficial phenomenon which masks, without impairing, an underlying unity.

Then he launches immediately into the simile of the rock-climbers:

> We have compared our civilizations to rock-climbers; and on the showing of this simile the several climbers, though they are certainly separate individuals, are also representatives of a single species and are all engaged upon an identical enterprise. They are all attempting to scale the face of the same cliff from the same starting-place on a ledge below towards the same goal on a ledge above. The underlying unity is apparent here; . . .[124]

Even though we are engaged at this point primarily in an elucidation of the "Social Science" role in the Study, a passing criticism of this simile may be in order. The simile is quite misleading if it is supposed to make "apparent" the "underlying unity." The notion of unity is really conveyed by speaking of civilizations as "people." Once having made this assumption, then one can argue by analogy that just as the variety of races is a superficial masking of the underlying unity of humanity, so the variety of civilizations masks the underlying fact that they are all of one mankind.

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[124] Ibid.

It is strange to find Toynbee using this argument by analogy because he repudiated it in an earlier context when he refused to go along with Spengler's organismic view of culture.[125]

The other basis of "underlying unity" is the common goal or "identical enterprise" of this single species of civilizations. Once again it is worth noticing that this unexamined assumption of a common goal is severely criticized and rejected by Toynbee in the course of his later re-evaluation of civilizations.[126] Using the value scale of higher religions, the civilizations prove themselves to be of three species. Only civilizations of the second generation are chrysalises of the higher religions, and civilizations of the third generation are "vain repetitions of the heathen."[127] Thus the "common goal" can hardly serve as a basis of "underlying unity" on Toynbee's own showing.

There is a third methodological metaphor that Toynbee uses on four occasions in the Study. Perhaps even more than in the metaphors of civilizations as motor-cars and civilizations as rock-climbers there is in the metaphor of the reviewing stand a strong emphasis upon the historian's comparative and law-making technique.

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[125] Ibid., 230.

[126] Ibid., V, 371.

[127] Ibid., VIII, 87.

In Volume Five, the attempt to trace the process of disintegration has led Toynbee to a consideration of "Schism in the Body Social." "In the course of a long empirical survey,"[128] he concludes that the disintegrating civilization splits itself into three fractions--a Dominant Minority, and an Internal and External Proletariat. Narrowing his search to the Internal Proletariat, he concludes on the basis of another survey that the Internal Proletariat display their creative power in the creation of 'higher religions' and of universal churches. In order to find the source from which the inspirations of these creative works are derived, Toynbee calls together all of the higher religions for a march in front of the reviewing stand.

> It will be seen that our assembly of religions with an indigenous inspiration remains singularly small, even when we have brought in the stragglers from the highways and hedges. If we now inspect our recruits, we shall find that two of them really belong to the 'alien' class after all, . . .[129]

What Toynbee is attempting here is not a "history" in the usual sense, but a comparative study to determine the laws which are in operation during the process of disintegration. In this specific case, Toynbee argues, our empirical Survey has led us to the conclusion that an alien origin is a help and not a hindrance to a 'higher religion' in winning con-

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[128] Ibid., V, 338.

[129] Ibid., 369.

verts.[130]

The next instance of the "reviewing stand" metaphor has a particularly interesting emphasis upon objectivity. Toynbee wishes to find the pattern of action which is common to the various "saviours" of mankind--a task which might well deter the most courageous historian. However the concept of a reviewing stand, of surveying according to performance seems to provide an objectivity similar to the judgment of the distance the rock-climbers had advanced, or the motor-cars had progressed along the one-way street. In all three cases the criteria of development were not established by the historian but were somehow in the very nature of things. As the historian watches objectively from the reviewing stand

> The first to march past will be the tragic battalion of would-be saviours with the sword who have slashed--with blades as futile as the Danaids' sieves--at the welling wars of a 'Time of Trouble'.

As Toynbee has already pointed out, even the parade arrangements have not been subjectively settled upon by the historian in order to give an advantage to one contingent as over against another, for:

> The association between the histories of universal states and the careers of would-be saviours with the sword does not merely testify in a general way to the inefficacy of force as an instrument of salvation: it enables us to survey the evidence empirically by giving us a convenient clue for

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[130] Ibid., 366.

> sorting out the would-be saviours of this kind and marshalling them in an order in which it becomes possible to pass them in review.[131]

The would-be saviours with a sword are living with a hope that is an illusion, concludes the reviewer of the parade, "for it is only in fairyland that swords cut Gordian knots which cannot be untied by fingers."[132] The reviewers' vantage point in the stands gives him the ability to formulate the results of the performance in definite fashion, for as he sees it, "'all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' is the inexorable law of real life."[133] Or in summary fashion the reviewer may write down:

> This ultimate failure of all attempts to win salvation with the sword is not only proclaimed in poetry and myth and legend; it is also demonstrated in history; . . .[134]

In Volume Eight the methodological imagery of "passing in review" the civilizations, or institutions, or leaders of society, is employed twice. The first problem is to survey the principal alternative types of reaction which could take place in the encounters between civilizations. Calling the reviewing-stand metaphor back into operation, Toynbee says:

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[131] Ibid., VI, 182.

[132] Ibid., 178.

[133] Ibid., 179.

[134] Ibid.

> In surveying the alternative types of reaction it may be convenient to begin with those that are retorts in kind to the action by which they have been evoked, and to pass the rest in review in an ascending order of degree of their difference in character from the challenges to which they are responses.[135]

What surprises a reader of this "parade" metaphor is the change which takes place between the announced purpose of the "passing in review" technique, and the announced results after the parade is over. From the introductory paragraph one would suppose that Toynbee intended to mark out the types of response that are made under specified conditions. His division of the section into "(a) Agents and Reagents"; "(b) Alternative Possible Reactions"; and "(c) Alternative Possible Denouements" further emphasizes that the "passing in review" of Part (b) is a "scientific" testing procedure in order to establish certain regularities of behavior on the part of these civilizations. But at the end of Part (b) we find the results of the review phrased in terms of the "relative efficacy of divers types of reaction," and we are thrown right into the middle of a problem of values. The switch from a search of possible types of reaction to a question of good or bad reactions comes in the concluding paragraph:

> If, in this account, we leave the epiphanies of higher religions out of our reckoning in reviewing the alternative possible reactions to an initiative taken by one of the characters in a play in which the dramatis personae are civilizations, we can

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[135] Ibid., VIII, 466.

> perhaps arrive at the following conclusions concerning the relative efficacy of divers types of reaction as alternative methods of wrestling the initiative out of the original agent's hands. We may conclude that the least effective reply is the retort in kind, particularly when it is a retort to force by force; that the negative retort of isolationism is less effective than positive retorts on either the economic or the cultural plane; and that, of the divers alternative possible cultural retorts, a pliant receptivity to the culture of a militarily or politically dominant aggressor is of less avail than the resiliant spirit that turns the tables on the military conqueror by taking him culturally captive.[136]

On the basis of Toynbee's previously announced decision to use the "touchstone of religion" as his source of value judgments, the question of the efficacy of military, political and economic reactions appears to be quite irrelevant. As he expresses it in Part (c), the outcome of a cultural conflict between Hellenism and the contemporary Oriental civilizations was a matter of spiritual indifference.[137] However Toynbee maintains the fiction of going through an objective and significant review of the evidence by the ambiguous statement at the close of Part (c) that we seem to have two dramas in two different languages.

> It will be seen that our religious and our secular dramas are written in two different languages which each defy translation into the other. From the religious standpoint of the preachers of spiritual salvation the secular drama is a vanity of vanities; from the secular standpoint of the

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[136] Ibid., 476.

[137] Ibid., 480.

> parties to an encounter between civilizations the religious drama is unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Greeks foolishness.[138]

A second instance of the "reviewing stand" metaphor in Volume Eight is rather highly developed. The occasion for its use is a discussion of the "consequences of encounters between contemporaries." When in the course of encounters between civilizations the assailant is successful, the assaulted party undergoes severe schisms, and forces upon the individual members of its society the need for personal response. In an examination of the types of response open to individuals, Toynbee turns to a metaphor which expresses a "scientific" attitude toward the facts, and the anticipation of reaching beyond appearance to regularities or laws of history. The metaphor is introduced by saying:

> If we now proceed to take stock of the impressions left on our minds by the spectacle that we have just been watching, we may find that these impressions are confused and that our minds are correspondingly bewildered. As we took the salute from the mixed force under review, the Zealot and the Herodian components of these motley troops both made a parade, as they presented arms in passing the saluting point, of the distinguishing marks blazoned on their respective accoutrements. In the conspicuousness of these badges and the emphasis of these gestures alike, they were insisting with one accord upon their diversity from one another; yet this unanimous assertion of theirs was being contradicted all the time by the evidence of our own observant eyes; . . .[139]

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[138] Ibid.

[139] Ibid., 610.

The results of this empirical maneuver is not expressed in terms of the social laws of the early volumes, but in general references to uniformities of behavior.

> It would be superfluous to call up again the rest of our muster of Zealots and Herodians to demonstrate that the same pair of psychological reactions resulted in the same failure in all other encounters between an assaulted society and an assailant culture in which the tragedy had already been played out to its conclusion by the time of writing; for these repetitions of Jewry's classic experience stand on record in this work in our foregoing survey of encounters between contemporaries.[140]

Or again, the conclusion is drawn in terms of the question, "Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology had to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences of encounters?"[141]

While the above methodological figures of speech are the most frequently employed, several others make their appearance in the Study. Toynbee stresses the objectivity of his approach to the data, along with the hope of discovering uniformities of action when he describes himself as an interrogator of the civilizations in a court-room metaphor.

In a treatment of renaissances, he states in the preface that, "We shall also put into the witness box, one after another, all the other civilizations of third genera-

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[140] Ibid., 622.

[141] Ibid., 623.

tion that have come within our cognizance--and these are all that come into question in our present inquiry, since these alone had been en rapport with their predecessors on the comparatively intimate terms required for making the feat of evocation a possibility."[142]

The united testimony of the witnesses in the witness box yields for Toynbee certain uniformities and regularities. In spite of the differences observable in the renaissances, there is a standard pattern.

> The necromancer's feat of evoking ghosts from the dead pasts of extinct civilizations has been found to have different effects in these diverse departments of a living social milieu; but there is one feature, of a geographical order, that is common to all the cases that we have reviewed so far. Whatever differences these divers kinds of renaissance may display in other respects, they all uniformly manifest themselves in changes in the life of a living society that take place within the limits of the society's native geographical habitat.[143]

Before leaving this survey of methodological figures of speech in Toynbee, it might be useful to observe that these dominating similes and metaphors are strong evidence that the hostility which Toynbee expresses in Volume One to the historians' scientific method understood as fact-gathering does not lead Toynbee into the Collingwood or Dilthey anti-positivistic position. It is evident that the metaphors

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[142] Ibid., IX, pp. 6-7.

[143] Ibid., 96.

in which Toynbee depicts his role as historian are strongly anti-Collingwood and anti-Dilthey. For example, we have noted Toynbee's insistence that he was a spectator to the events of history. Again and again he attempts to put himself as an observer over against the facts of the past. This was the thrust of the imagery of "inspecting recruits," of "passing in review," of "sitting in the reviewing stand," of putting the civilizations "in the witness box," of "reading the map from a non-Western point of view," of "Putting the mustangs through their paces," and of observing rock-climbers. This methodological procedure is, of course, the very antithesis of Collingwood's approach, and he never tires of attacking historians who, like Toynbee, regard "history as a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian, phenomena presented externally to his gaze, not experiences into which he must enter and which he must make his own."[144]

Similarly when Toynbee addresses himself to the task of "sifting, assembling, and comparing those historical facts that are indispensable raw materials for the empirical method of investigation,"[145] he can hardly be accused of agreeing with the Collingwood attack on the treatment of historical facts as though they were "raw materials" from which one

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[144]Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 163.

[145]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, 2.

could discover the causal connections.[146]

Roots and Motivation of the New Scientific Methodology

This chapter on "Toynbee the Social Scientist" would not be complete without a treatment of the question of why Toynbee turned to a scientific method. We have observed various reasons in his attack on traditional historiography, and in his choice of the role of an historian-explorer. But it is necessary to trace the early methodological struggle of Toynbee in order to understand how he arrives at a "science of human affairs," and how he values it as the sovereign clue to the meaning of history.

As an opening observation, it is important to note that Toynbee developed his "science of human affairs" in conjunction with his major contribution to historical thought, A Study of History. This work was not his first effort to write history, in fact it was preceded by a number of books and essays on history and current events. As early as 1913 he had written an article on "The Growth of Sparta" for the Journal of Hellenic Studies[147] while studying and teaching at Oxford. Shortly thereafter he had entered government service, working in the Political Intelligence Department of the

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[146]Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 128.

[147]Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Growth of Sparta," Journal of Hellenic Studies, XXXIII (1913).

Foreign Office. As a student of Turkish affairs, he was commissioned by Lord Bryce to investigate and publish the documents relating to The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.[148] The volume contains a 60-page historical summary of the antecedents of the Armenian people, and is, in general, framed in the traditional style of the national historians. There is one introductory passage which catches the attention of anyone studying the problem of method in the Toynbee of the Study. The passage cannot be considered as a significant harbinger of the "law-making technique" that Toynbee later seizes upon as his "sovereign methodological clue," but it does indicate an important psychological preparation for his later discovery. The brilliant style and the dramatic touch of the Study are noticeably present here, although one's attention is primarily drawn to the early appearances of historical pessimism in this essay of 1913.

> Such a relation has suddenly been created between us by the War, and it is one of the strangest ironies of war that it fuses together and illuminates the very fabric it destroys. The civilization in which we lived was like a labyrinth, so huge and intricate that none of the dwellers in it could altogether grasp its structure, while most of them were barely conscious that it had any structural design at all. But now that the War has caught it and it is all aflame, the unity and symmetry of the building are revealed to the common eye. As the glare lights it up from end to end, it stands out in its glory, in matchless outline and perspective; for

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[148]Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, Ltd., 1916).

> the first time (and possibly for the last) we see its parts simultaneously and in proper relation, and realize for one moment the marvel and mystery of this civilization that is perishing--the subtle, immemorial, unrelaxing effort that raised it up and maintained it, and the impossibility of improvising any equivalent structure in its place. Then the fire masters its prey; the various parts of the labyrinth fall in one by one, the light goes out of them, and nothing is left but smoke and ashes. This is the catastrophe that we are witnessing now, . . .[149]

One might simply write off this dramatic and evidently intense emotional shock that Toynbee describes, as "war reaction" or as a pessimism natural to a reading of documents filled with unrelieved suffering and brutality, but this would be an inadequate explanation. The sense of impending catastrophe, of the tragedy of impermanence, had been expressed by Toynbee at least three years earlier--two years before the outbreak of the War.

As early as the 23rd May, 1912, while Toynbee was on a walking tour of Greece, and just prior to his return to Oxford as a tutor in ancient history, he had had an "authentic minor personal experience," like Gibbon's in the ruins of Rome and Volney's in the ruins of Palmyra. Near the site of ancient Sparta, Toynbee came across a sight which "convicted" him "of a horrifying sense of the sin manifest in the conduct of human affairs." Speaking of himself, Toynbee says:

> The sensuous experience that activated his

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[149] Ibid., p. 593.

> historical imagination was not a sound of liturgical chanting; it was the sight of the ruins among which he had wound his way upwards to the peak; and this spectacle had been appalling; for, in this shattered fairy city, Time had stood still since that spring of A. D. 1821 in which Mistra had been laid desolate, . . .
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> Needless to say, the writer of this Study had made no progress towards reading the cruel riddle of Mankind's crimes and follies by the time when he was forced down from the heights of Mistra by the twofold pressure of hunger and nightfall.[150]

The experience of Toynbee at 23 years of age, "as he brooded over the catastrophe," was significant in his preparation for the Study, for he had "won from the Laconian landscape an intuition that was the germ of the present work.[151] In the same section he seems to identify this germinal intuition as two lasting lessons made on his mind by the impact of the Laconian landscape--"one concerning the historical geography of Continental European Greece and the other concerning the morphology of the history of civilizations."[152]

A second example out of the four recorded experiences of Toynbee in the year 1912, is the experience of rounding the shoulder of a mountain on the east end of the Island of Crete on the 19th of March.[153] Like an earlier "unbearable spectacle" from which the "harrowed participant from another

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[150]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 108.

[151]Ibid., 109.

[152]Ibid., 110.

[153]Ibid., 136.

world" averted his eyes, this experience too has a strong effect on the youthful Toynbee. From the three accounts of the story[154] the second contains the clearest reference to methodology. Leaving out the irrelevant geographical descriptions the story reads:

> The present writer received his first intimation of the mortality of the Western Civilization in an experience . . . on the 19th March, 1912. Rounding the southern shoulder of a mountain, he was startled at suddenly finding himself face to face with the ruins of a country house. . . . What was startling and disturbing for a Western observer in A. D. 1912 was to see a piece of architecture which, in his mental picture of his native country, was associated with the living world of his own generation standing here in Crete as starkly dead and deserted as the monuments of an Hellenic architecture. . . . This inevitable comparison awakened his imagination to the truth that, on this island, a civilization which was his own, and which on his own island was then still self-confidently alive, was already as dead as the civilizations that had come and gone in earlier generations of this species of society.[155]

The sense of impending tragedy is emphasized in Toynbee's first use of the story. The sight of the desolate habitations reminded him of an English poet's lines.

> He reflected that the four and a half centuries for which Venice had been mistress of Crete were a longer span of time than the present age of his own country's rule over the earliest acquired of her overseas dominions; and his ears seemed to catch an echo of Galuppi's music among the Cretan crags.

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[154]The account found in IV, 282; IX, 431; and X, 136.

[155]Ibid., IX, 431 and footnote.

> 'In you come with your cold music till I creep in every nerve'.[156]

These "intuitions of the mortality of the Western Civilization" which were so intense that Toynbee is able to repeat them in detail more than thirty years later, are strongly reinforced by his subsequent war experiences. From his travels in Greece, Toynbee returned to Balliol College to take up a tutorial fellowship in the autumn of 1912. His study and teaching up to the time of his entrance into government service in 1915, led to the publication of the article noted above on "The Growth of Sparta." Although there are certain overtones of the Study which can be found in the article, such as a reference to the inadequacy of the small political units, and the use of the metaphor of growth, there appears to be very little suggestion in the article of the Toynbee who repudiates traditional historiography in favor of the law-making technique. One would be more inclined to see in it the first evidence of a young scholar working along traditional lines to advance the research of a particular segment of parochial history.[157]

Along with this study of early Greek history, Toynbee maintains an interest in recent Greek history, to the extent that the article on Sparta is followed a year later by a

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[156] Ibid., IV, 282.

[157] For a critique of Toynbee's essay by a contemporary classics scholar see W. den Boer's "Toynbee and Classical History," in Toynbee and History, p. 223.

pamphlet on Greek Policy Since 1882.[158] This thirty-five page essay gives the background of the contemporary Greek struggle for liberation and concludes with an estimate of the future of the modern Greeks. He predicts that, "We are here in the presence of one of the most interesting tendencies of the present age: . . . she has found a new spirit to inform it; the Hellenism that inspired the nineteenth century will insensibly yield place to the "Americanism" that is destined to be characteristic of the twentieth, . . . "

But again a reader in search of the roots of the methodology of the Study finds little of significance in this type of journalistic writing.

In the year that Toynbee enters government service and begins to produce the series of atrocity studies, a book comes from his hand entitled Nationality and the War.[159] This five hundred page study has certain arguments and illustrations very familiar to a reader of the Study. But again we look in vain for the methodological roots of the later Toynbee. What we do find is a psychological preparation, a receptivity or mental conditioning which helps us to understand Toynbee's later delight in the "science of human affairs." Nationality and the War is an attempt to review

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[158]Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Policy Since 1882 (London: Oxford University, 1914).

[159]Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London: J. M. Dent, 1915).

problems of Nationality in the area affected by the War, according to his preface. He speaks of himself as a "professional historian" and mentions the fact that he will not confine himself to "narrative" altogether.[160] Aside from these fragmentary notes on method, we do find a repetition of the "Intimation of mortality" that had already formed the thinking of the traveling historian in 1912. In the preface a familiar phrase expresses this note of pessimism, "we are walking in a trance across the ruins." The war is described as a "revaluing of all our values," and the present predicament as an "affair of life and death."[161] The opening tone of chapter one is abrupt and dramatic; "For the first time in our lives, we find ourselves in complete uncertainty as to the future."[162] Towards the end of Nationality and the War the same sense of impending disaster is expressed in the explanation, "The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration. That has been the narrative of this book."[163] And the concluding words of the volume equates the catastrophe of the present with the fate of the Greeks.

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[160] Ibid., Preface v.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Ibid., p. 1.

[163] Ibid., p. 478.

> If they can profit by the present crisis to liberate their energies for higher ends, then the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand: if inspiration fails them in this hour, then we are witnessing the beginning of great evils for Hellas; and the Sovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of Greece.[164]

The series of "atrocity" accounts which flow from the pen of Toynbee at the Foreign Office in the next five years are fairly unimportant as far as revealing "our well-tried empirical method" of the Study. They indicate an author who tries to adopt a "straight narrative account" breaking into the account occasionally with judgments as to which witness is telling the truth.[165] These accounts covered The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire[166] and The Destruction of Poland[167] in 1916; and in 1917, The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks,[168] The Belgian Deportations,[169] The German

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[164]Ibid., p. 500.

[165]Arnold J. Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), preface.

[166]Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians.

[167]Arnold J. Toynbee, The Destruction of Poland (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916).

[168]Arnold J. Toynbee, The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).

[169]Arnold J. Toynbee, The Belgian Deportations (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917).

Terror in Belgium,[170] The German Terror in France,[171] and Turkey: a Past and a Future.[172]

Apart from direct methodological notations, the atrocity accounts must be observed as indicators of Toynbee's compelling interest in the future of the West, and of his deeply-rooted sense of the impending perils of Western Civilization. The graphic description of "our civilization" on fire, the references to its remains as "smoke and ashes" that introduced the Treatment of the Armenians, is echoed in The Destruction of Poland. Witnessing the action of the German barbarians, as he had the action of the Turkish barbarians, Toynbee gloomily predicts that: "The present fate of Poland foreshadows with inexorable clearness the fate that such a settlement could bring upon us all. . . . The triumph of German organization would not bring the millenium; it would bring darkness and the shadow of death."

It was during the opening days of the first World War that Toynbee began to draw comparisons between the destructive wars of the West and the breakdown of the Hellenic society.

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[170]Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium.

[171]Arnold J. Toynbee, The German Terror in France (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).

[172]Arnold J. Toynbee, Turkey: a Past and a Future (New York: George Doran, 1917).

> The general war of 1914 overtook one reading for Literae Humaniores, and then suddenly my understanding was illuminated. The experience that we were having in our world now had been experienced by Thucydides in his world already. I was rereading him now with a new perception--perceiving meanings in his words, and feelings behind his phrases, to which I had been insensible until I, in my turn, had run into that historical crisis that had inspired him to write his work.[173]

The sense of catastrophe in the West which one can trace in Toynbee's pre-Study days, and the identifying of that doom with the disaster of the Greek breakdown, is made more explicit in a Volume Ten discussion of the effects of catastrophic events on historians. Using himself as an example of the intellectual inspiration that comes to a historian from contemporary tragic events, he recalls the psychological effects of the first World War upon himself.

> He could not live through the experience of the outbreak of war in A. D. 1914 without realizing that the outbreak of war in 431 B. C. had brought the same experience to Thucydides. As he found his own experience revealing to him, for the first time, the inwardness of Thucydidean words and phrases that had meant little or nothing to him before, he realized that a book written in another world more than 2,300 years ago might be a depository of experience which, in the reader's world, were only just beginning to overtake the reader's own operation.[174]

This preoccupation with the fate of the West, this "intuition of mortality" which had begun to plague Toynbee from the time

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[173]Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 7.

[174]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 94.

of his traveling experience as a graduate student in 1912, is intensified by the course of the war. Even after his accounts of atrocities are behind him, and the war is nearing its end, he is gravely troubled about the "common ruin of civilization." Toynbee discusses his pessimistic, post-war outlook on Western civilization in two separate contexts. In 1921, just three years after the experience had taken place, and then again in Volume Ten,[175] approximately thirty-three years after the event, he relives his post-war views in a description of his own mental and psychological kinship with Lucretius in his experiences of Roman disintegration. First let us glance at the comment of Toynbee:

> Lucretius wrote that about a hundred and fifty years after Hannibal evacuated Italy, but the horror is still vivid in his mind, and his poetry arouses it in our minds as we listen. The writer will never forget how those lines kept running in his head during the spring of 1918.[176]

And then a look at Toynbee's translation of the passage of Lucretius in which he felt a sense of kinship with the Roman poet.

> So death is nothing to us and matters nothing to us, since we have proved that the soul is not immortal. And as in time past we felt no ill, when the Phoenecians were pouring in to battle on every front, when the world rocked with the shock and tumult of war and shivered from centre to

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[175] Ibid.

[176] Arnold J. Toynbee, "History," in The Legacy of Greece, ed. by Richard Livingstone (London: Oxford University, 1922), p. 315.

> firmament, when all mankind on sea and land must fall under the victor's empire and victory was in doubt--so, when we have ceased to be, when body and soul, whose unison is our being, have been parted, then nothing can touch us--we shall not be--and nothing can make us feel, no, not if earth is confounded with sea and sea with heaven.

By 1920, Toynbee was out of government service. He was appointed in 1919 to the chair of Byzantine and Modern Greek Language, Literature and History at the University of London. And in the summer of 1920, according to Toynbee the first traces of the Study came into conscious focus. In the perspective of 1951, Toynbee looks back upon a literary effort of the summer of 1920 as the "first attempt . . . to write the present work."[177] This early attempt to write the Study is, of course, extremely interesting to anyone concerned with the motivation and the shaping of the methodology of the later Toynbee. The references to the 1920 attempt are provocatively brief, but yet rather revealing. Twice the "attempt" is mentioned and commented upon; first in the preface to Volume Seven, and again in the "Acknowledgements" of Volume Ten.

In the preface of Volume Seven the reference reads:

> In the summer of 1920, after the philosophic contemporaneity of the Western and Hellenic civilizations had been borne in upon me by the experience of the First World War, I for the first time consciously tried--and, at this first attempt, signally failed--to write the

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[177]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, Preface ix.

> present work in the form (dictated by a Late Medieval Italian education in the Greek and Latin Classics) of a commentary on the second chorus (ll. 332-75) of Sophocles' Antigone. I did not succeed in finding my way into my subject till more than a year later.[178]

We do not have this "first attempt" of Toynbee's unless it is contained in embryonic form in his address of May, 1920, entitled "The Tragedy of Greece: A Lecture Delivered for the Professor of Greek to Candidates for Honours in Literae Humaniores at Oxford;"[179] and in the similar essay on "History," which was published in 1921 in Richard Livingstone's Legacy of Greece.[180] In the essay on "History" Toynbee does devote eighteen pages to "The Plot of Ancient Greek Civilization," dividing the account into three "Acts," and elaborating on the course of the "tragedy."

But when one asks how this can be considered the prototype of the massive ten-volume Study, the answer is far from apparent. In the context of this discussion on a plot or drama of the Hellenic tragedy, there is a lengthy and closely reasoned argument to the effect that a historian ought to confine himself to the reading of one civilization. The discussion, so foreign to the familiar twenty-one civilization surveys of the Study, reads as follows:

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[178] Ibid.

[179] Arnold J. Toynbee, The Tragedy of Greece (London: Oxford University Press, 1931).

[180] Toynbee, "History."

> But of course one asks: Why study Ancient Hellenic Civilization rather than ours? The study of any one civilization is so complex, it demands so many preliminary and subordinate studies--linguistic, institutional, economic, psychological--that is likely to absorb all one's energies. The greatest historians have generally confined themselves to the study of a single civilization, and the great Greek historians--Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius--concentrated on their own, and only studied others in so far as their own came in contact with them. Clearly, people who are going to be historians, not for life, but as an education for life, must make their choice. They must practically confine themselves to studying one civilization if they are to reap the fruits of study at all, and in this case it is natural to ask: Why study Hellenism rather than our own history?[181]

The only suggestion in this discussion of Ancient Greek Civilization that could lead to the law-making technique of the Study of 1927 is a brief reference to the possibility that the "plot" might be repeated "in our own history."

> It is possible that the great tragedies of history--that is, the great civilizations that have been created by the spirit of man--may all reveal the same plot, if we analyze them rightly. Each civilization--for instance, the civilization of Medieval and Modern Europe and again that of Ancient Greece--is probably a variant of a single theme.[182]

This hopeful lead which seems but a step from the comparative method of the Study is, however, carefully modified and indeed directed back to the more traditional task of the historian who confines himself to studying one civilization or

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[181] Ibid., p. 297.

[182] Ibid.

one national community.

> And to study the plot of civilization in a great exposition of it--like the Hellenic exposition or our own Western exposition--is surely the right goal or a humane education.[183]

A second argument in the context of "The Plot of Ancient Greek Civilization" makes it impossible to view Toynbee's literary efforts in the summer of 1920 as a methodological prototype of the Study. Not only is there an explicit argument for the concentration upon one area of history, as opposed to the "law-making technique" of the Study, but Toynbee seems to align himself with the "history as art" movement. He reasons,

> The study of a civilization is not different in kind from the study of a literature. In both cases one is studying a creation of the spirit of man, or, in more familiar terms, a work of art.
>
> Civilization is a work of art--in the literal meaning of the phrase and not merely by a metaphor. . . . It is a social work of art, expressed in social action, like a ritual or a play. One cannot describe it better than by calling it a tragedy with a plot, and history is the plot of the tragedy of civilization.[184]

As soon as one recalls the emphasis on technical apparatus and the "empirically demonstrated" laws of the Study, the contrast is apparent. It is not a contrast between the immature scholar of 1920-21 and the mature

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[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid., p. 296.

scholar of 1927-34. It is the contrast of a scholar with strong convictions but an uncertain methodology as over against the later Toynbee who has found a "sovereign methodological clue" with which he can reach his objective. In this early context, Toynbee emphasized the subjective character of Ancient Greek Civilization with the words:

> This analysis is and must be subjective. Everyone has to make his own, just as everyone has to apprehend for himself the form of a work of art.[185]

Toynbee's second reference to the "first attempt" in the summer of 1920 to write the Study contains an additional point that is not found in the Volume Seven reference and that may disclose the true link between the attempt of 1920 and the actual writing in 1930. In a Volume Ten footnote the 1920 experience is described in these words:

> In my first attempt, made in the summer vacation of A. D. 1920, I had tried to cast my ideas into the form of a commentary on the second chorus in Sophocles' Antigone (ll. 332-75). The theme of this poem--'the Mystery of Man'--was apposite and the poetry was magnificent, but the approach was unpromising; for this expedient of referring a question to some classical oracle was the Medieval and Early Modern Western approach into which I had been initiated at school, whereas the intellectual enterprise on which I had now embarked was an attempt to take bearings in the uncharted seas of a post-Modern Chapter of Western history. My appeal to Sophocles had, in fact, been a false move, and it was therefore neither surprising nor regrettable that it had been a failure.[186]

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[185] Ibid., p. 304.

[186] Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 232.

In this second reference to the summer of 1920, Toynbee makes more explicit the link between the "first attempt" and the Study. He can regard the effort of 1920 as a prototype to the massive Study not because of the methodological likeness but because of the similarity of the "intellectual enterprise." This distinction between the "form" or "approach" and the "ideas" or "intellectual enterprise" makes it possible for him to stress the fact that the first "form" or "approach" was a failure, while at the same time maintaining that there is a continuity between his historical efforts of 1920 and the search as represented by the Study in 1930.

It is worthwhile to track down the origins of Toynbee's "first attempt" before analyzing the nature of this "intellectual enterprise." Toynbee says that he had been initiated at school into this method of "referring a question to some classical oracle." He describes it as "the Medieval and Early Modern Western approach." Whether Toynbee consciously or unconsciously borrowed this approach from J. B. Bury it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty, but the words, the poet, the drama, and the lines are strikingly parallel to the methodological hint thrown out by Bury in his Inaugural Address of 1902.[187] In that year, John Bagnell Bury succeeded Lord Acton as the Regius Professor of Modern

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[187]Stern, The Varieties of History, p. 210.

History at Cambridge, and chose as the topic of his Inaugural Lecture, "The Science of History." Still in the years of his optimism as to the great future of the historical sciences and the future progress of civilization, Bury was certain that a more "scrupulously exact conformity to facts" would bring about the "revolution which is slowly and silently progressing"[188] in the historical profession. Along with his faith in the ultimate triumph of the Rankean methodology Bury commits himself to a concept of development which may be briefly stated as faith in the progress of man. Trying to express this "wider transformation" which he believed was taking place but to which the "world is not yet alive,"[189] he refers the question of present progress back to the oracle of Hellas; back to the Fifth Century B. C.

> There is no passage, perhaps, in the works of the Greek tragedians so instructive for the historical student as that song in the Antigone of Sophocles, in which we seem to surprise the first amazed mediation of man when it was borne in upon him by a sudden startling illumination, how strange it is that he should be what he is and should have wrought out, among other things, the city-state. He had suddenly, as it were, waked up to realize that he himself was the wonder of the world, 'None is more wonderful than man.' That intense expression of a new detached wondering interest in man, as an object of curiosity, gives us the clue to the inspiration of Herodotus and the birth of history.[190]

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[188] Ibid., p. 211.

[189] Ibid., p. 215.

[190] Ibid.

Bury's footnote, number six, notes the source of his quotation as simply "Sophocles, Antigone, lines 331-75." Toynbee's reference as given above was, "I had tried to cast my ideas into the form of a commentary on the second chorus in Sophocles' Antigone (ll. 332-75)."[191] Bury may have picked up his "clue" to history from the 1895 Inaugural Address of Lord Acton who was his immediate predecessor as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge,[192] and who refers to a "speech of Antigone" as one of the sources that "gives dignity and grace and intellectual value to history, and its action on the ascending life of man."

It is not likely that Toynbee at age seven heard the speech of Lord Acton, or at age thirteen heard the Inaugural Address of J. B. Bury, but he does note that ten years after the Inaugural Address, "In the autumn of A. D. 1912 I had the happiness of coming to know the great historian personally,"[193] and he shows familiarity with several of Bury's books.[194] From the evidence already cited of Toynbee's awareness of the mortality of Western Civilizations, and from the pessimistic tone of his written material that is avail-

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[191]See page 69.

[192]Dalberg-Acton, Lectures on Modern History, p. 3.

[193]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 234.

[194]Ibid., IX, pp. 66-67; X, 234.

able from the years 1920-21, it is possible to see why Toynbee in the post-war world might have found Bury's concept of development somewhat "unpromising" and altogether a "false move."[195] As he sees it, "history is the plot of the tragedy of civilization."[196] And in his essay on "History" he arrived at the two dark conclusions that we are just being overtaken by experiences that had overtaken Thucydides in 431,[197] and that Hellas had broken down in 431 B. C.[198]

If one can conclude that Toynbee, while picking up the reference to Sophocles from Bury, was not at the same time adopting Bury's immense confidence in the progress of civilization, it is also likely that Toynbee was not adopting Bury's superb confidence that just one school of history would shortly emerge.

Bury was confident that when Ranke's text, "Ich will nur sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist," was fully taken to heart, though there be many schools of political philosophy, there will no longer be diverse schools of history.[199] He was fully convinced that history could no longer be regarded

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[195]Stern, The Varieties of History, p. 215.

[196]Toynbee, "History," p. 297.

[197]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 94.

[198]Toynbee, "History," p. 317.

[199]Stern, The Varieties of History, p. 215.

as an art,[200] nor as a branch of literature.[201] In this stage of Toynbee's methodological development it is evident that he equates his study of Hellenic civilization with literature and art, and further insists that everyone ought to make his own "subjective" analysis of Ancient Greek Civilization, "just as everyone has to apprehend for himself the form of a work of art."

The conclusion remains then that beyond the fact that Toynbee accepts Bury's distinction that historians use both data and clues, there is no further light to be gained for a study of Toynbee's methodological development by an additional examination of the "Bury" lead.

Turning back to the Volume Ten explanation of the "first attempt," it is apparent that Toynbee makes explicit the link between the 1920 failure and the 1930 success in writing the Study, in the phrase, "the intellectual enterprise on which I had now embarked was an attempt to take bearings in the uncharted seas of a post-modern chapter of Western history." This characterization of the Study as "an attempt to take bearings," and as preeminently a concern with the future of Western civilization is important for an understanding of Toynbee's choice of method. It brings together the expressed pessimism of his work on the atrocity accounts,

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[200] Ibid., p. 212.

[201] Ibid., p. 214.

the strong penchant for prophecy in his journalistic essays on current events, and his mystic intimations of mortality as a youthful traveler. It sheds light on his developing interest in the 'laws' of history, and explains the reason why the original plan of the book was to climax in Part XI, "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations," and in Part XII, "Prospects of the West."[202]

Rather interesting corroboration of this interpretation is found in another of Toynbee's references to the summer of 1920. Several critics[203] have pointed out the similarities between Toynbee and Spengler, without being sure at what stage in Toynbee's development he became acquainted with the work of Spengler. Toynbee himself clarifies the problem in an essay on "My View of History" which was first published in 1946 as a contact publication in the volume, Britain Between West and East.[204] Referring to his first introduction to the works of Spengler he says:

> This question was simmering in my mind when, in the summer of 1920, Professor Namier . . . placed in my hands Oswald Spengler's Untergang des Abendlandes. As I read those pages teeming with firefly flashes of historical insight, I wondered at first whether my whole inquiry had been disposed of by

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[202]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, Preface.

[203]Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 206 and p. 210.

[204]This essay was later republished along with several others in, Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).

> Spengler before even the questions, not to speak of the answers, had fully taken shape in my own mind.[205]

Toynbee's psychological reaction to his reading of Spengler is of special importance. His first reaction was that Spengler had possibly "disposed of" Toynbee's own "whole inquiry." The grave concern for the West, the desire to "work out" its prospects, to awaken others to the impending catastrophe are implicit in this fear of Toynbee's that there may be nothing left for him to do. The opening lines of Spengler's work are:

> In this book is attempted for the first time the venture of predetermining history, of following the still untravelled stages in the destiny of a Culture, and specifically of the only Culture of our times and on our planet which is actually in the phase of fulfillment--the West-European-American.[206]

And Spengler goes on to emphasize the prophetic mission of the historian,

> This is what has to be viewed, and viewed not with the eyes of the partisan, the idealogue, the up-to-date novelist, not from this or that 'standpoint', but in a high, time-free perspective embracing whole millenniums of historical world-forms if we are really to comprehend the great crisis of the present.[207]

A year later, in September of 1921, Toynbee has a

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[205] Ibid., p. 9.

[206] Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. by Charles F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 3.

[207] Ibid., p. 34.

"plan" for the Study, but he is still without a method. He describes the way the "plan" came to him in one of the most interesting personal accounts of his Study.

> On Saturday, 17 September, 1921, I was travelling with my school-fellow and life-long friend Theodore Wade-Gery in the Orient Express en route from Constantinople to England, Before dawn we had been awakened by the rumbling of our train as it crossed the bridge over the Maritsa, below Adrianople, and, for the rest of that day, we were travelling on westward. . . . As I stood, hour after hour, at the corridor window, watching the stream glide past, . . . my mind began to dream of historical and legendary events. . . . These stimulating sights and reminiscences must have released some psychic wellspring at subconscious level, . . . before I went to sleep that night, I found that I had put down on half a sheet of notepaper a list of topics which, in its contents and in their order, was substantially identical with the plan of this book as it now stands printed in volumes I, IV, and and VIII. The path that had thus unexpectedly--and, as it might seem, casually--opened at last before my feet was to carry me farther than I then foresaw . . .[208]

It is difficult to account for the emphasis in this preface upon a mystic origin for the Study, except to refer to Toynbee's obvious interest in mystic experiences and introspection. Actually if his other explanations of influences of men and books upon his development are correct, there is little need to speak of the arrival of the "Plan" as "unexpected" and "as it might seem, casually--opened, at last before my feet." For a year now he had been acquainted with Spengler's attempt to predict the future of the West by means

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[208]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, Preface x.

of a morphology of civilizations. The similarities between the West and the Ancient Greek Civilization had already been borne in upon him by his war experiences, so he relates. According to the reconstruction of his past in "My View of History," he had been thinking about the problem of philosophic contemporaneity of societies even before his reading of Spengler, and had then criticized Spengler because he had not treated the question of the genesis of civilizations.[209]

Other than these broad references to the "Plan of 1921" the Toynbee papers and notes contain no copies of the actual plan. It is probable that it bore the stamp of Spengler's influence, if the contemporary writings of Toynbee are sufficient witness to his general approach in the early twenties. Biological analogies abound. Toynbee seems to be fascinated with the thought that his description of the West as a "child" of Greece, "may be something more than a metaphor, for societies, like individuals are living creatures, and may be expected to exhibit the same phenomena. . . ."[210]

On occasion the analogies to biological phenomena become rather confusing to anyone who is accustomed to the metaphors of the Study. For example Toynbee describes the early Christian church as "the last phase of ancient Hellenic

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[209]Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 10.

[210]Toynbee, "History," p. 289.

or Greco-Roman Society; which died after it had intercourse with other societies and had given birth to several children . . . "[211] And in a further elaboration of the relations between societies as comparable to rape he argues that:

> Civilizations, like individuals, spring from two parents, and in all new civilizations whose parentage we can trace, the heritage from the civilized mother has been more important than that from the barbarian who violated her.[212]

As late as January 1924, Toynbee still seems to be writing under the influence of Spengler's heady "analogies," which were supposed to lay bare the "organic structure of history."[213] The Introduction to Greek Civilization and Character, written in January of 1924 describes the first part of the book as "occupied with the life history of Hellenic civilization, its vicissitudes between genesis and extinction, or what, in the case of an individual human being, we should call his or her 'career.'" Toynbee supports his analogy by saying:

> This is the dramatic side of life, and also the side on which each particular life has most in common with every other. . . . There is no human interest in a 'career' unless the subject of it is a 'character', which maintains its self-identity through all its reactions to life and all the enlargement of its experience. Characters are

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[211] Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London: Constable and Company, 1922), p. 328.

[212] Ibid., p. 12.

[213] Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, 5.

> something permanent, and they are something individual as well--as infinite as careers are limited in their variety.[214]

In a companion volume of the same year, Greek Historical Thought, he reiterates his belief in the doctrine of philosophical contemporaneity and supports it with a biological analogy. Writing in the introduction dated January 1, 1924, he says:

> In the philosophical sense, all civilizations have been and are and will continue to be contemporaneous with one another. They are all the offspring of the same family in the same generation. . . .[215]

And in the same introduction, when Toynbee speaks in a matter-of-fact way of the sinking of the Western civilization, it is a distillation of his earlier mystic intimations, his post-war pessimism, and of Spengler's Decline of the West.

> In other words, the world of Hellenism . . . was a world like that in which we live today, by contrast with the Christian dispensation which in the chronological sense intervenes between us or with that religion, yet unborn, which will undoubtedly lay up a new treasure in a new heaven as our world sinks, to founder at last like its predecessors in 'the abyss where all things are incommensurable'.[216]

However limited we are in our knowledge of the "Plan"

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[214]Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Civilization and Character (New York: New American Library, 1953), Preface viii.

[215]Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Historical Thought (New York: New American Library, 1952), Preface xv.

[216]Ibid., xi.

drawn up "on a half a sheet of notepaper" in September, 1921, and how Toynbee intended to work it out methodologically; however much one might speculate as to whether it would have paralleled Spengler's intuitive and symbolic morphology of civilizations, as one approaches the year 1927 there is a clarification of the aims of the Study and the method through which it might be accomplished.

Toynbee is quite explicit about the time in which the Study took shape in the form of original notes. When he produced Volumes Four through Six he made a point of indicating in the preface that, "the original sketch of Parts IV and V [the contents of Volumes Four, Five and Six] was worked out, like that of all the parts that precede and follow, in the summers of 1927 and 1928, . . . "[217] Again in the preface to the last batch of volumes he comments that, "more than seventeen years had now passed since the latest of the notes for the book, which had all been written between June, 1927, and June, 1929, had been put on paper."[218] On three occasions in the same preface he refers to the relation of his present thinking with his thinking and "original notes" of 1927.[219] Although it is an argument by implication, one is tempted to

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[217]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, Preface viii.

[218]Ibid., VII, Preface vii.

[219]Ibid., vii and viii.

see in this constant reference to the notes of 1927 an indication that this planning was by far the more significant starting point, as opposed to the notes of 1921.

In Volume Nine, Toynbee again emphasized the importance of the notes of 1927:

> When the writer was planning the present Study in the summer of A. D. 1927, he saw that he would have to grapple with the problem of the respective roles of Law and Freedom in human history before he could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the prospects of the Western Civilization. Yet in the winter of A. D. 1928-9, when, with that ulterior objective in mind, he was drafting his notes for eventually writing the present part, . . .[220]

Also in Volume Ten, Toynbee underscores the significance of 1927 for the origin of the Study. Speaking of his desire to complete his study of the Arabic and Ottoman Turkish languages and to begin learning Classical New Persian he says that he regrets having been compelled to suspend work on these languages by the new tasks of 1924 and 1927. The significant dates are combined in the explanation:

> After having started in A. D. 1924 to produce an annual Survey of International Affairs under the auspices of Chatham House, he had started in A. D. 1927 to make systematic notes for the present Study, which he began to write, 'pari passu' with the Survey in A. D. 1930.[221]

Beyond these references to the importance of the work

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[220] Ibid., IX, 167.

[221] Ibid., X, 22.

of making notes in the years 1927, 28, and 29, there are several significant passages which contain Toynbee's attitude and purposes in those years in which the outlines of the whole Study are under construction. Here the emphasis falls upon the growing "intimations of mortality," the fear that contemporaries are not aware of the crisis of the West, and the desire to predict the immediate future of Western Civilization.

An example of Toynbee's pessimism in 1929 can be found in his reference to The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.

> This uncanny uniqueness of the contemporary situation of the West first struck the writer when he was putting on paper his original notes for the last portion of this Study in the early months of A. D. 1929; and the subject and title of the present Part were then immediately conjured up in his mind by a sudden reminiscence of a passage in The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. In his mind's eye he saw the picture of the stricken ship becalmed on the boundless expanse of the South Seas, with the crew prostrated by the torments of thirst; he saw the spectre of bark shooting towards him from the horizon, on which the ribs of its skeleton hull had shown up sinisterly black against the blood-red disk of a setting sun; . . . and his recollection of the poem ran on to bring before his eyes a vision of the dying sailors giving up the ghost one by one, till, on board the spellbound ship, the Ancient Mariner is left alone alive with his dead companions lying around him.
>
> The many men so beautiful.
> And they all dead did lie:
> And a thousand thousand slimy things
> Lived on: and so did I.[222]

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[222] Ibid., IX, 412.

References to Toynbee's same grim sense of foreboding may be found in other parts of the Study. In the Volume Four introduction to the Problem of the Breakdowns of Civilizations, he refers to the same Rime of the Ancient Mariner as a master description of the contemporary Western world. It is expressed in such statements as, "For our present purpose we have merely to take note of the fact that, among the civilizations which are alive at the present day, every one, apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of disintegration, with the possible exception of our own."[223] And he further comments, "As we cast our eyes around a world in which the majority of the civilizations known to us are already dead, while the rest of the survivors are all either in decline of in extremis, and as we remind ourselves that we have not any means of divining what our own society's expectation of life may be, we may be inclined to read into the panorama of history the same grim motif that the poet divined in the stones of Westminster Abbey,

> Mortality, behold and fear!
> What a change of flesh is here!"[224]

Moved by a deep fear for the future of the West and an intimation that the "Time of Troubles" has descended upon us, Toynbee speaks of the failure of his contemporaries to "look

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[223] Ibid., IV, 3.

[224] Ibid., 4.

at the facts of History as these presented themselves to the naked eye."[225] He describes Westerners of the twenties as a generation which continue "to peer at this formidable spectacle through smoked glasses inherited from its grandparents."[226] In the same context he dismisses with strong words the generation which included J. B. Bury and his faith in the progress of civilization:

> The generation of Homo Occidentalis that had already been in its dotage in A. D. 1914 had been the latest generation to hold, with an unquestioning faith, a dogma which, by then, had been serving for a quarter of a millenium as the gist of a Late Modern Western Man's mechanically desiccated and peptonized religion. This fallaciously comfortable doctrine was that the Western Society could see ahead of it an unbroken vista of progress towards an Earthly Paradise, . . . [227]

In a significant reference to the years 1928-29 quoted earlier[228] Toynbee says that as "he was drafting his notes . . . he was conscious that the fateful question then still seemed academic to most people in Western countries . . . " The context of the quotation identifies the fateful question as the prospects of the Western Civilization.

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[225] Ibid., IX, 167.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Ibid.

[228] See page 81.

To Toynbee the failure of his contemporaries in 1929 to properly assess and heed the crisis of Western civilization was such a prominent and pressing feature in his own thinking that he even wonders if it might not be the result of an "irrational imagination." Speaking of his own gloomy estimate in contrast with the cheerful complacency of his contemporaries, he asks, "what sense could be made of an irrational imagination's oracular impulse to identify the West's situation in A. D. 1929 with the Ancient Mariner's plight after the death of his companions? Need a once more prosperous Western Civilization take the other civilizations' deaths to heart? In A. D. 1929 it had been easier than it was in A. D. 1950 for Western common sense to dismiss this disturbing question."[229]

In this analysis of the psychological motivation of the author of the Study in the important years of 1927-29 one can detect along with Toynbee's sense of the imminent mortality of the West, and his concern over the complacency of his fellow-members of Western Society, an almost irresistable desire to predict the future of the West.

In a Volume Nine reference to the writing out of the original notes for the Study in 1927, Toynbee relates that in the summer of 1927 he was grappling with the respective roles

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[229]Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 413.

of Law and Freedom in human history. We know from the preface of Volume Seven that in those years, and indeed up to the year 1946, the Part called "Law and Freedom in History" had been originally developed as "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations." He further states that he had to grapple with this Part on "Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations" before he "could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the prospects of the Western Civilization." Additional confirmation that Toynbee was laboring over a question of the fate of the West, can be seen in the next sentence when he adds, "Yet in the winter of A. D. 1928-9, when, with that ulterior objective in mind, he was drafting his notes. . . . "[230]

A close examination of the outline of Toynbee's original Plan of the book supports the view that it was not simply set up as a systematic morphology of civilizations, but was a plan that led to a formulation of the "Rhythms" in the Histories of Civilizations, and was to be climaxed by a Part XII discussion of the "Prospects of the Western Civilization." This is verified by Toynbee's description of Part XII as an "experiment in prognostication." In an illuminating chapter on "The Need for this Inquiry," the by now (November 30, 1950) reluctant author who had sketched out the prospects of the West in 1929, but at the present could feel

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[230] Ibid., 167.

only a sense of distaste for this speculative subject, attempts to bolster his courage in order to proceed with the prediction. During the course of the argument he remarks that the passage of time has helped because, "this lesson from the experience of twenty-one sinisterly illuminating years had made experiments in prognostication less hazardous by pinning the still patently open questions within a framework of relatively sure prediction."[231]

The desire to predict, and thus to shake his contemporaries out of their complacency, is a prominent theme in the Volume Six examination of the "Process of Disintegration." For example, after finding that the rhythm of disintegration has had a regular pattern in societies such as the Hellenic, Sinic, Sumeric, Orthodox Christian, Hindu, Syriac, Far Eastern, Babylonic and Orthodox Christian in Russia, Toynbee asks whether there are "Symptoms in Western History" of this familiar disintegration-pattern. While acknowledging the problems that may make it impossible to plot out the course and write up the log of the voyage of a still living Western civilization, he nevertheless goes ahead with the task of prediction.

> Suppose that the pattern which we have now detected in the histories of so many disintegrating civilizations were to prove to be discernable in our own Western history, too. Might that not be regarded as

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[231] Ibid., 409.

> presumptive evidence that our own civilization has already been overtaken by a process of disintegration which is known for certain to have been the fate of so many other representatives of the species?[232]

This is followed by a series of analogies between the pattern of disintegration in other societies and the events in the West since the sixteenth century. Still couching his prophecies in a tentative fashion as questions rather than direct assertion, he asks,

> Are these devils to dwell in our empty and swept and garnished house till they have driven us to suicide? If the analogy between our Western Civilization's modern history and other civilizations' 'Times of Troubles' does extend to points of chronology, then a Western 'Time of Trouble' which appears to have begun sometime in the sixteenth century may be expected to find its end sometime in the twentieth century; and this prospect may well make us trouble; . . . We cannot say for certain that our doom is at hand; and yet we have no warrant for assuming that it is not; for that would be to assume that we are not as other men are; and any such assumption would be at variance with everything that we know about human nature either by looking around us or by introspection.
>
> This dark doubt is a challenge which we cannot evade; and our own destiny depends on our response.[233]

With these considerations of the psychological state of Toynbee in the crucial years of 1927 through 1929 in mind, it is important to turn next to the question of the shaping of his method for the massive Study. A normal point of

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[232] Ibid., VI, 314.

[233] Ibid., 320.

departure would be Toynbee's Volume Ten "acknowledgement" of his debt to Professor F. J. Teggart. In this paragraph with its accompanying footnote, Toynbee suggests that Teggart's contribution was methodological--that he rescued Toynbee from the "baffling obscurities in any initial problem of method and procedure . . . "[234] We have identified this initial attempt with his early struggles of 1920 through 1924 to give shape and substance to his pessimism about contemporary Western civilization, his sense of impending disaster and his great desire to awaken his contemporaries to the crisis by accurate prognostication of the fate of the West. What Teggart supplies sometime between the years 1925 when his Theory of History first appears and 1927 when Toynbee's "original notes" are constructed is "a sovereign clue which has not only initiated me into my subject but has piloted me through it."

The question as to "What is the nature of this sovereign clue from Teggart?", or "What methodological principles are taken from Teggart in shaping the methodology of the Study?" may be answered under four headings. Toynbee shares Teggart's strongly expressed desire to escape relativity, which is coupled with a strongly-worded attack on traditional historiography. Thirdly there is a heavy dependence by Toyn-

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[234] Ibid., IX, 232.

bee upon Teggart's explanation for the errors of traditional historiography as rooted in the eighteenth century. Finally there is a close similarity between the proposed solution of Teggart's "science of man" and the scientific motif in Toynbee.

As a preliminary and necessary observation one might note that the Toynbee of the Study gives explicit and enthusiastic credit to Teggart for his methodological aid, but Teggart in his Theory of History uses Toynbee as an example of the type of historiography he is combatting. It is not without significance that the Toynbee he attacks is the Toynbee of the "first attempt"; the Toynbee who wrote the chapter on "History" in the book The Legacy of Greece in 1922. This is the Toynbee who had the "ideas" for his Study but could not find an appropriate "form" for them. Teggart's criticism reads:

> The picture varies from writer to writer, but perhaps the most widely adopted type has been that arrived at by instituting an analogy between the life cycle of the individual and the entire existence of humanity. The most recent example of this mode of thought is not without interest.[235]

Teggart then adds a lengthy quotation from Toynbee's chapter in The Legacy of Greece on the analogy between Western Society and the birth and death of a person. Teggart dismisses Toynbee's theory and a variety of such theories advanced as a

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[235]Frederick J. Teggart, Theory of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), p. 42.

basis for a synthesis of world history, as "personal speculations" which are the "unavoidable result of the adoption of traditional historiography as the sole form for the statement of the results of historical investigation."[236]

It is difficult to know whether Teggart's criticism led Toynbee to give up his "first attempt" at a history of civilizations. Although there are in the Study several protestations as to the limited value of biological analogies, and direct assertions that societies are not organisms[237] it is likely that Toynbee had already found his first approach unpromising before his reading of Teggart's brief criticism.

Teggart's positive contribution to Toynbee may best be seen as a "sovereign clue" or way to escape the relativity of the historical observer. From the evidence in an earlier chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer" it would be difficult to deny that Toynbee was in his own view a methodological explorer, grappling with the wilderness of historical data, and the trackless wastes of as yet unframed historical questions. His problem is sketched out in his repeated use of the phrase "shimmer of relativity" and his self-description as an historian seeking for the "presence of some constant and absolute object of historical thought in the background."

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[236] Ibid., p. 43.

[237] Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 77; II, 219 and 230; VI, 175.

This approach to the study of history through a consideration of the problem of relativity is not at all characteristic of the writings of Toynbee before 1927. There is, however, in the writings of Teggart an almost unvarying approach to the theory of history by a posing of the problem of relativity in one aspect or another.

As early as 1916, in Teggart's Prolegomena to History, he introduces the subject of relativity by quoting from Principal Caird's address on "The Study of History" given at the University of Glasgow. Teggart selects Caird's questioning of the scientific status of the study of history, when Caird declares: "Knowledge which has not yet been elevated out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submitted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law, cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the higher education."[238] Following this quotation Teggart adds these words: "To this challenge there has been no adequate response on the part of those who are professionally engaged in the study and teaching of history." It is interesting to note Teggart's use of the terms "challenge and response" in 1916 and to speculate on its appearance as a possible source of Toynbee's famous thematic use of the terms in his

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[238]Frederick J. Teggart, Prolegomena to History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916), p. 3.

Study,[239] but it is more important for this analysis to note the fact that Teggart opens his subject with a series of conflicting views and opinions as to the validity and universality of historical knowledge.

In 1918, Teggart wrote a volume on The Processes of History.[240] Again the introduction to the subject is constructed around the "wide differences that exist between the many and various groups into which mankind is broken up." The heterogenous points of view listed by Teggart include not only the differences between French, Belgians, Italians, and other Europeans, but differences between Europe and Asiatic, between the Europeans and the Sikhs, Rajputs, Afghans, Buddhists and Mohammedans.

By 1925, Teggart is able to give more systematic expression to "present discontents" with the relativity of the social sciences. In his introduction to the Theory of History he summarizes his problem in this fashion:

> The problem with which we are confronted is set, then, by the fact that while publicists urge the need of a science of society in the name of the general welfare, and while teachers urge the need of instruction in the elements of 'social science' in the interest of the intelligence of the people, the higher learning of the universities, in response to these demands, offers only a series of

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[239]For various views see Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 207.

[240]Frederick J. Teggart, The Processes of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918).

> uncoordinated opinions as to the relationship of certain academic subjects, each of which pursues particular and separatist aims, by the employment of exclusive modes of investigation.[241]

A final example of Teggart's approach to the theory of history through the problem of relativity may be found in a 1927 address to the American Historical Association in which Teggart poses a question strikingly like the question in Toynbee's opening chapter of the Study.

> The question, then, which calls for an answer is whether our understanding of the greater problems of history must, in perpetuity, remain subject to the influence of transitory fashions in explanation; whether the formation of our judgments as to what 'actually happened' in the past must continue to be subordinate to interests--religious, philosophical, political, economic or social--which undergo change from generation to generation, if not from year to year.[242]

Our second area of investigation into the nature of the "sovereign clue" given to Toynbee by Teggart concerns the attack which both men make on traditional historiography. Again an argument from silence, while limited in usefulness, is in order. One might argue that the lack of a sense of methodological antithesis in the pre-Study writings of Toynbee is due to the fact that no particular occasion presented itself to the early Toynbee to discuss problems of method. However the series of sharp criticisms in the Study combined

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[241] Teggart, Theory of History, Preface xv-xvi.

[242] Frederick J. Teggart, Two Essays on History (Berkeley: Privately printed by Bruce Brough Press, 1930), p. 6.

with the fact that many of these criticisms repeat the Teggart criticisms gives greater credence to the view that part of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee discovered in Teggart was a deep discontent with contemporary historical methodology.

Teggart's general annoyance with the contemporary world of historical scholarship may be found in his frequent reference to the passivity and intellectual myopia of the historians. Like the later descriptions by Toynbee, "traditional" and "academic" are terms of disapproval. When Teggart sketches out his investigation in three successive phases, he introduces the analysis with the argument that:

> The critical aspect of the present inquiry has its outcome in finding, first, that history, so far from being 'scientific' has remained satisfied with its traditional function of constructing narratives of happenings in the past, . . . [243]

And as a more direct criticism of the historians, Teggart says, "It is remarkable, indeed, that the fact should not have impressed itself more generally on the minds of contemporary scholars that when established modes of procedure have brought to the surface irreconcilable views as to method and aim of inquiry in any field, the time has come for a far-reaching inquiry into the theoretical foundations of the subject in question."[244]

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[243] Teggart, Theory of History, Preface xix.

[244] Ibid., xiii.

Again in his 1927 address to the American Historical Association Teggart argues that, "The passive attitude of historians, during the last century, has placed a serious obstacle in the way of advance towards the scientific study of Man; it has proved a barrier to the acquisition of that knowledge which is required for the guidance of the world at the present time."[245]

The identification of traditional historiography with the current professional historians had already been made by Teggart in the book from which Toynbee took his "sovereign clue." There Teggart discusses the growing irritation of the other social scientists with their historian colleagues. He remarks that, "In the study of history, the activities of scholars give evidence of a widespread dissatisfaction with the conventional procedure of 'academic' historians." A reader of the ninth volume of the Study is reminded of the same observation put into a much more dramatic setting with Toynbee's word picture of the sea gulls and the "comically 'know-nothing' air of the domesticated ducks" of Round Pond in Kensington Gardens, London. As he describes it, the sea gulls were catching the morsels of bread thrown to the ducks by the visitors in the park, and the ducks "were saving their face by pretending not to notice how aggressively the boisterous trespassers were behaving." The moral of the story is

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[245]Teggart, Two Essays on History, p. 11.

not left to the intuitive powers of the reader for "When the writer heard his wife's voice asking him, in a tone of amused surprise, why he had suddenly burst out laughing, he realized that this comic encounter between ducks and gulls on the Round Pond in Kensington Gardens had moved him to mirth by presenting itself to his imagination as an animated allegory of a drolly similar encounter between historians and social scientists."[246] Toynbee, like Teggart, finds it difficult to understand how traditional and academic historians can continue to act like ducks when the sea gulls are swallowing up the food which belongs to the ducks by right of inheritance.

Our analysis of the elements of traditional historiography which Toynbee wished to repudiate included a notice of his sharp attack on "nationalistic" history. While it is true that Toynbee's dislike of nationalism was rooted in his experiences of the first World War and its bitter aftermath,[247] it is significant that his attack on nationalism in historiography so closely parallels the Teggart criticisms. If Toynbee's hostility to nationalistic historiography had stemmed from his journalistic experiences it is likely that his attack would have focused on the emotional prejudices of English, French, Turkish or Greek historians. What actually

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[246] Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 194.

[247] Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, pp. 361-362.

takes place is not an emotionally based irritation with the nationalistic prejudices of his fellow historians, but a high-level criticism of the limiting nature of the work of the universal historian when he has to work with the traditional units of national, political histories. In this situation the criticism is surprisingly like the Teggart criticism from which the following excerpt is taken:

> The type of synthesis dominant in the nineteenth century is a product of the movement, in political discussion, which has concentrated attention upon the idea of the State. Nationalistic history and the Theory of the State are products of one and the same set of conditions. They are alike particularistic, and alike result in a narrowing of sympathy and attention. The wealth of materials available for the study of the past of a country cannot be brought within the scope of any 'central government' synthesis. Nationalistic historiography can never do justice to the content of the past.[248]

It is rather significant that Teggart and Toynbee employ the same illustration of the limitations of nationalistic historiography. In 1925, Teggart says: "The restrictions imposed upon historical study and historical writing will be recognized at once if we consider any such phrase as the 'history of England.'"[249] A few years later, between 1927 and 1933, Toynbee says, "In setting out to look for some objective 'intelligible field of historical study,' it seems best to start with what is the usual field of vision of con-

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[248]Teggart, Theory of History, p. 36.

[249]Ibid., p. 35.

temporary Western historians, that is, with some national state. . . . Great Britain seems as good a choice as any."[250] Both historians procede to argue that the national unit cannot be considered as the basis for a universal history; Teggart in a brief way and Toynbee in a rather elaborate second chapter discussion.

Included in this second topic of comparison between Teggart and Toynbee should be the observation that Teggart adds to his "nationalistic," "passive," "traditionalistic," "academic," "narrative" and "synthesis" criticisms of contemporary historiography, the further criticism that it has misappropriated the title of "scientific"; and this criticism is echoed by Toynbee. Teggart points out this narrow definition of the term "scientific" in the statement: "As used by historians, however, the word 'scientific' signifies merely the use of a critical technique, and applies only to the mode of procedure followed in the establishment of particular facts; it does not suggest research directed to the solution of scientific problems, or imply the adoption of the 'method of science' as understood in other fields in inquiry."[251] Continuing his description of contemporary "scientific" methodology in a later context, Teggart observes that:

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[250]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 17.

[251]Teggart, Theory of History, p. 4.

> Historical criticism yields only isolated 'facts'. The academic historian pursues the activity of determining these facts 'in the faith that a complete assemblage of the smallest facts of human history will tell in the end; the labour is performed for posterity.' . . . Hence the academic historian holds to the belief that, having discovered the facts, all that remains to be done is to state what he has found without prejudice or bias.[252]

It is quite apparent that this is the source of Toynbee's attack[253] upon the "scientific" historians of the Late and Post Modern Western historians such as Mommsen and Ranke who "have given their best energies to the 'assemblage' of raw materials. . . . " And to one who has worked his way through Toynbee's polemic and back to Teggart's attacks, it is not surprising to find that one of Toynbee's favorite "whipping-boys," the Cambridge Modern History series, was brought to the post a few years earlier by Teggart in what figured to be a devastating rhetorical question at the conclusion of an attack on such synthetic histories:

> In the world as it is today, is the historical scholar to look forward to contributing the result of his specialized researches to some later Cambridge Modern History, or is he, on the other hand, to entertain the hope that his investigation may stand beside those of the biologist, for example, as contributing, through an added knowledge of the operations of nature, to the welfare of the human race?[254]

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[252] Ibid., p. 25.

[253] See page 16.

[254] Teggart, The Processes of History, p. 35.

The third part of this investigation into the nature of the "sovereign clue" which Toynbee finds in Teggart has to do with the explanation of the dilemma and roots of modern historiography. Toynbee recognizes his dependence on Teggart in his discussion of the antinomianism of modern historians, when he not only quotes directly and at length from the Theory of History,[255] but bases his reconstruction of the history of historiography on Teggart's thesis.

Teggart's explanation of how modern historians got off to such a poor start begins with Aristotle. He argues that "until recently, philosophy has asserted that history is not science." "The distinction," he adds, "goes back to Aristotle, who regarded science as knowledge of the universal, history as knowledge of the particular."[256] Although Toynbee does not make explicit reference to Teggart until he reaches Volume Five,[257] in a Volume One annex on problems of method in the Study, he gives an explanation of the origin of popular views of history which closely approximates Teggart's explanation. In his words:

> According to the popular view, the ascertainment and record of particular 'facts' is the technique of 'History'; . . . The elucidation and formulation of general 'laws' through a process of com-

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[255] Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 183.

[256] Teggart, Theory of History, p. 51.

[257] Toynbee, A Study of History, V, 10, n. 2.

> parative study is the technique of 'Science'; . . . These popular equations have a respectable origin--they can be traced back to Aristotle--. . . .[258]

From a discussion of Aristotle's primary error, both historians move to a discussion of the eighteenth century as the age in which modern historiography adopted a metaphysical system with rueful consequences for the study of history. Late in Teggart's Theory of History he summarizes the thesis of the book and gives a capsule treatment of a theme we have already seen in Toynbee.[259] Teggart's summary reads:

> The thesis of this book is that our present difficulties, in the field of the humanities, are the direct result of a continued adherence to certain methodological conceptions which had their beginning in the seventeenth century, and which received their characteristic formulation in the first half of the eighteenth century. It is imperative that we should understand that, in a sincere and devoted effort to reach a strictly scientific basis for the study of man, the humanists of the eighteenth century introduced an explicit separation between the study of 'events' and the study of 'change'. 'Change' to them represented nature's orderly procedure for attaining certain predetermined ends; 'events' to them appeared as accidental interferences with the 'natural order' of change. Hence it was believed that the scientific study of 'change' must proceed by making abstraction from the 'events' recorded by historians. . . . The influence of these methodological conceptions is evident today in the continued separation between history, on the one hand, and the 'sciences' of economics, sociology, and anthropology, on the other, . . .[260]

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[258] Ibid., I, 441.

[259] See page 14.

[260] Teggart, Theory of History, p. 198.

A student of Toynbee will recognize in the above statement an argument employed by Toynbee in the annex to Volume One, and in the Volume Nine section on the antinomianism of modern historians. In both places Toynbee argues that there is no intrinsic difference in method between the historian and the various social scientists. Using the successes of the anthropologists, economists, and other social scientists as examples, he concludes that the historians' battle for a separate discipline had been won by Science and these "picturesque antinomian" warrior historians had gone down to ignominious defeat.[261]

A fourth way in which Teggart influences Toynbee's method is found in the similar proposals or antidotes the two historians offer to the failure of traditional historiography. It is related to the three sections just under observation as a positive proposal is related to three aspects of a negative analysis, and will help us to see that Toynbee borrows from Teggart much more than just the ammunition with which to attack contemporary historiography.

One of the prominent questions asked by reviewers of Toynbee's Study is the question, "Is this History?" While almost all of the critics treat this question indirectly or

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[261]Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 216.

implicitly, some of them such as Barker,[262] Barnes,[263] den Boer,[264] Brinton,[265] Geyl,[266] Renier,[267] and Walsh,[268] explicitly raise the question and use it as a framework for their critique of Toynbee. Frequently this treatment of Toynbee is misleading. It assumes that everybody, or almost everybody, knows what "history" is, and that Toynbee is to be viewed as a confused, albeit magnificently erudite person, who somehow gets off the royal road of "history" into the religious and psychological quagmires on either side. While in a sense this jockeying for position in the contemporary academic race is made in response to Toynbee's attempts to maneuver the post-Western historians out of the race as anachronistic "warriors" or rather stupid "ducks" who are completely out of the main line of progress, the argument on this level shows little evidence of becoming fruitful. If one is to understand Toynbee's method it must be viewed as a

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[262]Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee's Study of History," International Affairs, XXXI (1955), 5-16.

[263]H. E. Barnes, American Sociological Review, XII (1947), 480-486.

[264]den Boer, "Toynbee and Classical History," p. 221.

[265]Crane Brinton, "Toynbee's City of God," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXII (Summer, 1956), 361.

[266]Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," 260.

[267]G. J. Renier, History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p. 215.

[268]Walsh, Philosophy of History, p. 215.

deliberate attempt to supersede traditional narrative historiography because of what he views as its inherent limitations. Teggart offers a way to do this, and a very attractive way with Teggart's insistent claim that what he is doing is "scientific" as opposed to the pseudo-scientific approach of the fact-gatherers. Under the banner of a "science of man," or bearing the title of "a scientific student of history" Teggart proposes to do what the adherents of the traditional method have been unable to do. In a decisive passage he explains his program in the following words:

> As a result of such an examination, it becomes apparent that the traditional method still adhered to by the historian, the statement of what has taken place in the form of narrative, does not lead to any explanatory conclusion; and so, if the whole attempt is not to be abandoned as vain and chimerical, it becomes necessary to find out how investigators have proceeded in other fields of history. This leads to the discovery that geologists and biologists utilize the historical information at their command, not for the purpose of constructing narratives of happenings, but to determine what have been the processes through which things have come to be as they are.
>
> The point of view thus gained at once clarifies the situation, for it reveals the significance of the chronological data which the human historian of today has inherited from his predecessors; it throws light upon the nature of the activities of a large and increasing number of historical students; and it displays the importance and utility of the great residuary body of historical facts which historiographers have been unable to incorporate in their narratives.[269]

Teggart's attack on the traditionalist position is

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[269]Teggart, The Processes of History, p. 38.

directed at the method of traditional historiography and the format in which this "history" appears. He argues that the usual narrative format is the result of a supposedly scientific method by which the historian gathers many facts, using the critical technique, then he narrates the story of "what happened." This narrative form means that the historian is unable to incorporate into his story many facts of great importance. The strictly chronological, narrative format is too narrow and restrictive to achieve a non-partisan, truly scientific, history. The use of the label "scientific" simply to designate the process of finding the facts without prejudice, of going to the original documents, of having a critical mind, is misleading, and the traditional historian thereby cuts himself off from the possibility of attaining truly scientific results.[270] Teggart's point is not simply that the narrative historian works with only part of the "scientific method" and is hence only partly successful. He insists rather that the narrative historian, while attempting to be objective by merely relating the facts which are somehow scientifically verifiable by a critical treatment of the documents, is in actuality adding to his conception of the facts by selecting only certain facts to narrate and by inferring the motives of the actors in history in order to

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[270]Teggart, Theory of History, p. 26.

fill out the narrative.[271] Teggart concludes that narrative history remains art and is not science.

In place of the narrative form which was based on an incorrect definition of the term "scientific" by the historian, Teggart proposes an analytical history which will be a search for the processes or the uniformities of the past. Arguing that the archaeologists and orientalists have removed the old barriers of insufficient data, he says, "With this difficulty removed, we may face the situation that the analytical study of history must be founded upon a comparison of the particular histories of all human groups, and must be activated by the conscious effort to take cognizance of all the available facts."[272]

Teggart attempts to support his "analytical" history over against the "narrative" history by pointing out certain evidences of a new movement within traditional historiography itself. His argument is that several historians, and foremost among them Lord Acton, are "reaching out in directions unknown to the older historiography." According to Teggart's analysis, these men are searching for the "elements" of history, whether those elements be "freedom," "class struggle," "sea power," or "religious revivals."[273] Of course, Teggart

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[271] Ibid., p. 66.

[272] Teggart, The Processes of History, p. 37.

[273] Ibid., p. 36.

does not conclude that these revolutionary historians are therefore following his call for a new "science of man" but he hopefully suggests that when they have found themselves and have become methodologically self-conscious, they will turn to analytical historiography as the school of the future.

In Teggart's view the simple narrative format will give place to a problem study. Stated generally the historian will pose for himself the problem, "how man everywhere has come to be as he is."[274] As Teggart expresses it in another context, we must view the present not as a situation but as a condition of things:

> Instead of the question, 'Why did a particular individual do this?', the inquiry, in the second case will take the form: 'How are we to account for the differences . . . which we encounter among different peoples?'[275]

Like the natural scientist he will be interested primarily in processes or uniformities. But he will differ from the natural scientist in that he will be dealing with dated events. Teggart explains it in this fashion:

> It follows that, having dated events to work from, the historian of man, when he comes to investigate processes, will adopt a procedure widely different from that followed by Darwin and his contemporaries. Instead of confining his attention to the present, utilizing the

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[274] Ibid., p. 5.

[275] Ibid., p. 74.

> facts of the past for purposes of verification only, he will begin by examining the evidence for the actual changes that have taken place. Hence the procedure which is bound up with the conception that the present is the key to the past will, if one might so say, be reversed, and 'History' will remain the study of the past with a view to the elucidation of the processes manifested in the present.[276]

The explorer motif which we found in Toynbee and which he coupled with the methodological explorations he felt that he was undertaking, are similar to expressions Teggart employs to describe his methodological reconstructions. In a discussion of this new science of man, Teggart does not hesitate to lapse into exhortations to other historians to follow him in the discarding of the narrative format of traditional historiography. One example of these interspersed exhortations may serve to illustrate this point.

> We must, then endeavor to meet our obligation through the utmost possible extension and utilization of historical study. In making this effort, we must recognize that we cannot rely upon others for guidance. . . . We are called upon to face the responsibility of creating an 'historical science', . . . we must set ourselves to the performance of a task which has not hitherto been undertaken, though its execution has long been overdue.[277]

In summary then, Teggart proposes a new history that will discard the narrative format. In its place a new historiography will be developed which in format and nature shall

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[276] Ibid., p. 127.

[277] Teggart, Two Essays on History, p. 11.

be analytical and comparative. "History" for Teggart will be a search for uniformities and processes. In his own words, "the older historical study will contribute the concept of 'events,' though the current acceptance of events as important in and for themselves will give place to the concept of events as the active element in change."[278]

This sharp de-emphasis of events in favor of processes is, of course, what immediately strikes the reader of Toynbee's A Study of History. Here is little to remind one of the traditional historical format; little to suggest a calendar of events from some ancient past to the present. What does impress the Toynbee reader is exactly the kind of "analytical history" for which Teggart was contending. The table of contents establishes not a series of subdivisions in the story of a people, war, or even civilization, but sets a series of problems for the author and reader to solve. As soon as the introductory chapters concerning problems of classification are out of the way, Toynbee launches into his inquiry, "at the natural starting-point, by considering how civilizations come into existence, . . . "[279]

A final objective in this general discussion of Toynbee as the "social scientist" is to review the expectations

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[278]Teggart, Theory of History, p. 148.

[279]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 183.

of Toynbee as he applied the "science of man" to the study of the past. It is clear from the earlier discussion in this chapter that Toynbee expected his law-making technique to solve the age-old problem of historical bias and relativity, and this in its most virulent form among his contemporaries as nationalistic historiography.

Deliverance from the egocentrism, nationalism and parochialism of the contemporary historians comes when he adopts a scientific method which is able to reveal uniformities in the past and present of a universal character. These uniformities or "laws" of history are not useful fictions nor fabrications of the historian's mind, but are reflections of the nature of the universe. In answer to the first major question Toynbee frames as the "natural starting-point" of his analytical history--the question of how civilizations come into existence, he traces an alternating rhythm which is common to all civilizations. Of this rhythm he remarks in Volume One of the Study, "We have now ascertained the nature of the geneses of civilizations. They are particular beats of a general rhythmical pulsation which runs all through the Universe."[280]

Again in Volume Three, Toynbee expresses a similar fear of historical relativism and counters with the faith that his scientific, comparative method will rescue the his-

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[280] Ibid., 205.

torian by enabling him to reveal underlying unities in the lives of civilizations. The last page of Volume Three, which marked the end of the first unit in the ten-volume Study significantly recapitulates the opening problem of Volume One:

> And thus we have returned, at the close of this third part of our Study, to the point from which we started at the beginning of the first part, when we dwelt upon the fact that in any age of any society all social activities, including the study of history itself, are governed by the dominant tendencies of the time and the place. Yet if we were merely to dwell on this point once again, we should be ending this part of our Study on a false note; for, as we have observed in our critique of the concept of Race, the variety that is manifested in Human Nature and in human life and institutions is a superficial phenomenon which masks, without impairing, an underlying unity.[281]

The analytical approach to history seemed to provide a means of escaping that species of relativity that Toynbee disliked above all others--the "naively vulgar native Western egocentric prejudice." This egocentricity seemed to be almost inherent in narrative historiography. As Toynbee observes,

> Such fixations of social emotion upon national groups become almost universal, and historians have been no more immune from them than other people. Indeed, the spirit of Nationality has appealed to historians with special force, because it has offered them some prospect of reconciling the common human desire for unity of vision with the Division of Labour imposed upon them by the application of the Industrial

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[281] Ibid., III, 390.

System to their work.[282]

The corrective to this prejudice was not the addition of new narratives to those already constructed; a gathering of more data to be worked up into new synthetic histories, but the establishment of a new standpoint.

> . . . the unavowed and unavowable axiom of egocentricity ought to be ruled out by adopting the contrary axiom that all representatives of any species of human society are philosophically on a par with one another.[283]

Toynbee's effort to drive out the nationalistic bias of his fellow historians was not restricted to writing such volumes as A Study of History. He had accepted an appointment in 1921 as Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Language, Literature and History at the University of London. Sir Daniel Stevenson's intention in founding this Stevenson chair of history as disclosed by Toynbee in the inaugural lecture was to counteract nationalistic prejudice in the teaching profession and in journalism by the provision of a Chair of International History at the University of London and the establishment of a Director of Studies in the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Toynbee notes in his address that the founder is persuaded that "in practically all countries the teaching of History and the class-books used therefore have had a strong nationalist bias. . . . "

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[282] Ibid., I, 10.

[283] Ibid., IX, 410.

Beyond the beneficial task of rooting out nationalism Toynbee could see an additional benefit in the new methodology. The discovery of laws in history provided a basis for predicting the future. In the light of his earlier "intimations of mortality" as he traveled in Greece and Crete before the outbreak of the first World War, and his sense of impending catastrophe in the years following that war, it is easy to understand why Toynbee would be fascinated with the element of predictability that his law-making technique seemed to promise in the 1927-1933 period.

This fascination with "prediction" is most clearly seen in Toynbee's notes of June, 1927 to June, 1929. It may be noted that many of his experiments with lengths of cycles and periods did not become sufficiently verifiable to find a place in the final text of the first three volumes of the Study as published in 1933, but their appearance in Toynbee's preliminary drafts is of great significance.

On one occasion in the notes for 1929 Toynbee labored over the problem of the length of the cycles in a disintegrating phase of civilization. To support his view that four-hundred and two-hundred year periods appear uniformly and a uniform number of times in a disintegration phase he turns to the phenomenon of wars in human history. His research and charts reveal a constant interval of approximately one hundred and three years between general wars so

that he is able to predict the outbreak of the second World War in the year 2035. It is a curious commentary on the fallibility of historians that nine years after this forecast based on empirical evidence, Toynbee was busily engaged in packing his forecast along with several chests of notes and research material to be sent to New York in the hope that they would survive the holocaust of the second World War in Europe. The same incident of the optimistic forecast followed by the unexpected arrival of a general war helps us to understand not only the early faith of Toynbee in what his new methodology promised to do, but sheds a great deal of light on the growing despair of Toynbee in the thirties and his disillusionment with his method as expressed in Volumes Four through Six.

C H A P T E R V

THE LATER TOYNBEE AS A "STUDENT OF LIFE"

" . . . it might begin to be possible for pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an angle of spiritual vision . . . "
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Seven

Use of the Term "Student of Life"

Approaching Arnold Toynbee's A Study of History as a major methodological document in modern historical studies we have sought to avoid artificial or imposed categories by examining the metaphors with which Toynbee has classified his methodological position. We stressed the repeated use of the explorer imagery in the Study. By the use of this motif Toynbee was able to indicate the two-fold nature of his task: he was to explore the validity and usefulness of new methodological principles amid the jungle of historical events, places, persons and interpretations; and he would explore the future of the West in a world which resembled the uncharted seas upon whose troubled surfaces most of the other ships of civilization had met disaster. The present study has brought to light his growing use of the explorer metaphor as Toynbee's early methodological optimism was severely challenged by a much more deeply-rooted historical bias than he had supposed. The "shimmer of relativity," which Toynbee sup-

posed would be readily brushed aside by his law-making technique, proved in later volumes to be deeply rooted. It was rooted, not simply in the social conditions of the historian's environment, but in the act of cognition itself. The explorer motif expressed Toynbee's growing methodological uncertainty, to the point where in the post-Study writings he regards the twenty-seven year Study as a highly speculative quest. He expressed the hope that somehow the variety of people asking questions of all the various kinds may help mankind "to take its bearing in a mysterious universe."

Having established the fact of a radical change in Toynbee's methodology, it then became important to study the basic "scientific" methodology with which Toynbee began his Study in 1927, and from which he turned in 1936. Chapter four of this study focused on Toynbee's effort to define himself as a "social scientist." By tracing all of the descriptive phrases clustered around Toynbee's notion of "a science of human affairs," we tried to determine the precise significance of the scientific motif in Toynbee's methodology; to explore its polemical usage within the Study; and to understand the vast confidence Toynbee had in the efficacy of the empirical method to pierce the shimmer of relativity in the foreground of the historian's vision.

The third self-characterization is the phrase "student of life." Again we have an expression used by Toynbee

in a significant way. It does not represent a casual reference to himself as a person who is interested in human life as over against scholars who are mechanistically oriented. The phrase emerges gradually in the Study as a particular banner under which Toynbee attacks the influence of piecemeal labor on modern historical studies. In the early volumes of the Study the author adopts certain arguments from the romantic or vitalist tradition in order to refute and dispose of the distortions which industrialism and mechanism have introduced into the historian's work.

He seems unaware of any antithesis in his dual roles as "social scientist" and as "student of life." Our task is to note in the early volumes, the infrequent yet nevertheless interesting polemical use of the "student of life" motif. In the later volumes there is a significant growth in the use and meaning of this motif as Toynbee loses confidence in his law-making technique, and turns increasingly to what had been at first a supplemental tool, the intuitions of the "student of life."

The "Student of Life" Motif Complements the Researches of the Social Scientist

Because we are tracing a dynamic situation, namely a reversal of roles within the corpus of Toynbee's master-work, we shall proceed by examining successive references to the student of life role in the Study. The first instance is

found in the opening chapter on "The Relativity of Historical Thought."[1] As argued earlier, the chapter is a springboard for Toynbee's whole quest to go beyond the "shimmer of relativity" in the confidence that there is "some constant and absolute object of historical thought in the background." In the chapter, two institutions are singled out as making such a deep impress on the transient social environment as to become almost a priori categories in the historian's mind. Hence if the historian is to discern the "Lineaments of some abiding form in the passing events" he must escape the influence of Industrialism and Nationalism.[2] To be sure, when Toynbee began his work in 1927, the sources of relativism were easily identifiable and much more susceptible of treatment than the deep-rooted and ineradicable relativity of which he speaks in his later essay on "The Limitations of Historical Knowledge."

Industrialism as an institution has put its impress on historical thought in two ways. Historians have followed the Industrial System by adopting assembly-line procedures for writing history [as in the Cambridge History Series] and by trying to adapt Western scientific thought to the study of history.[3]

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[1] Ibid., I, 16.

[2] Ibid., 2.

[3] Ibid., 3.

At this point in the argument one might expect to see Toynbee rejecting the positivist tradition in favor of a position resembling that of Dilthey or Collingwood. And indeed that hunch is strengthened by a footnote which refers to Dilthey's seventh volume. The similarity between Toynbee and Dilthey at this point is, at first, striking. Toynbee seems to argue that the methods of Physical Science are distinct from the methodology of the human sciences.

> The same method, however, has latterly been applied in many realms of thought beyond the bounds of Physical Science--to thought which is concerned with Life and not with inanimate Nature, and even to thought which is concerned with human activities. Historical thought is among these foreign realms in which the prestige of the Industrial System has exerted itself. . . . [4]

Dilthey's parallel argument is, "Die realen Kategorian sind . . . in den Geisteswissenschaften nirgends dieselben als in den Naturwissenschaften."[5] The similarity in views is especially noticeable in Toynbee's emphasis upon the richness and variety of life. He speaks of "thought which is concerned with Life and not with Inanimate Nature,"[6] and arrives at the conclusion that two methods of thought need to be distinguished in life.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig and Berlin, 1927), VII, 195.

[6] Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 3.

> In the world of action, we know that it is disastrous to treat animals or human beings as though they were sticks and stones. Why should we suppose this treatment to be any less mistaken in the world of ideas? Why should we suppose that the scientific method of thought--a method which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature--should be applicable to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures and indeed of living beings?[7]

This emphasis upon the richness of Life is reminiscent of Dilthey's theme of "life embracing life."[8] Nevertheless one must pursue the matter beyond these similarities to the really serious differences between the men. For example, if we look only at the similarities how can we account for the criticism of Collingwood, a man who has historical views admittedly close to Dilthey,[9] in which he argues:

> As a contrast with Oakeshott's work, which represents the transformation of historical thought from a positivistic stage to a new stage which I may perhaps call idealistic . . . I may here mention Professor Arnold Toynbee's great Study of History, which represents a restatement of the positivistic view itself.[10]

Obviously this search must be narrowed to the point where we can isolate which aspects of nineteenth-century positivism Toynbee rejects and which he accepts. To see the

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[7] Ibid., 7.

[8] H. A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p. 319.

[9] Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 172.

[10] Ibid., p. 159.

elements of positivism that he rejects one needs to understand the goal he is trying to reach and what it is that hinders the attainment of this objective. From the evidence in chapter one it would appear that Toynbee is attempting to write universal history--in the sense of a history that is capable of embracing all national groups and which will gain the assent of all parochial viewpoints. This aim is expressed in his praise of H. G. Wells' Outline of History.

> There is a strong tendency to depreciate works of historical literature which are created by single minds, and the depreciation becomes the more emphatic the nearer such works approximate to being 'Universal Histories.' For example, Mr. H. G. Wells' The Outline of History was received with unmistakable hostility by a number of historical specialists. They criticized severely the errors which they discovered at the points where the writer, in his long journey through Time and Space, happened to traverse their tiny allotments. They seemed not to realize that, in re-living the entire life of Mankind as a single imaginative experience, Mr. Wells was achieving something which they themselves would hardly have dared to attempt--something, perhaps of which they had never conceived the possibility.[11]

It is obvious from what follows that Toynbee had conceived the possibility.

Toynbee objects to nineteenth-century positivism because it hinders a whole view of history: "This deep impulse to envisage and comprehend the whole of Life is certainly immanent in the mind of the historian; and such

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[11]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 4-5.

violence is done to it by the Division of Labour which the analogy of the Industrial System imposes on historical thought. . . . "[12]

Toynbee's summary of the first chapter corroborates that his goal embraces universal history:

> These multiple tendencies can be summed up in a single formula: In the new age, the dominant note in the corporate consciousness of communities is a sense of being parts of some larger universe. . . .
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> If this observation is correct, and if it is also true that historians cannot abstract their thoughts and feelings from the influence of the environment in which they live, then we may expect to witness in the near future a change in the outlook and activities of Western historians corresponding to the recent change in the general conditions of Western Society . . . they will probably find their intelligible field of study in some landscape where the horizon is not restricted to the boundaries of a single nationality, and will adapt their present method of work to mental operations on a larger scale.[13]

Given this goal of a universal history, the objection to positivism was that it fractures the continuity of history into discrete parts, and likewise narrows the historian's vision into a parochial framework rather than a universal framework. To meet these shortcomings Toynbee turned to Bergson and vitalism.[14] He shares with Bergson a feeling of

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[12] Ibid., 8.

[13] Ibid., 15.

[14] Ibid., 9.

discontent with the scientific tradition,[15] and a turning to the romantic traditions in order to off-set its deficiencies. He resembles Dilthey in evincing a mutual interest in the romantic tradition, and an anti-mechanistic attitude. But the areas of agreement are fairly well circumscribed. Toynbee elects to follow Bergson rather than Dilthey in the initial volumes of his study. The distinction between Dilthey and Bergson occurs when Bergson defines vitalism in a biological sense, while Dilthey thinks of "Life" in terms of a human experience which is known from within.[16] Only a careful disentangling of the text and the philosophical threads will help explain why Toynbee can appear to dismiss the "scientific method of thought" as a methodological principle for the historian in chapter one;[17] then spend two hundred and seventy-one pages of Volume One developing a scientific method of thought and finally to conclude on that page of the same first volume:

> Have we not been guilty of applying to historical thought, which is a study of living creatures, a scientific method of thought which has been devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature? In making a final attempt to solve the riddle that has been baffling us, let us follow Plato's lead and try the alternative course. Let us shut our eyes, for the

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[15]Morton G. White, Age of Analysis (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), p. 19.

[16]Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 320.

[17]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 7.

> moment, to the formulae of Science in order to open our ears to the language of Mythology.[18]

This apparent contradiction in Volume One in which Toynbee warns himself against the "Apathetic Fallacy," i.e., treating living creatures as though they were inanimate, then falls victim in the succeeding chapters to the 'Apathetic Fallacy,' and finally attempts to outgrow the 'Apathetic Fallacy' by the use of mythology, is paralleled by what appears to be an equally contradictory attack by the critics. On the one hand Toynbee is taken to task for his dependence upon the methods of the natural sciences and his attempts to revive nineteenth-century positivism in historical thought.[19] On the other hand critics constantly point to his breach with the methodology of the natural sciences, either to praise or blame him for it.

> . . . no book that deals with human affairs has been more free from the blatant parochialism of our age and our civilization . . . , our naive submission to the one-eyed methodology of the physical sciences and 'objective scholarship.'[20]

Although we should acknowledge that criticisms of such divergent nature are partly explained by the fact that Toynbee seems to shift his ground in the course of the Study

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[18] Ibid., 271.

[19] Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 159.

[20] Lewis Mumford, "The Napoleon of Notting Hill," The New Republic, CXXXI (November, 1954), 17.

and that Collingwood's criticism was raised after the appearance of the first three volumes, it serves only to emphasize that Toynbee begins his work with the hope of reconciling two methodological positions. By refusing to follow Dilthey into the position of recognizing a radical distinction in the nature of the human science methodology, Toynbee appears to be confident in the first three volumes that the historian is not facing an either/or proposition.

Instead Toynbee was initially attracted to the new philosophical hero of his day, Henri Bergson. As Tangye Lean has observed:

> The year in which Toynbee graduated saw the works of Bergson, delayed by translation, sweep into Oxford in an abrupt and surprising flood. They came to Toynbee's own intellectual world with the force he has said, 'of a revelation.'[21]

Here was an opportunity to reject the current methodology as too mechanistic, deterministic, and rationalistic. Here was the opportunity to use "intuition as superior to the scientific intellect in its power to see all things and describe them accurately."[22] Yet for all its emphasis upon the continuity of time and life, this brand of romanticism did not seem to carry with it the rejection of "English empiricism." This was an important consideration for Toynbee as can be

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[21]Tangye Lean, "A Study of Toynbee," Horizon, XV (January, 1947), 25.

[22]White, Age of Analysis, p. 65.

seen in his argument against the views of Oswald Spengler. Crucial in the argument is the characterization of Spengler's position as German transcendentalism and his own position as English empiricism.

> In the foregoing series of passages, in which Spengler carries his dogma of relativity from the domain of Art into almost every other domain of social life, there is a magnificent logic; and an English empiricist might find this German transcendentalist a formidable antagonist if he were rash enough to challenge him to a tournament with his own German weapons.[23]

Hence it is not with the either/or of Dilthey but with the both/and of Bergson that Toynbee confidently begins his massive Study. The proof that Toynbee supposed the "Scientific method" is valid but not able to reach far enough into the mysteries of life; that the language of intuition can penetrate the mystery and then translate itself into scientific truths, will unfold as we trace Toynbee's growing reliance on the intuition of the student of life. In this section, let us simply note the awareness he seems to have that we must "go beyond" the present methodological limits. In the same controversial first chapter in which he reaffirms his faith that relativity of viewpoint can be superseded, the methodological change that Toynbee predicts is expressed in the metaphor of "lifting the horizon" and "operations on a larger scale."

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[23]Toynbee, A Study of History, III, 382.

> . . . so, in the new age upon which we have entered, they [the historians] will probably find their intelligible field of study in some landscape where the horizon is not restricted to the boundaries of a single nationality, and will adopt their present method of work to mental operations on a larger scale.[24]

Summarizing our results at the end of this attempt to find out why Toynbee describes himself as a "student of life," we can say that Toynbee the "student of life" must supplement Toynbee the "social scientist" if he is to reach his goal of writing universal history. To transpose it into methodological terms one might say that the romantic tradition must supply the intuition because it sees life as a whole, while the scientific tradition must supply the means of testing the validity of the clues given by intuition, and together universal and universally valid history will be possible. But this is to move somewhat ahead of our systematic tracing of the role of a "student of life."

The next instance of the "student of life" motif is found in a series of references to the planes of life. In this running criticism of the parochial historian who has used the scientific method in order to treat his subject in building-block fashion, Toynbee argues that this parochialism is due to a superficial view of life. While observing the failure of the "Western historians" to write history in which

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[24] Ibid., I, 15.

other than western civilizations have had fair treatment, Toynbee contends that: "In the first place, his vision of the contemporary world must be confined to the economic and political planes of social life and must be inhibited from penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper but is fundamental."[25] This repeated description of the economic, social, and political planes as "superficial" in comparison to the fundamental cultural plane is clearly attached to Toynbee's search for "an abiding form" in the flux of historical change. In almost the identical language with which he expressed the hope of finding an escape from the relativity of social environment at the end of his first chapter, Toynbee indicates that the "abiding form" is actually found on this cultural level.

> On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes to see, the lineaments of the four living non-Western civilizations are still clear.[26]

The assertions about political, economic, social and cultural levels of experience are not argued in the text but are simply declared to be either superficial or fundamental. The curious reader will ask the question, "On what basis is the classification of 'planes' made"? The answer appears to be that the cultural level is significant because it is here

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[25] Ibid., 151.

[26] Ibid.

that Life is dynamic and lasting.

> If, however, their mental vision had penetrated through the political plane to the cultural plane beneath, they would have realized that, even if the first appearances on the political plane had been entirely confirmed by closer investigation, the static condition, on this plane, of the societies which they were studying was of little or no significance in view of the wealth and life which reveal themselves in the histories of these same societies as soon as the observer's attention is transferred from the superficial to the fundamental plane of social existence. By ignoring the cultural plane and by equating politics with Life, Western observers arrive at an opinion about non-Western histories which exposes the confusion of their thought as much as it ministers to their self-esteem.[27]

A similar occurrence of the "student of life" role is found in the annex to Volume One. Here again the appeal is made to planes of life in which "superficial" and "fundamental" are the descriptive adjectives. Again the economic and political planes are dismissed as "material planes" and the cultural plane is singled out as a deeper level. The context of the argument is Toynbee's attempt to answer the "Diffusionist doctrine." The Diffusionists hold to the view that the "geneses of civilizations can be accounted for by the fact that certain techniques and aptitudes and institutions and ideas can be proved historically to have been acquired, by the majority of those who have eventually acquired them,

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[27] Ibid., 165.

through the process of Diffusion."[28] Toynbee tries to counter this position which is incompatible with his creative evolutionary thesis by the argument that the Diffusionists have been betrayed by the "relativity of historical thought."

> The ultra-modern Western scholar is apt to be betrayed insidiously, by the mental atmosphere in which his mind is constrained to work, into persuading himself that, because Western serving-machines and Western rifles and Western cotton goods have been diffused throughout the Orthodox Christian and Islamic and Hindu and Far Eastern Worlds in these latter days, this diffusion of Western knick-knacks is tantamount to the conversion of these four other living societies to our Western Civilization.[29]

The argument proceeds a step further than its earlier form when he goes on to state that this cultural plane is the area of the soul. Here is the plane of "inner spiritual life" of a civilization which is not superficial but is their "real life."[30] Given that Toynbee is in search of historical truth which is not subject to the relativity of the social environment, and that he continually speaks of finding the answer on the cultural plane which is "real life," it is not difficult to trace the steady progression from history as the history of civilizations to history as the history of the soul.

However, this writing of "history" as the "history of

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[28] Ibid., 427.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 429.

religion" is still twenty years in the future for the Toynbee of Volume One, so let us trace his increasing consciousness of himself as a "student of life." In Volume One he remains a "student of life" who tries to balance the opposing principles of Diffusion and of the Uniformity of Nature in order to account for the richness and variety of life. This appeal to "Life" and the "student of Life" as over against the sterility of the purely intellectual approach of the scientist and philosopher makes its hesitant entrance in this opening volume to be exploited in full development in the later volumes.

> Thus, in any objective study of the process of acquisition . . . we have to allow for the operation, side by side, of two different principles. . . . The proper task of the student of Life is not to magnify either principle tendenciously at the other principle's expense but to render to both principles their real due.[31]

Even though it involves slicing into a complex argument that will be treated as a whole under a later heading, let us observe a reference to the "student of Life" role in the annex to I. C(iii) (e). The implication that the historian "student of Life" somehow goes beyond the researcher who is limited to the technique of science is clearly set forth in this attempt to distinguish the historian from the dramatist or anthropologist.

Our historians are apt to pride themselves on

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[31] Ibid., 426.

> the enrollment of these scientific auxiliaries as being the greatest advance which the study of history has made in recent times; and we may venture to agree with them in this without exposing ourselves to a charge of inconsistency; for while we have criticized them at the beginning of this Study for trying to apply the technique of Science outside its province, we have never objected to their employing the sciences in a menial capacity as hewers of wood and drawers of water.[32]

The next sustained use of the élan motif in relation to the historian's role as "student of Life" is found in Volume Three. The whole volume treats the growth of civilizations, and in the course of the argument Toynbee discusses "Life" or the élan vital as that mysterious factor operative in the growth of a society. Important for our analysis is the series of warnings issued in the discussion to the effect that the application of our Western Physical Science to Life or the study of Life might have serious consequences. For example, Toynbee develops the thesis of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World in order to show how dangerous it would be to "peg" our Western Society at a certain level and thus rule out fresh spiritual creations.[33] The fear that the life of society might be arrested because of the sterilizing effect of the application of Physical Science to human affairs, rests upon Bergson's hypothesis, as Toynbee goes on to point out

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[32] Ibid., 446.

[33] Ibid., III, 101.

that "the will has it genius, as well as the intellect, and genius defies all prognostication."[34]

The protection of the unique, unpredictable, spiritual element of life leads Toynbee steadily toward a position which undermines his original hope of finding laws in history. Still pondering the relation of élan to the question of growth in civilizations, he concludes that although it is possible to talk about laws in Inanimate Nature, the question of uniqueness must prevail in any analysis of the relations between Man and Man.

> And it has been a harder task to domesticate animals and plants than to dominate Inanimate Nature--to harness the horse than to harness the tide. Inanimate Nature obeys regular laws which Man has merely to work out in order to apply them mechanically for his own practical purposes. It is infinitely harder to cope with the waywardness and complexity of Life; . . .[35]

It would be premature to conclude that Toynbee in Volume Three turns away from his original plan of avoiding the relativism and subjectivism of historical studies by means of a discovery of the intelligible units of history and the laws of their behavior. At the most we can detect here a realization on Toynbee's part that a dependence upon the élan motif and an emphasis upon the complexity of Life makes

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[34] Ibid., 118.

[35] Ibid., 159.

his goal much more difficult to attain.

How much more difficult is seen in his criticism of H. G. Wells. We observed in the opening chapter of the Study that Wells was singled out by Toynbee as an historian who sought a universal view of man in history. The "whole monumental work" is again applauded in Volume Three but Toynbee now lodges the complaint that Wells does not go far enough. In dealing with Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Wells is content with "a mere description and classification and docketing of the outer man."[36] This criticism could come from Collingwood and Dilthey; especially in the light of Toynbee's added phrase that Wells should have exercised his imagination "by an intuitive sympathy of one soul with another." The criticism that "he regards history as a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian, phenomena presented externally to his gaze, not experiences into which he must enter and which he must make his own"[37] could be inserted into Toynbee's criticism of Wells with little disturbance of the chain of thought. But this is actually the criticism levelled at Toynbee by Collingwood! Can we then conclude that Toynbee has now come around to the position of Collingwood or Dilthey? Evidently not, because Toynbee is

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[36]Ibid., 195.

[37]Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 163.

not applying a radical criticism to Wells' methodology. Under the influence of the élan motif defined in a spiritual rather than biological sense, Toynbee is arguing that Wells does not do justice to Life by stopping with mere description and classification. In Toynbee's eyes, Wells' method is not so much wrong as inadequate. The historian qua "student of Life" must proceed via imagination to the inner man.

The close tie of the élan motif with the problem of proper historical method is apparent in Toynbee's discussion of the disintegration of civilizations. He asserts that once civilizations have started to disintegrate and the élan vital has gone out of them, the student can then describe them in "cause and effect" terms. In this case mechanism has replaced creativity, and the civilization is now on a traveling belt of interlocking cause and effect. Hence in Volume Five we find several references to the possibility that the historian may use two ways of description. He may describe a broken-down civilization in mythological language as "remorselessly condemned to eventual destruction," or in scientific language as "mechanically dispatched to the same grim goal on a traveling belt of interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked."[38] A later reference continues the distinction of describing a

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[38]Toynbee, A Study of History, V, 13.

civilization in "two different ways," but substitutes the terms "Life" and "Inanimate Nature" for "mythological language" and "scientific language."

> . . . a profound change sets in if and when the civilization breaks down and goes into disintegration. This change can be described in two different ways, according as we speak in the language of Life or in terms of Inanimate Nature.[39]

For the purpose of tracing the role of "a student of Life" in Toynbee's Study, the distinction between two languages is not important. These "ways of describing" are not mutually exclusive in this context. On the contrary the two ways of description are put forward as supplementary to one another for the "student of Life" who is trying to study civilizations of the past. In the Seventh Volume Toynbee pushes the distinction beyond the verbal level and develops a thoroughgoing dichotomy between language and order of knowledge. But before we reach that major turn in the formulation of his historical methodology, let us notice some intervening references.

While pursuing references to the historian who deals with "Life" rather than with merely Inanimate Nature, we should notice a growing shift in language. Although it is somewhat premature to discuss the fascination which Toynbee develops for depth psychology later, there is a trend in that

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[39] Ibid., 198.

direction even in Volume Five. We observed Toynbee's interest in an objective view of history which he argued could be found on the cultural plane where the "real" life of a society is in evidence as distinct from its passing and superficial politico-economic plane of existence. The category of "planes" seems to lose ground as Toynbee proceeds with the Study. The transitional phraseology between the "planes" of the first three volumes and the "Collective Subconscious" of his concluding volumes appears to be the "spiritual depths" of Volume Five. Once again the context is concerned with the mystery of "Life," with the complex, spiritual element in life that can only be grasped by the "student of Life" who goes beyond the work of the social scientist.

> What are these two ways of life which produced these vast spiritual effects when they were respectively adopted in place of Archaism by Cato and in place of Futurism by Peter? In peering into spiritual depths which may prove unfathomable, let us begin by taking note of the common differences. . . .[40]

The "Student of Life" Motif Raises an Epistemological Dilemma Which Threatens to Invalidate the Method of Toynbee the "Social Scientist"

Critics of Toynbee have noticed an increasing interest in religion in the second half of Toynbee's Study and we have been tracing this trend in terms of the "student of Life" role. In Volume Six the methodological problem resi-

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[40] Ibid., 393.

dent in this dual role of "student of Life" and "social scientist" comes into sharp focus. We have heard Toynbee's initial warning to beware of the dangers of dividing the historian's task into small unrelated units, as has happened in man's technological endeavor under the impact of science and industrialism. A universal view, Toynbee felt, could be obtained by adding the intuitions of the past to the work of the social scientist. It was further research as a "student of Life" on the cultural plane which led Toynbee to a discussion of spiritual dimensions in life. There arises a growing question, not so much as to the inadequacy of scientific methodology, but as to the adequacy of reason itself. In the name of "Life" Toynbee begins to challenge Humanism in Volume Six, assailing its very presuppositions.

> However parochial the savage's horizon may be on the plane of sheerly human life on the surface of this planet, his soul still lives and moves in a spiritual environment with a superhuman dimension which the modern Western humanist has deliberately excluded from his reckoning. The humanist purposely concentrates all his attention and effort upon a purely human cross-section of life which he abstracts from the totality of his spiritual environment by a mental operation that is performed for the practical purpose of bringing human affairs under the human control.[41]

The analysis of the possibilities of mental operations is carried further in this same context by added observations on the "spiritual dimension." Toynbee here suggests

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[41] Ibid., VI, 13.

that the spiritual dimension may not be an aspect of life which can be encompassed by a wider vision, i.e., by finding an intelligible field of study that will enable us to escape the relativity of the social environment. The spiritual dimension in history is a "mode of spiritual being" which greatly complicates the problem of knowing in the historical process.

> However large its area on Earth, Man's Universe cannot give Man's spirit room to breathe unless it also extends from Earth to Heaven; and our modern Western school of humanists have perhaps been peculiar, as well as perverse, in planning to reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of Babel on terrestrial foundations in these dimensions--as though it were sheer physical distance, and not any difference in mode of spiritual being, that divided and distinguished Heaven from Earth.[42]

With the distinction pressed beyond a distinction in methods, Toynbee poses for himself the task of knowing by means of spiritual intercourse. This way of knowing is distinguished from an intellectual apprehension of reality by use of the terminology "Head" and "Heart." For example, Toynbee seeks to make this distinction in the case of the philosopher's knowledge as opposed to the saint's knowledge.

> Yet, for all their sublimity, these three attributes of the Divine Nature are in themselves no more than conclusions of the human understanding; they are not experiences of the human heart; and, while it is no doubt possible for a human soul which has made its first discovery of God on the intellectual plane to enter into communion with

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[42] Ibid., 14.

> Him thereafter on that higher level of spiritual intercourse on which human beings are able to love, as well as know, their human fellow creatures, the attainment of communion with God.[43]

If this train of thought is a faithful reproduction of a growing dilemma in Toynbee, we find a further elaboration of it in his crucial discussion of "Transfiguration." Although often overlooked, this chapter rivals the initial chapter of the Study in methodological significance. Volumes Five and Six are concerned with the process of the disintegration of civilization, and more specifically with the problem it presents to the Soul living in such intolerable circumstances. Leading up to chapter eleven in which "Transfiguration" is introduced as the only possible alternative for the searching Soul, Toynbee concludes that "we have already passed in review three different attempts to find one; but, so far, our survey has brought us each time to the dead end of a blind-alley."[44]

There follows a twenty-page description of the way of Transfiguration for the Soul in a disintegrating civilization. Does this "Soul" refer solely to past situations or does Toynbee regard himself as suffering similar dilemmas? It is my opinion, in the light of the following evidence, that Toynbee identifies himself as a twentieth-century histo-

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[43] Ibid., 41.

[44] Ibid., 149.

rian with the Soul who finds an answer in "Transfiguration."

There are two kinds of evidence which can be cited. First, the "Head" and "Heart" distinction is used to refute the "Way of Detachment." We know from later discussion that Toynbee is concerned as an historian to yoke together the Heart and the Head "in a common enterprise of striving to reach and grasp this hidden treasure [a unitary truth]."[45] In the final paragraph of chapter ten concerning Detachment as a way of life he argues that Detachment is no solution to the Soul. " . . . for in consulting only the head and ignoring the heart it is arbitrarily putting asunder what God has joined together."[46] The way of Detachment is linked with the philosophers or the rationalists as distinct from the saints and the men of faith. Furthermore the way of the Head, or intellect, must be superseded by the way of the Heart. In concrete terms, "therefore the philosophy of Detachment has to be eclipsed by the mystery of Transfiguration. The Hinayana makes way for the Mahayana, Stoicism for Christianity, the Arhat for the Bodhisattva, the sage for the saint."[47]

Second, the pronoun "we" is used to emphasize a sense

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[45] Ibid., VII, 505.

[46] Ibid., VI, 148.

[47] Ibid.

of being personally involved. The passage on "Transfiguration" begins with the usual phraseology of the student of history who is examining certain phenomena of the past. As in earlier cases the "we" has the sense of an observer;

> We have found that the experience of being constrained to live in the adverse social environment of a disintegrating civilization confronts the Soul with a spiritual problem. . . .[48]

So he continues to discuss the "Soul" in the light of an historical observer until the second paragraph where he suddenly switches the "we" from a formal, stylistic usage to a participant in this search for escape.

> As we gird up our loins to take this fourth and last turning a clamour of disapproving and derisive voices assails our ears. Shall we allow ourselves to be intimidated by this chorus of protest? Shall we abandon at this point a course of exploration which has hitherto proved so disappointing as it has been laborious? It is tempting to yield to the promptings of weariness and disillusionment. Yet, before we do give in, it may be well to consider whether we really wish to resign ourselves to remaining imprisoned in a city of destruction--like rats in a trap--so long as there is still one possible egress left untried. . . . When we look the hostile chorus in the face we see before us nothing more formidable than the sullen countenances of the baffled philosophers. . . .[49]

The tie that connects the Soul in a collapsing society with the historian hampered by a disintegrating methodology is a common search; the "Soul" is searching for the

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[48] Ibid., 149.

[49] Ibid.

lasting value, and the historian is searching for the absolute behind the relativity of events. Keeping in mind the initial passage of Toynbee in Volume One as to his search for the "abiding form" behind the "shimmer of relativity," notice the similar way in which he describes the "Soul" in a disintegrating society.

> The painful perturbing dissolution of familiar forms, which suggests to weaker spirits that the ultimate reality is nothing but a chaos, may reveal to a steadier and more penetrating spiritual vision the truth that the flickering film of a phenomenal world . . . is an illusion which cannot for ever obscure the lasting unity that lies behind.[50]

The same identification of the historian and the "Soul" is indicated in a later passage in which Toynbee describes the self-transcendence of the futurist. The "Soul" that turns to futurism as a way of escape from a disintegrating society will be disappointed, but in his disappointment he might stumble upon the way of transcendence.

> Through the disappointment of a mundane hope we have been admitted to an apocalypse or discovery of a reality which has been there all the time behind the scenes of the narrow man-made stage that has hitherto set the limits of our field of vision and of action.[51]

The significance of this passage rests upon the attached footnote in which he spells out the direct relationship between the Soul and the contemporary historian: "The quest

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., 129.

that originally led us into this Study was the hope of seeing through the 'shimmer of relativity in the foreground of historical thought.'"[52]

Further evidence that chapter eleven on "Transfiguration" focuses for us Toynbee's methodological problem as well as the problem of the Soul in a foundering society may be found in a figure of speech common to both problems.

The figure of speech is that of a man who gains a mountaintop view of the surrounding countryside. In this context the overall view can be gained either by means of flying in an airplane or climbing a mountain. The figure of speech is applied to the Soul in a splintering society as a situation in which he must escape the familiar collapsing forms in order to see the larger whole. Toynbee frequently uses the same figure of speech to describe the work of the historian. For example he acknowledges the contribution of Augustine to a supra-mundane range of vision.[53] The frequency of appearance of this metaphor as a description of the historian's task has been noted in an earlier section of our discussion.

If it is true, that Toynbee identifies his role of an historian in a methodological dilemma with the predicament

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[52] Ibid., n. 1.

[53] Ibid., IV, Preface.

of the Soul in a disintegrating society, then this section sheds light on the methodological shift in the Study as well as the shift in Toynbee from history to history of religion. Of the whole crucial chapter on "Transfiguration" the key passage is the one in which Toynbee asserts:

> To know Him--and, through Him, the Kingdom over which He reigns--it is not enough for our yokel in his airplane to see the world with the eye of a hawk.

We will break the quotation at this point to interject the argument that this was precisely what Toynbee originally hoped was possible--to find a large enough field of study, the intelligible unit of civilization, to make parochialism impossible.

> The man must be given an eye which not only magnifies but also penetrates into other dimensions. What he needs is the eye of the poet, . . .

Again one might observe that if Toynbee had stopped at this point he would still be within the framework of his original plan because he has earlier argued that a poet's contribution to the historian's search can be valuable. The poet has an insight that can be translated into the language and work of the empirical historian. Now Toynbee adds a further qualification:

> And the poet who has this vision of the transfiguration of This World by the Kingdom of God must also be something of a prophet, for he must have an intuition of the Godhead which poetry alone cannot give him. The act of Transfiguration

> is a mystery because it is an act of God and an effect of God's presence--and this is a truth which has been less obscure to the Jewish futurist than to the Greek philosopher.[54]

Far from being an isolated reference, the same chapter contains a similar conclusion. In this case Toynbee is attempting to describe the Civitas Dei. The point of interest for our methodological analysis is the use of the phrase "a supra-mundane spiritual dimension." This is the old "cultural plane" of Volume One on which Toynbee hoped to find an "abiding form" as distinct from the "shimmer of relativity." Gradually, as we observed earlier, the cultural plane became a "spiritual dimension." Now it is a "supra-mundane spiritual dimension."

> As far as this Civitas Dei enters into the Time-dimension at all, it is not a mere dream of the future but is a spiritual reality which is at all times present in This World besides existing--and, indeed, just because it exists--as well in an Eternity and an Infinity that are in a supra-mundane spiritual dimension.[55]

Put in relation to a question posed by Toynbee in chapter one of Volume One where he asks if it is possible to ascertain "the presence of some constant and absolute object of historical thought,"[56] the answer of Volume Six is that this "constant and absolute object" is the Civitas Dei. How

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[54] Ibid., VI, 161.

[55] Ibid., 156.

[56] Ibid., I, 16.

the historian knows about this Civitas Dei is the vital question for other historians. Toynbee's answer is that this "problem may be intractable to attempts to solve it in terms of logic."[57] In a footnote he compares our knowledge of the Civitas Dei to the "rending of a veil in order to bring into view a hitherto invisible kingdom that has been in existence in the background all the time and has merely been awaiting the hour appointed for its revelation."[58]

Although there is considerable diversity among the critics as to Toynbee's relation to Christianity, and a noticeable variation in Toynbee's own convictions about Christianity, we can observe in a preliminary way that Volume Six contains his closest affirmation of a "Christian" view of history. Espousals of Christianity climax this long argument on the Soul in a disintegrating civilization:

> The member of a disintegrating mundane society who has taken this road has a surer hope, and therefore a deeper happiness, than the merely once-born member of a mundane society that is still in growth; for he has learnt the saving truths that 'the Most High hath not made one world, but two,' and that the human wayfarer who still finds himself a sojourner in This World is not on that account beyond the pale of the Other World but is travelling all the time within the domain of the Kingdom of God and is at liberty to live as a citizen of this omnipresent commonwealth here and now, if he is willing with all his heart to pay allegiance to

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[57] Ibid., VI, 157.

[58] Ibid., 156, n. 4.

> Christ the King and to take upon himself those obligations of citizenship which Christ has consecrated by voluntarily fulfilling them in person. This entry into the Kingdom of God is a second birth.[59]

Effects of This Turning Point in the Study

It would clarify the significance of this turning point to examine how critics of Toynbee have ignored changes in his views. Some of their wholesale attacks apply either to the early empirical, or the later religious Toynbee, but not to both. It is usually claimed that Toynbee deliberately abandons the Enlightenment criteria of empirical reason.

The clearest spokesman for the charge of antirationalism is probably Karl Popper. He includes Toynbee's work in his study of The Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper carefully conditions his attack when he says: "I wish to make it clear that I consider this a most remarkable and interesting book, and that I have chosen it because of its superiority to all other contemporary irrationalist and historicist works I know of."[60]

The criticisms of Popper are directed toward the historicist attitude in Toynbee's Study, i.e., "the fashion of

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[59] Ibid., 168.

[60] Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (rev. ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 435.

not taking arguments seriously . . . the attitude of looking at once for the unconscious motives and determinants in the social habitat of the thinker, instead of first examining the validity of the argument itself."[61] Popper describes the general situation in the Study in the following way.

> Thus I think that we have every right to make the socioanalytical diagnosis that Toynbee's neglect to take serious arguments seriously is representative of a twentieth century intellectualism which expresses its disillusionment, or even despair, of reason, and of a rational solution of our social problems, by an escape into a religious mysticism.[62]

Again stressing the change in Toynbee, Popper summarizes his description of the Study thus:

> A social science which cannot quite meet these demands is therefore inclined to defend itself by producing elaborate attacks upon the applicability of science to such problems. Summing up my historioanalytical diagnosis, I venture to suggest that Toynbee's historicism is an apologetic antirationalism, born out of despair in reason, and trying to escape into the past, as well as into prophecy of the future.[63]

Of course Popper is not alone in the criticism of Toynbee's antirationalism. Renier remarks that: "I dislike Toynbee's method, because it dwells in the sphere of myth and allegory, outside rationality, and because the intense loyalties he

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[61] Ibid., p. 436.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., p. 440.

inspires are equally innocent of rationality."[64]

A critic in the "London Times" argues that "in another section there are some pertinent criticisms of the antinomianism of modern historians; nevertheless, Dr. Toynbee feels, the laws of history may be transcended in the 'Law of God which is perfect Freedom,' thus turning a moral insight into an epistemological principle which makes all reasoning impossible."

A. J. P. Taylor in "The New Statesman and Nation" of October, 1954, makes a rather passionate attack on the irrationalism of Toynbee. After quoting Toynbee's intuition about the superiority of higher religions over civilizations as the vehicle for helping human beings make their pilgrim's progress, Taylor retorts: "The echo from Bunyan is not accidental. These monstrous volumes with their parade of learning are a repudiation of Rationalism."[65] In the same vein as Taylor, Christopher Hill berates Toynbee as a betrayer of rationalism.

> Nevertheless, after all is said, A Study of History can only be described as a very sad book. It is sad because its final aim is to lead us to a conscious and deliberate irrationalism.[66]

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[64]Renier, History, pp. 215-219.

[65]Ibid., p. 117.

[66]Christopher Hill, "Time and Mr. Toynbee," Modern Quarterly, II (n.d.), 291.

Mr. Hill is not content to identify a general trend toward religion in the Study but specifies the personal goal of Toynbee in a rather dramatic fashion when he writes that Toynbee "turns back in fear and horror when he perceives where his own assumptions are leading his argument; and he ends on his knees praying for a miracle. He has written himself into the Roman Catholic Church. . . . "[67]

These charges of irrationalism or antirationalism have much in common with a series of criticisms which come from several Dutch scholars. Verbally, the criticisms of Geyl and Baudet appear to be quite unrelated to the "anti-rationalist" charges, but actually both schools of critics agree on the distorting effect of a Toynbee who has passed this point under discussion in his methodological development.

We have seen Toynbee's crucial decision to turn to the spiritual dimension for his clue to history; or, as he expresses it, to pay allegiance with all his heart to Christ the King in order to gain a revelation of the "abiding forms." This move has been interpreted as an escape mechanism, or "despair in reason" by the rationalists. Obviously the implication is that this escape into irrationalism leads the historian to a distortion of history. Geyl and Baudet

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[67] Ibid.

begin with a discussion of the "vision" and argue that this "compelling vision" is the distorting factor in Toynbee's Study. Geyl argues:

> But when a man comes to the past with a compelling vision, a principle, or dogma, or such magnitude and emotional potency as Toynbee's unity in the love of God; with a system which causes him to reduce the multitudinous movement of history to one single criterion, rejecting most of them, and incidentally his own, as unimportant; that man can write a work full of color and striking theories, . . . but no history. . . . The Student of History, as Toynbee calls himself, may know more of history than I shall ever do, but he is no historian. He is a prophet.[68]

Baudet has a similar criticism. Describing the Study as a theodicy and accounting Augustine as the chief contributor to Toynbee, Baudet observes:

> 'Primary vision,' that is the original basic thought, the idea with which Toynbee commenced writing his book. One always begins with an idea, a brain-wave. Many have criticized Toynbee's primary vision as a theoretical 'a priori.' Certainly, it is that, too. But is such an 'a priori' not a self-evident and inevitable basis of theoretical thought; a compelling necessity? That is also the opinion of Romein, who has even referred to the famous 'a priori' of Gibbon in order to demonstrate that vision simply originates in such a way.[69]

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[68]Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," 269.

[69]"'Primaire visie', dat is de oorspronkelijke kerndedachte, de idee, waarmee Toynbee begonnen is zijn boek te schrijven. Men begint altijd met een idee, een inval. Vele hebben Toynbee zijn primaire visie theoretisch verweten als, 'a priori'. Zeker dat is zij ook. Maar is 'denktheoretisch' zulk een 'a priori' niet een vanzelfsprekend en onvermijdelijk fundament; een dwingende noodzakelijkheid? Dat is ook de meening van Romain, die nog op het beroemde 'a priori' van

If these two groups of criticisms are to have any direct relevancy to Toynbee's work they must address themselves to this crucial point in the Study. The temptation is strong to digress from the study of Toynbee's methodology in order to line up the two sides in the argument on a rational-irrational axis. This could easily degenerate into a fruitless exchange of epithets, or a stalemate of mutually immovable faiths. Another temptation would be to follow Geyl on this endless merry-go-round of whether or not Toynbee is an historian. The question may be legitimate, and has certainly been a bone of contention among the friendly and unfriendly critics, but again it sheds very little light on the present study of Toynbee's methodology. It would seem rather important, on the other hand, to press the question at this particular place, of whether or not Toynbee's affirmation of faith in a spiritual dimension has any effect on his historical views. It is important to ascertain the nature and extent of this methodological turning point in the Study. The two groups of critics tend to emphasize the radical change in Toynbee. The rationalist critics in their general criticism of Toynbee argue that this act of transfiguration

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Gibbon heeft gewezen om te betoogen, dat nu eenmaal visie op zulk een wijze ontstaat." H. Baudet, "Een beschowwing over de beteeknis van het werk van A. J. Toynbee in het verband van zign tijd cultuurkring," Historie en Metahistorie (Leiden), (1952), 46.

represents a break in methodology, or escape from reason or a despair of finding a rational solution of our social problems. Geyl and Baudet also emphasize a breech in the methodology caused by this introduction of an "a priori" or "vision."

Toynbee and his publishers emphasize in contradistinction to these critics, the continuity of the historian's methodology. This concern to couch changes in the Study in terms of an expanded program rather than a repudiation of an original program is interestingly expressed by the publishers on the jacket of Volume Seven. This volume is the first in the concluding batch of volumes of the Study, and appeared in 1954, fifteen years after Volume Six had been published. On the jacket is the explanation:

> In the course of the thirty-three years separating the conception and the completion of an undertaking on a scale comparable with Gibbon's, Dr. Toynbee's outlook has inevitably undergone changes which have vitally affected the trend of his great work. The most significant of these changes, concerning his estimate of the role of Religion in History, has led him beyond the limits of his original purpose, though without disrupting the basic plan.[70]

This explanatory remark reflects Toynbee's analysis in the preface to Volume Seven where he speaks of recasting his original notes. To express the continuity of this last batch of volumes with the earlier ones he puts the descrip-

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[70]Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. VII, on the dust jacket.

tion in quantitative terms.

> In the outcome, the original plan of the book still stood and the execution of Parts VI, VIII, X, and XIII was carried out more or less on the lines of the original notes. The subjects of Parts VII, IX, and XII, on the other hand, came, in the event, to be treated very differently from the original design--and the subject of Part XI, in particular, so differently that the title of this Part had to be changed from 'Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations' to 'Law and Freedom in History.'

Put in this way the reader might well say that the changes are certainly minor if but one out of eight parts has had to be changed in a minor sense. But this is very misleading. Part XI was not simply one part in a series of essays, but was to be the climax of the whole scientific study. Looking back to Volume One where the plan of the whole Study is outlined, and comparing this plan on page V with the first chapter, it is obvious that Part XI would harvest the careful, empirical researches of the first ten parts. The problem, Toynbee argues, is to escape the distortions of past historians who were subject to the relativisms of time and social environment by discovering an intelligible unit of study and by proceeding empirically. The second step in the operation is to put these civilizations through their paces in a comparative study in order to find the uniformities of behavior. Under this plan Parts II through X are to be viewed as putting the civilizations through their paces. So the "Plan of the Book" logically proceeds with such ques-

tions as genesis, growth, breakdown and debris of civilization in order to complete the study and to isolate the link between these civilizations. All of this work, important as it might be, is nevertheless preliminary to Part XI where the results of the investigation would be set out as uniformities, or laws, or the "lineaments of an abiding form" behind the "shimmer of relativity." That this is a fair analysis of Toynbee's initial purpose may be seen in Part XII. Here Toynbee proposed to deal with the "Prospects of the Western Civilization." The whole point of including a section on the "Prospects of the Western Civilization" depended upon his finding empirically verifiable rhythms or laws by the time he reached Part XI. Further evidence that the initially hopeful plan broke down somewhere along the line is the apparent reluctance of Toynbee to enter into Part XII when he finally reached that topic on November 30, 1950.

> As he took up his pen to write the present Part of this book, the writer was conscious of a sense of distaste for this self-imposed task which was due to something more than a natural shrinking from the obvious hazards of a speculative subject.[71]

When Toynbee goes on to analyze his 'sense of distaste' he advances a reason for it which he cannot seriously hope to maintain. While it may appear to be a reason, in the light of Toynbee's earlier writing it can only be interpreted

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[71] Ibid., IX, 406.

as a rationalization.

> Why was it, then, that, so far from diminishing, his distaste had been increasing steadily in the meantime? The answer to this question was not obscure to the writer himself. The reason was that this growing disinclination of his had in fact little or nothing to do with the difficulty of estimating the Western Civilization's prospects, but was rooted in a reluctance to throw overboard one of the cardinal principles governing the writer's whole approach to this study of History. He was distressed by a fear that, if he allowed himself to single out any one civilization for special treatment, he might be abandoning a standpoint from which alone it was, in his belief, possible to see in true perspective the whole history of a species of Society of which the Western Civilization was one, but only one, representative.[72]

Toynbee tries to explain his distaste on the basis of a "cardinal principle" that he ought not to single out any one civilization for special treatment. Two considerations immediately suggest themselves to the reader of the passage. First, why did Toynbee promise the reader in his original plan to treat "The Prospects of the Western Civilization," (Part XII in The Plan of the Book, Volume One) if it were contrary to a "cardinal principle" of the study? To demonstrate that this original intention was not simply a youthful and temporary ideal, Toynbee repeats his plan to include a study of "The Prospects of the Western Civilization" in the second batch of volumes (preface to Volume Four) and in the preface to the last batch of volumes (Volume Seven). Fur-

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[72] Ibid., 410.

thermore he argues in Volume Seven that, "the prospects of a contemporary Western Civilization . . . had become clearer and graver . . . "[73] It cannot be argued by Toynbee that this matter of "singling out" the West is the violation of a cardinal principle.

The second consideration that makes this violation of a "cardinal principle" a specious argument is the fact that Toynbee has repeatedly singled out the West in his earlier volumes for unusually full treatment without expressing reluctance. In these earlier cases the plea is always to the effect that the West is still living, in contrast to the dead civilizations of the past.

Toynbee's reluctance to discuss the prospects of Western Civilization is based on a disillusionment with his original methodology and the results that this method seemed to promise. If his original plan had been successful and the "abiding form" had emerged from the "shimmer of relativity," then he would have been armed with empirically verified law with which to analyze the prospects of the West. Now, however, the results of his study are valid only for the one who has been through the act of transfiguration and can see history through this vision. Needless to say, those 'captious critics' help to make the task even more disagreeable.

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[73] Ibid., VII, Preface vii.

Before leaving the matter of Toynbee's reluctance to write Part XII, let us point out a second major consideration. Not only is his reluctance psychological and arises from an apparent failure to reach the desired certainty, but his reluctance is rooted in the fact that Part XII is now quite superfluous. As long as Toynbee could proceed under the assumption that civilizations were the intelligible unit of study, and that the future of mankind was bound up with man-in-the-process-of-civilization, then it was quite logical and imperative that something be said about the prospects of Western Civilization. But after the great change in Toynbee, it is obvious that the Western Civilization has nothing in prospect. Through Volume Four the question of the future of the West was a very live issue. For example Toynbee rejoices in the fact that the cyclic version of predestination is not a legitimate inference from historical data and that "This is a message of encouragement for us children of the Western Civilization as we drift today alone, on the 'wide sea' of human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations around us."[74] Toynbee argues that the West has the live option of discarding war either by agreement or by a knock-out blow. In the context of the passage he lapses into the role of a warning or imploring prophet, and the point is clearly made that the Western Civilization has to choose

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[74] Ibid., IV, 38.

peaceful means in order "to reprieve mankind from the doom of physical extermination."[75] In the same volume Toynbee emphasizes the importance of treating the prospects of Western Civilization when he contrasts our position with the hopelessness of the Hellenes; " . . . for them the whole game is over, for good and for ill, while for us, whose civilization is still 'a going concern', the crucial part of this game is probably still to play."[76]

Now, however, following the major reorientation of Volume Six, the need no longer exists for discussing the prospects of Western Civilization. Man's future is tied to the development of the Kingdom of God, and Western Civilization is "only a vain repetition of the heathen."[77] Toynbee argues:

> In this perspective the civilizations of the first and second generations might justify their existence, but those of the third generation would cut a disconcertingly poor figure. If civilizations were the handmaids of Religion, and if the Hellenic Civilization had served as a good handmaid to Christianity by bringing this higher religion to birth before that civilization had finally fallen to pieces, then the civilizations of the third generation would appear to be 'vain repetitions' of the heathen.[78]

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[75] Ibid., 180.

[76] Ibid., 317.

[77] Ibid., VII, 445.

[78] Ibid., 444.

In the same vein, Toynbee regards Western post-Christian secular civilization as at best a superfluous repetition of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worse "a pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual progress."[79] To one who worried through the first six volumes with Toynbee in the hope that some plan might be devised to renew a faltering Western Civilization, his casual dismissal of Western Civilization in Volume Seven involves a radical psychological reorientation. At most in Toynbee's new view, the West can have a negative role that it might "inadvertently perform." This would be the task of "unintentionally providing" a meeting ground for higher religions, and of serving as a demonstration of a peculiarly vicious idolatry--man's corporate worship of himself.[80] It is not by accident that Toynbee concludes this section with the statement, "as for the civilizations of the third generation, they are now right out of the picture." On the basis of this new view of history, it is clear why Toynbee would be exceedingly reluctant to discuss the "Prospects of Western Civilization."

The situation becomes even more difficult for a discussion of the "Prospects" as Toynbee continues in Volume Seven. This changed view of history which grows out of

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[79] Ibid., 445.

[80] Ibid.

Toynbee's methodological turning point in Volume Six, has increasingly radical implications for Toynbee's original view as he begins to press it into service. For example, there is a forced change in the categories of civilization. The old "Western Civilization" which Toynbee once treasured, is now divided without explanation into two entities, a "Medieval Western Respublica Christiana" and a Modern Western secular civilization. Notice that this clever distinction allows for an amazing change in the discussion of the origin and growth of the Western Civilization. This Western Civilization had been described as an "intelligible field of Study"[81] and had been worked out empirically in Volume One.[82] Although Toynbee was not specific as to the date of its birth, he indicated that it was in the neighborhood of 1200 years ago:

> . . . since the time, now more than twelve hundred years ago, when our Western Christendom was born,--a feeble infant from the Church's womb.[83]

When this early conclusion is placed alongside of a Volume Seven conclusion on the same subject, the contrast is striking:

> It will be seen that the monstrous birth of a Modern Western secular civilization from the womb of a Medieval Western Respublica Christiana, . . . was made practicable by the

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[81] Ibid., I, 51.

[82] Ibid., 147.

[83] Ibid., V, 190.

> renaissance of the Hellenic institution of the 'absolute' state in which Religion had been a department of Politics.[84]

In the following paragraph he speaks of the civilizations of the third generation as an "unhappy delivery." Hence if we have correctly represented Toynbee's position regarding "Western Civilization," as a "vain repetition," as a "monstrous birth," and as "now right out of the picture," his reluctance to discuss "The Prospects of Western Civilization" is quite understandable.

Once it is seen that Toynbee the student-of-life plays the dominant role after Volume Six and that Toynbee the social scientist steadily loses ground, the series of contradictory descriptions in the later volumes emerge as Toynbee attempts to carry out the implications of his new position while attempting to preserve the results of his earlier investigations. We have argued above that this change should have brought about a radical readjustment in the "Plan of the Book" but that Toynbee attempted to complete his original plan even though he himself had cut the foundation out from under the plan to write on "The Prospects of Western Civilization." We further argued that the tension which built up as the Study approached Part XII, Toynbee explained away by an appeal to a "cardinal principle."

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[84] Ibid., VII, 539.

The attempt to preserve the results of Toynbee's bold plan for empirically establishing "intelligible fields of study," putting these units through their paces, and then jotting down the rhythms or uniformities, is found in several places in the later volumes. One example is found in Volume Eight under the heading "An Expansion of the Field of Study." Here the implication is that the Study has gone somewhat beyond its original intention but that the expansion is merely supplemental. The problem for Toynbee is to salvage as much as possible of the original position of "intelligible fields of study." This is no mean task in the light of the new view that civilizations are meaningful only in the measure that they contribute to the progress of higher religions. Nevertheless, Toynbee makes the attempt when he says:

> Actually we have found that a civilization can be studied intelligibly in isolation so long as we are considering its genesis, its growth, or its breakdown. Indeed, the historical evidence that has presented itself in our empirical survey of breakdowns has seemed to warrant the conclusion that the breakdown of a civilization is invariably due to some inward failure of self-determination and never due to blows delivered by external agencies.[85]

But even this hope of salvaging something from the detailed investigation of the first five volumes by limiting the empirical survey of civilizations to their "genesis, growth, or breakdown" is open to challenge. As we have seen

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[85] Ibid., VIII, 87.

in the preceding argument, Toynbee was forced to reconstruct the genesis of Western Civilization. As late as Volume Five, Western Civilization was described as being born from the womb of the church in the time of Gregory the Great. But in Volume Seven the once "intelligible field of study" known as Western Civilization has somehow been divided into an undefined Medieval Respublica Christiana and a Modern Western secular civilization which comes to "monstrous birth" out of the mistakes and sins of the Medieval Western Church. Perhaps the most disconcerting feature of this major change in the treatment of Western Civilization is to notice Toynbee's repeated argument that this new thesis is validated by one test case. In the light of the careful marshalling of cases in the early volumes in order to establish uniformities it is surprising to read, in Volume Seven,

> If we take, as a test case for the verification of this thesis, the eruption of a Modern Western secular civilization out of a Medieval Western Respublica Christiana, . . . [86]

And in the same chapter,

> If we take, as a test case for the verification of this thesis, the genesis of the Christian Church . . .

It is difficult to see what Toynbee could have in mind when he speaks of one case as verification for a thesis. Earlier Toynbee had objected to Spengler's laws on the basis

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[86] Ibid., VII, 534.

that they were induced from a "handful of facts," and that Spengler employed a simile in order to mask "the inadequacy of the evidential basis."[87] Toynbee's conclusions had always been prefaced with the call, "Let us test, by making a survey, whether the phenomena which have thus presented themselves in a single case are unique and therefore of little account or regular and therefore significant."[88] In Volume Five a single case was "of little account"; now in Volume Seven one test case somehow is supposed to verify a thesis.

In this exploration of the implications of Toynbee's methodological shift in Volume Six we have brought to light the radical changes in the plan of the book, the forced re-classification of Western Civilization, a complete re-orientation of the prospects of the West and a sharply different use of evidence. Because the Study is so lengthy and detailed, many readers and reviewers simply glide over observations in the later volumes which do not harmonize with their memory of observations made in the early volumes. One such set of observations or "findings" we should like to consider in this section on Toynbee the "student of Life," because it illustrates the view that a fundamental change has taken place in Volume Six and that the findings of the his-

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[87] Ibid., IV, 11.

[88] Ibid., V, 83.

torian in the second part often do not supplement or complement the earlier empirical findings, but rather contradict them. The "findings" under discussion concern the relationship between civilizations as propounded specifically in Volumes Five and Eight.

The first picture developed by Toynbee is the dominant scheme of the first five volumes. It is a view of civilizations which attempts to escape the egocentric illusion by means of a comparative study. In this comparative study Toynbee hopes to avoid the question of value by the assertion that these "civilizations are separate representatives of a particular species of societies which are all philosophically contemporary with one another and philosophically equal to one another in value."[89] Toynbee rejoices that the old "magic bean-stalk" view of civilization with all of its egocentrism and provincialism can be discarded in favor of the "true image" of evolution as it has come to be conceived by our Western botanists and zoologists.[90] This image of the "pollarded willow" promises a way of escape from the egocentric illusion and the relativism of "our Western historians," and Toynbee clearly states that "we have already attempted to transpose it into terms of human history."[91]

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[89] Ibid., I, 178.

[90] Ibid., 168.

[91] Ibid., 169.

Because we will refer to this image of the "pollarded willow" on a number of occasions, let us notice its details in Toynbee's own words.

> The workaday willow, like the magic bean-stalk, starts its growth perpendicularly in a single line; but, before it has time to grow top-heavy, a man comes along with an axe and pollards its head. . . . Will the tree die of the shock, or will it adapt its manner of growth to the new conditions that have been imposed on it from outside? Possessing the will to live, the tree chooses the latter alternative; and from its mutilated summit it now puts forth half a dozen shoots instead of one and sends those up in all directions, . . . Each of these shoots attempts, in its own growth, to overcome the effects of the blow which the trunk has received and to carry the life of the tree forward one stage farther.[92]

When this image is applied to the history of civilizations it produces the standard picture we have come to recognize in the first five volumes of the Study.

> We have suggested that the histories of individuals and communities and societies fall into successive chapters, in each of which a number of representatives of which ever the species may be are confronted by some identical challenge which imposes an ordeal. Under each of these common ordeals the parties react in different ways. The majority succumb outright; some just manage to survive . . . ; others discover a response to the challenge which is so satisfactory that it not only carries them through the ordeal of the moment but puts them in a favorable posture for undergoing the next; others, again, follow these path-finders as sheep follow their leader into a gap which he has forced through a hedge.[93]

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[92] Ibid., 168.

[93] Ibid., 169.

Toynbee adds that "we shall be guided by this conception throughout our Study."

Upon such a master-plan Toynbee develops elaborate views on the relation of the creative minority to the other members of the society. It harmonizes rather well with his views about peaceful encounters and creative inspiration. Indeed a number of passages rather lyrically describe the results of a successful response on the part of a creative minority.

> For those who do not catch the inspiration in their souls, 'like a light caught from a leaping flame', are induced to conform externally by the enlistment of their faculty of mimesis.[94]

Our interest is now narrowed to the results of this creative response on peoples outside the growing society. The metaphor of light is employed to describe the results when Toynbee affirms that

> When this light strikes the walls it is not arrested there, for the walls of a growing civilization are walls of glass in a city that is set on a hill and that cannot be hid. The light streams out and on to shine before men; . . .[95]

A further description of the effects of a growing civilization speaks of the radiating civilization's value as "a means of self-education for the party by whom the act of

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[94] Ibid., 196.

[95] Ibid., V, 196.

mimesis is performed, and as a tribute of admiration and token of friendship for the party towards whom the mimesis is directed."

> Mimesis is evoked by charm; and we can now see that the charm which is exercised, during the growth of a civilization, by a succession of creative minorities preserves the house not only from being divided against itself but also from being attacked by its neighbors--in so far, at least, as these neighbors happen to be societies of the primitive species.[96]

Toynbee describes this situation of "accepting and transmitting" the radiation of a growing civilization as "the normal relation between a civilization and the primitive societies round about . . . " When a civilization falls into collapse it "ceases to be a whole on which other societies can model themselves, or decline to model themselves, consistently and integrally."[97] The tragedy of a disintegrating society is carefully assessed;

> In fact, while a disintegrating society surpasses a growing society in its radiation on one, or even two, of the three social planes, it simultaneously falls behind it on one plane at least: and, if we now substitute qualitative for quantitative standards of measurement, we shall be left in no doubt that the net result is a moral loss and not a moral gain.[98]

In brief, this development is described by Toynbee as a "disastrous miscarriage."

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[96] Ibid., 198.

[97] Ibid., 199.

[98] Ibid., 200.

When we turn from this analysis of Volume Five to the discussion in Volume Eight on the same problem of the relation between societies, quite a different situation is described. The "findings" no longer follow the pattern of the "pollarded willow"; the assumption of the philosophic equality of the civilizations has been dropped, and the whole pursuit of "civilization" as an intelligible field of study has lost its meaning. Clearly the old tension between Toynbee the "student of Life" and Toynbee the Social Scientist has turned in favor of the "student of Life." Under these circumstances a survey yields these conclusions:

> In the field of encounters between contemporaries in which both parties are societies of the species that we have labelled 'civilizations', and even in the wider field in which the 'agent's' role is played by a primitive or semi-primitive society, an Orpheus captivating all fellow creatures within earshot by the enchanting harmony of his heavenly music is a rare figure by comparison with a Charlemagne forcibly baptizing the captives of his bow and spear or an Awrangzib morally alienating intended victims who have proved more than a match for him on the battlefield. The rule at which we thus arrive inductively proves to be that normally an encounter between contemporaries is culturally sterile even when one party, and a fortiori when either party, is in a healthy state of cultural integration; and the historic evidence likewise bears out the converse 'law' that a state of cultural disintegration is favourable to cultural intercourse, and most favourable of all when it is the state of both parties to the encounter and when on both sides it has gone to extremes.[99]

We have then two "normal" situations. The first

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[99] Ibid., VIII, 507.

"normal" situation as discussed in Volume Five rests on the moral gain, the self-education, the tribute of admiration, and the preservation from attack which ensues when a growing civilization allows its light to stream out through walls of glass to the "boundless field in which there is nothing to limit their range except the inherent limitations of their own carrying power."[100] In the second "normal" situation we have the rule that encounters between contemporaries are "culturally sterile." Stated in its most extreme form the second "normal" situation reads;

> The intrusion of any alien cultural element into the life of any society, in whatever state of life it may happen to be at the time, is manifestly a dangerously disruptive, and therefore a painfully harassing, experience. . . .[101]

Briefly stated, the "findings" in the first instance support the early view of Toynbee that in a growing and healthy civilization progress is possible through creative leadership and the radiation of a healthy and integrated culture. In the second instance the "findings" point to the opposite conclusion that the normal relationship between societies is "culturally sterile," and proves to be "dangerously disruptive" to the passive society. It ought to be pointed out that the master-plan of the second half of the

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[100] Ibid., V, 196.

[101] Ibid., VIII, 509.

Study sees no creative possibilities in "civilizations," for these civilizations are not the "path-finders" who lead the other sheep "into a gap which he [path-finder] has forced through a hedge."[102] The master-plan of the second half of the Study sees the real or "spiritual significance" in the relationship between societies. This relationship must be that of "encounters" from which a new creation springs.

> At the time of writing, half-way through the twentieth century of the Christian era, Christianity and the Mahayana were the two great living witnesses to the spiritual significance of the social phenomenon of encounter between civilizations. . . . Humanly speaking, it was a creative response to the challenge of one of these encounters that had brought to birth Christianity and the Mahayana and Islam and Hinduism.[103]

One more task remains to be done in this section on Toynbee as "student of Life." We have traced the growth of this role in the Study as a means of identifying the methodological struggle. Our argument thus far has been that Toynbee looked to the élan motif in order to supersede the parochialism and subjectivism into which contemporary historiography had been betrayed. To gain a whole view of Life was an important complementary feature to the effort to induce laws of history from the empirical study of civilizations. This meant, as we have seen, the introduction of mythological and

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[102] Ibid., I, 169.

[103] Ibid., VIII, 628.

religious intuitions in order to give the empirical historian certain clues with which he might develop surveys leading to the laws of civilizations. The uneasy working arrangement between what Toynbee variously calls reason and intuition, or science and religion, or head and heart, or science and Life, was steadily breached in Volumes Five and Six, culminating in the transfiguration argument of Volume Six. We have introduced a number of those "captious critics" at that turning point in the Study, and have raised the question as to what extent does this methodological shift effect the original purpose and actual results of Toynbee's work. While it was important to explore the extent of the methodological shift in this present context, it might in one sense be considered a deviation from our stated purpose of tracing Toynbee's view of himself as the "student of Life." So let us return to our initial task with but one modification.

"Student of Life" Role Leads to a Solution to the Problem of the Meaning of History

We began by a notation of the successive instances of "student of Life" role from Volume One to Volume Six. Our modification now involves a departure from the chronological sequence to a topical treatment of the "student of Life" motif. Three topics may cover the remaining references. First we can note the reiteration of Toynbee's position--the view that religion makes sense out of the historian's task.

Then we turn to his discussion of the place of reason, pointing out his attack on rationalism in the first phase, and his more moderate attempts later on to limit the extent and use of reason. Finally we shall observe Toynbee's efforts to reconcile reason with his religious commitment.

As a "student of Life" who goes beyond reason and science to a mystic experience of transfiguration, Toynbee stresses the value of this discovery both for society and the historian within society. In Volume Seven he treats at length the advantages of regarding the churches as a higher species of society. This "reversal of roles" forced the dismissal of Toynbee's original assumption that all civilizations are philosophically equal--an assumption that he had depended upon to deliver him from parochialism and subjectivism. It has led him to discard his attempt to write a history of civilizations in favor of a history of religions. But these are minor affairs compared with the advantages of the new position, and Toynbee hastens to indicate "what light the significance of the churches' past may throw on the promise of their future."[104] His plea for a new position reads:

> This human fellowship with the One True God, which had been approached in the primitive religions and been attained in the higher religions, gave to these certain vital virtues that were not to be found in either primitive societies or civilizations. It gave power to overcome

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[104] Ibid., VII, 506.

> the discord which was one of the inveterate evils of Human Society; it offered a solution of the problem of the meaning of History; . . . [105]

In a further elaboration he identifies the meaninglessness of history with the spatial and temporal limitations of the historian. This of course was the problem with which Toynbee opened his Study. However, the difference between Volume One and Volume Seven is quite apparent, for in this context the hope of finding an abiding form is based not on an empirical study of the rhythms of civilizations, but rather in a religious experience.

> Even in the most narrow-verged society the ablest, most energetic, and most fortunate individual cannot influence, or even survey, the action in which he is concerned beyond the close-drawn limits of a horizon which embraces no more than a fraction of the human participant in it, is 'a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing.' But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual meaning when man catches in History a glimpse of the operation of a One True God who is both transcendently infinite and intimately loving, and who has the power and the will to take up His human creatures into His own range of action and mode of existence. . . . [106]

If the meaning of history is found in the experience of transfiguration, the historian then faces the problem of accounting for the use of the intellect in historiography. Two attitudes seem to reflect Toynbee's struggle to find the boundaries between reason and prophecy. There is a strongly

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[105] Ibid., 507.

[106] Ibid., 512.

hostile attitude expressed in the later volumes toward the rationalists and rationalism. The attack is directed toward what Toynbee regards as the excessive claims of Reason. In Volume Seven the extended argument begins with the assertion that the Hellenic minds discovered "Reason" and then 'idolized it.' He traces the idolization of Reason into the modern Western secular civilization where the Western rationalists have followed an Hellenic philosophy "in worshipping a false 'God the Reason.'"[107] One of the chief objections he has to rationalism is that it has become a parochial faith which sees Western Civilization as the culmination of history. In addition, it cuts off from human experience those areas of knowledge which come via religion and prophecy.[108] Just one example of the many criticisms of Western Rationalists suggests this double accusation:

> . . . even if the traditional Western rationalist, in an elegiac mood, were to acquiesce in seeing the Western Civilization deposed from the place of honor in the moving picture of human progress up to date, he would be moved to indignation and mockery at the notion of assigning the vacated place to Religion.[109]

A third objection to Rationalism is the charge that it leads to a constriction of the moral capacity of the

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[107] Ibid., 468.

[108] Ibid., 450.

[109] Ibid.

individual and thence to an irresponsible abandonment of Society. This charge is rooted in Toynbee's journalistic experience of 1933. In that year he had written in the Survey of International Affairs a critique of the World Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference in which he had put his finger on the inadequate ideological basis of those conferences. His argument was that Enlightened Self-Interest, "so far from being an automatic, self-regulating psychological mechanism for making all things work together for Man's good, was nothing more than an intellectual abstraction which had no counterpart at all in the realm of practical life."[110] In this present context the argument of 1933 is incorporated into a general attack on Rationalism. The ideology of enlightened self-interest is traced to a parentage in Rationalism and the family tree boasts a grievous collection of juvenile delinquents.

> The association of the words 'enlightened' and 'self-interest' is, indeed, a contradiction in adjecto--when 'enlightenment' is taken to mean a blindness to everything supernatural and superhuman in Man's vision of the Universe. In such a Weltanschauung, in which the Heavenly Light has been 'blacked out', 'enlightened' does not lead even to the common-sense conclusion that the interest of the individual is inseparable from 'the greatest good of the greatest number'. Within the narrowing moral horizon of a godless universe, in which piety towards the dead has become inept, and providence for the unborn quixotic, a concern for the living generation of his fellow men also ceases to be

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[110] Ibid., 517.

> within the individual's moral capacity. Thus, paradoxically, pure rationalism applied as a rule of conduct leads to the conclusion that the only 'realistic' course is to abandon Society to the irrational play of Chance; . . . [111]

This outburst of hostility toward Rationalism and the Rationalists of which the above quotations are examples cannot stand as representative of Toynbee's more considered arguments concerning the use of the intellect. While strenuously objecting to the claims of "Reason" to serve as the foundation for a complete Weltanschauung, he does attempt to mark out the spheres of experience in which the intellect plays the dominant part. As an example of a situation in which Reason might be said to transgress its proper limits, Toynbee points out the strife between "two possible schools of metaphysics." In this case the argument concerns the regularity of the Laws of nature as observed by the Hellenic and Indic World, and the regularity of the "Law of God" which the Israelite and Iranian prophets discovered as the regularity of a single constant aim pursued "unwaveringly, . . . by the intelligence and will of a personality."[112] Although our interest is not in the "regularity" argument as such, we are interested in Toynbee's handling of what he thinks may be a theoretical inconsistency (i.e., "of being logically irreducible to unity.") in the two kinds of regularity. His

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[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid., IX, 174.

comment or resolution of the theoretical inconsistency is to subsume logic under "real life." As he says,

> In fact, the apparent incompatibility between the two kinds of regularity is merely a mirage in the shadow-world of abstract logic; in real life they are not only compatible with one another, but are inseparably complementary in a divinely inspired interplay in which, at divers levels of Reality, cyclic movements according to laws of Nature are successively transcended in experience and endeavors that, in turn, are subject to cyclic movements at a higher level. . . .[113]

Narrowing the general problem of the limits of the intellect to the specific area of historical method, we observe the same procedure at work in Toynbee's formulation. Here the intellect has a limited sphere of operation and a limited value to the historian, as Toynbee remarks;

> When we are investigating the relations between the facts of History, we are trying to see God through History with our intellects. The sorting out of facts is essentially an intellectual activity. The Intellect, however, is only one faculty of the Soul.[114]

Toynbee analyzes Augustine, as one of a group of outstanding historians, in this two-phase operation of the historian who sorts out the facts of history with his Mind and then seeks the meaning of history with his Heart. In summary his analysis reads . . . "in passing to the second part of De Civitate Dei from the second installment of the first

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[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid., X, 113.

part, Saint Augustine is being carried by the Human Mind's impulse to investigate the relations between the facts of History into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to find a meaning behind them."[115]

If the historian uses his intellect to sort out the facts of history and to investigate the relations between the facts, then the question arises as to the adequacy of this first operation in the historian's task. Clearly in the following notations Toynbee wishes to establish the necessary part the intellect plays in the historian's performance but at the same time the secondary and inadequate role it plays. One example of this position can be found in his dispute with Collingwood. In the argument he advances the point in several different phrases that "Thought is not the whole of Life"; and that Collingwood "is wrong in instructing the historian to ignore all strands of experience except the intellectual strand." This appeal to "real life" leads Toynbee to the statement of his own position, which is that "the historian must discover for himself some additional means of establishing psychic communications with the human objects of his study beyond a reperformance of acts of thought. . . ."[116]

The same argument as to the insufficiency of Reason is found in the Volume Ten discussion of the "Inspirations of

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[115] Ibid., 91.

[116] Ibid., IX, 732.

Historians." Commenting on Ibn Khaldun's recourse to a transcendental thesis, Toynbee observes:

> His conclusion is that human affairs do not constitute an intelligible field of study so long as the inquirer is attempting to study them in isolation from the action of Man's Creation; and this is equivalent to saying that Man's Oikoumene only becomes intelligible when it is recognized as being a fragment of God's Universe.
>
> Ibn Khaldun is here saying, in effect, that Man on Earth is a denizen of two worlds. . . . Man has a franchise in a mundane commonwealth in virtue of a human esprit de corps, and at the same time a franchise in a supra-mundane commonwealth to divine revelations.[117]

The task of tracing out the limitations of the use of the intellect in the historian's work does not represent a period of psychological exhaustion which might have influenced the last volumes of Toynbee's Study. It is a very pertinent topic in his post-Study writings. He discusses it in his post-mortem essay "What I Am Trying to Do," in connection with the problem of what human affairs are subject to scientific law, i.e., open to investigation on the level of the intellect. Summing up the results of more than twenty-seven years of historical research, Toynbee concludes that "there are some things in human affairs that have no pattern because they are not subject to scientific laws. . . . I also think that the poetry and the prophetic vision that well up out of the subconscious depths of the human soul are not

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[117] Ibid., X, 87.

ammenable to law."[118]

Again in a recent discussion in An Historian's Approach to Religion, Toynbee includes a chapter on the "Encounters between Higher Religions and Philosophies." In this chapter he further develops his earlier thesis of two "Truths." It is apparent that he wants to speak of two truths, the Truth of the Subconscious Psyche and the Truth of the Intellect, in order to avoid the conflicts between Science and Religion. At the same time he does not want an absolute dichotomy, so that he hastens to speak of the truths as modes of apprehending the unitary Truth. Our interest in the key passage below focuses on the inferior status of scientific truth.

> In either mode of apprehending the Truth, however, there can be either a vision of some particular feature or aspect of the Truth or a vision of the whole of it. On the poetic level of the Subconscious Psyche, the comprehensive vision is Prophecy; on the scientific level of the Intellect it is Metaphysics. If our foregoing analysis of the difference between Poetry and Science is correct, a comprehensive view of poetic truth must, in the very nature of the two modes of apprehension, be more feasible than the attempt made by Metaphysics to present a comprehensive view of scientific truth.[119]

The footnote to this lengthy quotation further defines the limitations of the Intellect in gaining the

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[118]Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," p. 4.

[119]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 126.

vision of the whole truth.

> 'Prophecy' in the original and authentic sense in which the word means, not a forecast of the future, but the revelation of a mystery that is out of the Intellect's reach. The literal meaning of 'prophecy' is the 'utterance' of Truth from a hidden source from which Truth cannot be extracted by intellectual processes.

Having examined Toynbee's hostility to the Rationalists and Rationalism of the contemporary West, and having watched a more moderate and considered judgment emerge as to the limits of the use of the intellect in historical studies, let us now turn to our third topic.

The reconciliation of the findings of the Intellect with the intuitions of the subconscious is attempted in terms of two motifs we have found frequently employed in the Study. The first motif of the historian as an explorer or adventurer sets the formal context of the reconciliation. He argues that every historian is on a voyage of "spiritual adventure," indeed an "enthralling voyage of spiritual exploration."[120] In this adventure the historian depends upon Science (in this passage used interchangeably with "Intellect" or "Head") and Religion in a joint endeavor to solve the problem of the meaning of history. So the motif or role of the historian-traveller is used by Toynbee to suggest that theoretically or formally the conflict is resolved by the historian who

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[120]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, 500.

rejects neither, and draws from both, for "In this present Study we cannot aspire to do more than follow our pair of explorers--if Science and Religion can be imagined as setting out hand in hand--on the first voyage of this new quest for the Visio Beatifica."

This verbal reconciliation in the metaphor of the traveler implies an equality and harmony of Intellect and Subconscious, "a hand in hand" relationship which is not carried out in actual practice. It would seem to me that the reconciliation is couched in these terms in order to preserve the appearance of being philosophically unprejudiced or uncommitted. The phrase "we cannot aspire to do more than follow our pair of explorers" is the counterpart in Toynbee's historical methodology to the one praise-worthy element he defends in historic Rationalism. While agreeing with Martin Wight that Rationalism imbibed a Judaic fanaticism and intolerance from Christianity, he yet admires Rationalism's principle, "to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead, without being willing to allow its pursuit of intellectual truth to be arrested by any non-intellectual considerations."[121]

The genuine as opposed to verbal reconciliation of Science and Religion, Head and Heart, Intellect and Subconscious, is made by Toynbee in terms of the "Student of Life"

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[121] Ibid., 474.

metaphor. Here there is no misleading imagery of hand in hand effort unless it is the picture of blind Science being led by visionary Religion.

. The argument starts with the distinction between "two kinds of Truth." In order to reconcile these two truths and avoid an absolute dualism, Toynbee links the two kinds of Truth to the concept of "planes of life," a concept which he had introduced without discussion in Volume One; "Scientific truth and prophetic truth are experiences on different planes, as are scientific truth and ritual observance."[122]

If the Intellect and/or Science are restricted to one plane of experience and Religion to another level of experience the question still remains as to the relationship between these levels of experience. Little doubt is left in the mind of the reader as to the deeper level of experience or the priority of the intuitive truth.

> When this difference had been recognised--and only then--it might begin to be possible for pilgrim souls to feel their way towards an angle of spiritual vision from which the real nature of the relation between these diverse kinds of experience would become apparent.[123]

Thus the reconciliation takes place on the grounds of religion--a feeling one's way towards an angle of spiritual vision, and it would seem in the light of the passages now

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[122] Ibid., 475.

[123] Ibid.

being examined that without Religion the historian's task is useless.

In the Volume Seven exposition of the relation between churches and civilizations, Toynbee summarizes the three "vital virtues" that had been attained in the higher religions. The second of the three reads: "it [human fellowship with the One True God] offered a solution of the problem of the meaning of History."[124] The elaboration of this passage underscores the meaninglessness of history if it is attempted apart from a "glimpse of the operation of a One True God." Interestingly enough the objections to a non-religious interpretation of history are the same objections which Toynbee tried to meet in the opening chapter of Volume One of the Study.

> But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual meaning when man catches in History a glimpse of the operation of a One True God who is both transcendently infinitely loving, and who has the power and the will to take up His human creatures into His own range of action and mode of existence, in so far as they respond to His challenging call to act in This World as partners in His divine Work.[125]

The same emphasis upon the meaninglessness of human history is found in the annex to this chapter as Toynbee seeks to explore the assertion that higher religions alone

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[124] Ibid., 507.

[125] Ibid., 512.

give value and meaning to History. He argues, "No doubt every human life-trajectory does have this enduring effect, just as the motion of a single atom or electron affects the equilibrium of the whole physical universe. But this so-called 'impersonal immortality' is no redemption of Man's role in terrestrial history; it is the heart of the nightmare of Human Life on Earth without the fellowship of God; . . . [126]

In Volume Eight a similar conclusion regarding the meaninglessness of history as seen from the standpoint of the human observer is drawn. Only when the scientific labor of the historian is placed in the framework of Religion can there by any significance to history.

> Was this uniform self-defeat of Zealotism and Herodianism the last word that the oracles of History and Mythology had to speak when asked for light on the spiritual consequences of encounters? If it were indeed the last, then the outlook for mankind would be forbidding.
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> Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question was that this might well be the end if the whole story was comprised in the history of civilization, but not if Man's attempt at civilization was no more than one chapter in the story of a perennial encounter between Man and God.[127]

Again in Volume Nine the reconciliation of the findings of the Intellect with the intuitions of the Subconscious

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[126] Ibid., 756.

[127] Ibid., VIII, 624.

takes place in a religious framework. The context of the crucial passage is a discussion of the "Laws of Nature" and the "Law of God." The "Laws of Nature" are obtainable in Toynbee's view by an empirical study of the rise and fall of civilizations. But the pessimistic conclusions from this Study of the vain repetitions of civilizations must be rescued by religion.

> 'Laws of Nature' display the regularity of a recurrent movement--for instance, the motion of a wheel revolving any number of times round its axis. If we could imagine a wheel coming into existence without owing its creation to a wheelwright, and then revolving ad infinitum without ever serving any purpose, these 'repetitions' would indeed seem 'vain'; and this was the pessimistic conclusion drawn by Indic and Hellenist philosophers from a Weltanschauung in which, by a tour de force of intellectual abstraction they had set the sorrowful wheel of existence turning for ever in vacuo. . . . 'Laws of Nature' make sense when they are pictured as being the wheels that God has fitted to His own chariot; . . .[128]

In Volume Ten Toynbee turns to his own experience and the experiences of other historians for insight into the role of the historian as a 'Student of Life.' The reader is strongly tempted to lose the thread of the argument in favor of an enjoyable hour with this modern Plutarch's Lives. But for our purposes in this chapter the argument itself is more relevant and important. The whole volume might be described as an attempt to make and hold to a distinction between the

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[128] Ibid., IX, 174.

facts of history and the meaning of history. Although the distinction has not been systematically advanced in the earlier volumes, it does have points of likeness with the distinction between the two kinds of truth of Volume Nine. The "facts" of history, like "scientific truth," are in the province of the Intellect, while the "meaning of history," like the "religious truth" is in the province of poetry and the subconscious. This distinction, however, does not represent two distinct fields such as "history" and "theology"; for we notice that Toynbee emphasizes that a true historian must know the facts and the meaning of the facts.

> . . . if the child is to become an historian in very truth and deed, it must learn to harness its curiosity about the facts to the service of something more purposeful and creative than curiosity itself. It must come to be inspired with a desire, not just to know the facts, but also to divine their meaning; . . . [129]

This same two-fold division of the historian's labor, the collecting of facts and the divining of their meaning, is again related to two separate faculties of the historian's Soul in a later reference of Volume Ten.

> When we are investigating the relations between the facts of History, we are trying to see God through History with our intellects. The sorting out of facts is essentially an intellectual activity. The Intellect, however, is only one faculty of the Soul. When we think about something, we are apt also to have feelings about it, and our impulse to express our feelings is

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[129] Ibid., X, 42.

> still stronger than our impulse to express our thoughts.[130]

"Facts" and "meaning behind the facts" is linked to the activity of one of Toynbee's historian-heroes Augustine; again with the Mind/Heart or Intellect/Feeling distinction in the historian's Soul. Toynbee sees the greatness and immortality of Augustine's De Civitate Dei in the fact that the author was "carried by the Human Mind's impulse to investigate the relations between the facts of History into embarking on the Human Heart's quest to find a meaning behind them."[131]

Another of his selected list of historians has the same experience as Augustine. Ibn Khaldun is described as an historian who attempted to write history in secular sociological terms or in a "would-be strictly scientific explanation."[132]

> It will be seen that the failure of a secular sociological explanation of the rises and falls of empires to account for the course of history in the Maghrib has led Ibn Khaldun to introduce a new actor onto the stage of History and, in doing so, to give History itself a new dimension. His conclusion is that human affairs do not constitute an intelligible field of study so long as the inquirer is attempting to study them in isolation from the action of Man's Creator; and this is equivalent to saying that Man's Oikoumene only

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[130] Ibid., 112.

[131] Ibid., 91.

[132] Ibid., 85.

> becomes intelligible when it is recognized as being a fragment of God's Universe.[133]

The unintelligibility or meaninglessness of history that is not placed in a larger religious context is clearly argued by Toynbee in what appears to be the climax of the thesis of Volume Ten. We have noticed the basic distinction between facts and the meaning of the facts as it is developed in this volume and illustrated by autobiographical and biographical references. Of the five sections in Volume Ten, section "E" reads, 'The Quest for a Meaning Behind the Facts of History.' Here one finds the most emphatic pronouncements on the radical difference between the findings of the Intellect and the intuitions of the Subconscious. As late as the third section of this volume, in the discussion of Ibn Khaldun's historical work, Toynbee had argued that even though the "big questions" of history could not be solved by Khaldun's secular sociological explanations, at least "a fraction of the phenomena" had been explicable.[134] In this climactic and summary section of the whole argument, however, Toynbee seems to find little value in the historian's intellectual endeavors if it is not rescued by religious intuition. For example, he comments on Gibbon's definition of history as the "register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind"

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[133] *Ibid.*, 87.

[134] *Ibid.*, 86.

and the "all is vanity" of Ecclesiastes that they are an anthropocentric angle of vision. His further comment is that from an anthropocentric angle of vision, "Life presents the mirage of a wilderness, not only for mankind but for the gods."[135] Added emphasis upon the uselessness of the findings of the historian working by intellect alone is given in the descriptive phrase "this spiritual cul-de-sac," and in the statement that "a spectacle in which no meaning can be found, so long as the meaning of it is sought in the creature's vain endeavors, proves to be meaningful as soon as the meaning of it is sought in the Creator's indwelling purpose."[136]

One last reference from this section is noteworthy for in it Toynbee refers to the "riddle of Life" which appears to be without solution from a secular viewpoint:

> When 'Dominus illuminatio mea' is taken in lieu of 'Man is the measure of all things' as Man's key to the riddle of Human Life, the vanity of Man is transfigured in this divine light.[137]

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[135] Ibid., 127.

[136] Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[137] Ibid., 127.

C H A P T E R VI

TOYNBEE'S QUEST ENDS AS "CHRISTIAN HISTORIAN"

"But this apparently senseless 'sound and fury' acquires spiritual meaning when man catches in History a glimpse of the operation of a One True God . . . "
Arnold J. Toynbee in Volume Seven

"God alone knows the truth."
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1947 Civilization on Trial

Explanation of Approach Used

This study of the historical methodology of Arnold Toynbee began with a discussion of the various self-characterizations which Toynbee has used, such as the "explorer," the "scientific historian," the "student of life" and the "Christian historian." By following the use of the "explorer" role one could trace the problem of change in Toynbee's A Study of History and see his early confidence in what his "new history" would accomplish steadily dissolve into the deep questionings and ambivalence of his summing up of the "haunted enquiry." Clearly the change in Toynbee's attitude toward his Study rested in part upon the methodological framework he employed, and through the frequently-used terms, the "Social Scientist" and the "Student of Life" we traced the shift in Toynbee's position from the confident "laws" of the early volumes to the religious intuitions of

the concluding volumes.

If the law-making method of the Social Scientist seemed to provide an inadequate framework for Toynbee's Study and failed to reveal the "lineaments of some abiding form," or that "which is absolute and not merely relative to the particular social environment of particular historians," and if the "Student of Life" had to first complement and finally dominate the "Social Scientist," then this task is not complete without one further stage of analysis. We must seek to analyze the theoretic structure of reality upon which Toynbee's method depends, and on the basis of which theoretic view Toynbee discards one method for another. This analysis may best be attempted by investigating a final self-characterization of Toynbee's choosing, the "Christian historian."

One might expect to find in a chapter entitled "The Christian Historian" some kind of a systematic study of Toynbee's religious views. From the remarkable profusion of Biblical texts which fill the pages of A Study of History, the many discussions of theological doctrines, and the recent involvement of Toynbee with a Religio Historici, such a systematic study is surely possible. But it would be somewhat irrelevant to an investigation of his methodology and could be challenged also on the grounds that it lacked intrinsic value. Another approach one might anticipate in this chapter would be a discussion of Toynbee's view of the

Christian church in history. Again this approach is a possible one, and might be of value to students of Church History, but for a study of methodology it offers only an interesting diversion. What will be attempted in the following pages is to trace the self-characterization of a "Christian historian," and to investigate the meaning of the term "Christian" as it relates to the working historian. Arguably, Toynbee discloses his view of "ultimate reality" when he speaks of himself as a "Christian historian," and it is this theoretic view of reality which becomes the final arbiter in his methodological problems. As a further extension of this argument we will examine two theoretic views which Toynbee holds which can be identified as early and later, and views phrased successively as the "pollarded willow" versus "bean-stalk," as the "growth rhythm" versus "encounter rhythm" or as the "Humanist" versus "Christian" poles in Toynbee's thought. This analysis should result in the clarification of many of the changes that take place in the course of the Study among which are the re-evaluations of certain historical figures and movements, shifts in forecasting, the curious indecision as to whether a civilization is dead or alive, and sharply divergent estimates as to the "crisis" of the West.

Use of Term "Christian Historian"

Does the term "Christian Historian" or its equivalent occur often enough to demonstrate that this self-characterization is neither an incidental nor irrelevant role? As one might expect from the earlier examination of the "Social Scientist" designation which Toynbee equates with a "discreet attitude of neutrality" or a refusal to make value judgments, any such designation as "Christian Historian" is unlikely to appear in the early volumes of the Study. Interesting references to a committed position begin to appear in the sections of Volume Six in which Toynbee chooses to follow Augustine out of the City of Destruction and into the Civitas Dei. Volume Five contains an annex discussion of "Marxism, Socialism, and Christianity"[1] and in the course of the argument Toynbee speaks of himself as a "Christian critic," a "Christian observer" and as a "latter-day Christian."

Briefly the references are:

> The Christian critic will have no quarrel with the Marxian Socialism for going as far as it does: he will criticize it for not going far enough. . . .
>
> Thus, from the Christian standpoint, the Marxian experiment in Socialism is a tragedy; but this cannot be the Christian observer's last word; . . . We latter-day Christians may still turn a Marxian attack upon Christianity

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[1] Ibid., V, 481.

to good account. . . . [2]

The identification of himself with the pilgrim who follows Augustine into the Civitas Dei has been examined in chapter four, and we can refer to it here as the Volume Six link in the chain of identifications Toynbee forges in the last part of the Study. It may be sufficient to note that in this section he refers to the new standpoint as a "Christian Weltanschauung," and as possessing a "supra-mundane spiritual dimension."[3]

A Volume Seven identification of his position with that of a Christian historian may best be found in the section called "The Bow in the Cloud." In an attempt to explore the implications of the new standpoint, Toynbee poses the question,

> If we adopt this Augustinian Platonic Weltanschauung as our own and attempt, in the light of it, to envisage terrestrial history sub specie aeternitatis, what significance shall we find in the idea of progress in this world?[4]

In Volume Eight, Toynbee again links his work as an historian with the religious standpoint,

> . . . a twentieth-century historian might venture to predict. . . . A Christian-bred historian, however, would be a traitor to the genius of his

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[2] Ibid., pp. 586-587.

[3] Ibid., VI, 156.

[4] Ibid., VII, 561.

> ancestral faith if . . . [5]

A Volume Nine reference to the "Christian historian" appears in the middle of a paragraph devoted to the question of the relative merits of the higher religions. Toynbee introduces his view by saying:

> . . . it seemed unlikely to a latter-day Christian historian that either Hinduism or Islam would be placed on a spiritual par with the Mahayana or Christianity. . . . [6]

There are scattered references throughout Toynbee's volumes to his personal experiences, and this part of our study of his methodology may be clarified by bringing them together. Three comments on his early life suggest that his boyhood was molded by a religious training. In his Volume One attack on "The Protestant Background of our Modern Western Race-feeling," he thought it necessary to append this footnote:

> As the following analysis of the historical relation between Protestantism and modern Western race-feeling might conceivably be misinterpreted as an expression of religious prejudice in the mind of the writer, it might be pertinent for him to mention that he was brought up as a Protestant and that he has not become a Catholic. [7]

Further explanation of his Protestant childhood can be found in the final volume reflections on the influences which

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[5] Ibid., VIII, 627.

[6] Ibid., IX, 394.

[7] Ibid., I, 211.

inspire historians. Contrasting the valuable influences of home and church that teach the "Biblical vista of History from Creation through the Fall and the Redemption to the Last Things" with the "well-meaning but myopic-eyed organizers of national systems of compulsory education" that teach parochial, secular historians, Toynbee rejoices that he had been "taken to church as a child every Sunday as a matter of course."[8]

The next phase in his life followed his education at Winchester (1902-1907) and he speaks of it as a "forty years" wandering in the wilderness.[9] This phase is similarly described as agnosticism.[10]

The third period in Toynbee's religious experience begins in the year 1936. He describes it as a turning "on the road back to Religion from Agnosticism."[11] The best observer of that experience may be Toynbee himself, as he lapses into a favorite form of third person description:

> In the summer of A. D. 1936, in a time of physical sickness and spiritual travail, he dreamed during a spell of sleep in a wakeful night, that he was clasping the foot of the crucifix hanging over the high altar of the Abbey of Ampleforth and was hearing a voice saying to him Amplexus expecta

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[8]Ibid., X, 5.

[9]Ibid., VII, 544.

[10]Ibid., IX, 635.

[11]Ibid.

('Cling and wait').

The resemblance of Toynbee's religious experiences to Augustine's description of his own conversion in the garden at Milan is not accidental. By recalling the stages in which the Study was written one is able to understand the emergence of the "Christian historian" designation in Volumes Five and Six. The Study was completed in three "batches of volumes." The first three volumes were being written from June, 1927, when the systematic plan for the Study was started, until May, 1933. The second batch of volumes numbering Volumes Four, Five, and Six, was being written from the summer of 1933 to March, 1939. The last four volumes were written after Toynbee returned from war-time government service, from 1947 to 1951. It can be seen that the middle batch of volumes coincides with the time of Toynbee's religious turning point, and that the classic passage in Volume Six, where he chooses to follow Saint Augustine into the Civitas Dei, is an interesting methodological elaboration of a personal religious experience.

As a precaution against reading too much into this experience before we have analyzed the concept of a "Christian historian" let us note that as late as 1952, Toynbee speaks of himself as a "semi-penitent agnostic" and as a twentieth-century Western "ci-devant Christian agnostic."[12]

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[12] Ibid.

In his own account of his religious orientation, Toynbee refers to the impossibility of taking "a traditional form of Christianity as he found it."[13] He prefers to view his experience as that of one who is making a perilous passage, or as a "disciple of Saint Francis," whose present requirement was "to hold on his course and to trust in God's grace."[14]

We have recorded Toynbee's direct testimony to the effect that he has become a "Christian historian," and this has been correlated with references to his religious experience. Additional corroboration may be found in his attitude toward "Humanism" over the span of years from 1922 to 1958. In 1922 an essay by Toynbee on "History" was published in the book, The Legacy of Greece. In the essay he expressed his admiration for the Greeks and argued that the Renaissance in the West was "one of the greatest and most fortunate decisions in the career of our civilization."[15] His approval of the Greek way to civilization was so strong, and his delight in the West's determined and successful attempt to learn everything our predecessors could teach us so enormous that he enthusiastically concluded that this decision "largely

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 644.

[15] Toynbee, "History," p. 294.

accounts for the wonderful impetus which has revealed itself in Western Civilization during the last four centuries."[16]

By 1927 the same attitude was reinforced and made explicit in the plans for the Study. He pleads for Humanism as the final and proper attitude of the ideal historian. The non-religious character of the remedy for Western problems, under the striking paragraph heading of "What must we do to be saved?", carried a three-fold remedy consisting of economic, political and cultural reforms.

Toynbee's turning away from "Humanism" as a dangerous idolatry can be found where one might anticipate it if this reconstruction has been correct up to this point, namely in the second batch of volumes. In a Volume Four section on the "nemesis of creativity," Toynbee identifies the worship of self, which "leaves none but God out in the cold" as the creed of Communists and Positivists, and "the more numerous adherents of a vaguer, . . . school of humanist thinkers and humanitarian men of action whose outlook has become the dominant Weltanschauung of our Western Society in its Modern Age."[17] The Greeks are linked with this movement as those who have idolized the state. The Papal Encyclical of March 14, 1937, is called in as a parallel view of man's

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[16]Ibid.

[17]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, pp. 302-303.

temptation to idolatry:

> Whoever detaches race or the Nation or the State . . . from the temporal scale of values and raises them to be the supreme model and deifies them with idolatrous worship, falsifies the divinely created order of things.[18]

A final reference to "humanism" shows Toynbee in complete revolt from his early glorification of the Greek spirit and the Renaissance. The circumstances are most intriguing to anyone interested in the development of Toynbee's views, because they come close to providing a clear test of a complete about-face on the same subject. In 1914 Professor Gilbert Murray asked the twenty-five year old Toynbee, a promising young historian-don at Oxford to write a book on Hellenism for the Home University Library. A draft of four chapters, or about forty-two pages, was written before war-time government service interrupted the author's work. In 1950 when Toynbee was finishing the twelfth part of the thirteen-part Study, he speaks of resuming his work on the Hellenic world. A footnote adds: "As he wrote these words, he took these sheets out of a drawer in a bookcase, given him by his mother in his study at No. 45 Pembroke Square, Kensington, London."[19] He made a new plan in 1951 for the book, and the writing was completed in 1956 and 1957. In the preface to

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[18] Ibid., 303.

[19] Ibid., X, 22, n. 1.

Hellenism Toynbee struggles to emphasize the completely new approach that he is using by asserting that, "Since then (1914) I have not re-read either this draft or the notes."[20] It is difficult to conceive of an author so intensely curious as Toynbee taking out a forty-two page manuscript in 1950 with the declared intention of planning "the completion of a history," and yet refusing to "re-read" the material he had already collected and written. The probable explanation is that the views in 1951 had so little in common with the views of 1914 that Toynbee decided to act as though the early manuscript had not even been written.

At any rate the book on Hellenism wastes little time in charging the Greeks with developing a civilization that "was the most wholehearted and uncompromising practice of man-worship that is on record up to date."[21] "Man-worship or Humanism" is the distinctive mark of Hellenic history. As Toynbee now sees Hellenism:

> . . . the mere institution of city-states is not, in itself, the distinctive mark of the Hellenic way of life. What is distinctive of Hellenism is the use that it made of this institution as a means of giving practical expression to a particular outlook on the Universe. In the fifth century B. C. the Hellenic philosopher Protagoras of Abdera expressed this in his celebrated dictum that 'man is the measure of all things'. In traditional Jewish-Christian-Muslim language we should say that

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[20] Toynbee, Hellenism (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), Preface.

[21] Ibid., p. 8.

> the Hellenes saw in man 'the Lord of Creation' and worshipped him as an idol in place of God.[22]

At the end of the book Toynbee deals with the legacy of Greece. In his 1922 essay he had expressed enthusiastic praise for the legacy of Hellenism, but now the "spirit of Hellenism" is a "Demon" which the modern world must exorcise if it is to save itself from meeting with its Hellenic predecessor's fate. In place of the 1922 version of a "fortunate decision," which, "largely accounts for the wonderful impetus which has revealed itself in Western Civilization during the last four centuries," Toynbee now warns that this "Hellenic form of idolatry is a ghost of Hellenism that we harbour at our peril."[23]

Toynbee's First Theoretic Structure of Reality

In addition to Toynbee's avowal that he regards himself as a "Christian historian," one can profitably explore the theoretic structuring of reality with which he starts his study, and against which he reacts in terms of an Augustinian Weltanschauung.

Toynbee's initial view has its roots in ancient Greek vitalism, which regards man and the universe as the expression of a basic monistic principle. This élan or Life principle has a rhythm of rest and action. To this rhythm Toyn-

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[22]Toynbee, A Study of History, III, 223.

[23]Ibid., I, 197.

bee attaches a teleological principle of conditional progress from the lower to the higher, which may have its roots in his Platonic studies. The addition of this concept of development saves Toynbee from the pessimism of Spengler, and is reiterated whenever his laws of rhythm come to the point of grim contemporary application. The secondary principle, however, forms the bridge for a new theoretic view of reality and a reconstruction of the study.

Vitalism comes to Toynbee through four favorite sources in the years when his Study was in preparation. The footnotes, sources, and authoritative guides of the first three volumes are J. G. Smuts' Holism and Evolution (1927), "The South African philosopher-statesman whose guidance we have sought on many occasions";[24] Gerald Heard's The Ascent of Humanity (1929), whose "standpoint is almost coincident with ours";[25] Henri Bergson's L'Evolution Creatrice (1921); and J. Murphy's Primitive Man; His Essential Quest (1927). In the Volume Ten "Acknowledgements and Thanks," Toynbee singles out General J. C. Smuts, who "in his 'Holism and Evolution', communicated to me his insight into the cosmic movement in which Reality passes through different orders of being without losing its continuity or its identity."[26] When

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[24]Ibid., III, 223.

[25]Ibid., I, 197.

[26]Ibid., X, 234.

we recall that before the Study began Toynbee was depressed about the future of the West and that he was seeking to gain a "Pisgah" view of the prospects of the West, the promise offered by Murphy, Smuts, Beard, Wells, and Spengler that an overview elaborated out of biological evolution was the key to the science of human affairs must have been most attractive. Teggart's contribution to the crucial shaping of the Plan of the Study in 1927-30 was to assure Toynbee that a scientific method could be applied to historical studies which would give the researcher "laws" instead of opinions. The "laws" of the historian would have predictive value, and would be of universal validity because they reflected the very nature of reality itself.

In a revealing phrase in Toynbee's Volume One explanation of his method, he explains it as an attempt "to transpose it (the botanists and zoologists image of evolution) into terms of human history."[27] The view of reality with which he begins is that there is a basic life principle in the cosmos which reveals itself in "non-human fields" under the evolutionists' image of the pollarded willow, and in human fields as a multiplicity of civilizations. It is important to recognize that for Toynbee the acceptance of a "pollarded-willow" view of human life excludes the "old-

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[27]Ibid., I, 169.

fashioned image of the bean-stalk." In historiographical terms Toynbee is saying that to see human life in its historical forms as the expression of a cosmic rhythm, is to forego any value judgments about civilizations ("the bean-stalk view") in favor of the view that all civilizations are philosophically equal. The "bean-stalk view" is disposed of as a "christian scheme of history," which survives in modern Western historiography as the "relic" of an "egocentric illusion," and even as a "malicious trick"[28] to which Western historians have fallen victim.

On this foundation, or as we have termed it a theoretic structure of reality, Toynbee attempts to account for all the phenomena of the historical scene. His remarks in Volume One show a confidence which subsequently proved ill-founded. He states, "we shall be guided by this conception throughout our study."[29] In his eyes, it explains the dynamics of society, accounts for the crisis of the West, provides a criterion for success, makes clear the mystery of religion, makes possible a series of predictions, and interprets the place of Toynbee himself in the historical process. However the failure of this framework, explained at first as merely an inadequate methodology, leads Toynbee to the major

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[28] Ibid., 170.

[29] Ibid., 169.

reconstruction that we have seen emerging under the banner of the "Christian historian."

Throughout Toynbee's first three volumes there is an overview or general framework, contained in a number of brilliant metaphors, which is familiar to readers of the early Toynbee and which best express the various parts of Toynbee's initial view. Under the imagery of the "Ancient Mariner" he outlines a melancholy picture:

> As we cast our eyes around a world in which the majority of the civilizations known to us are already dead, while the rest of the survivors are all either in decline or in extremis, . . . we may be inclined to read into the panorama of history the same grim 'motif' that the poet divined in the stones of Westminster Abbey.
>
> Mortality, behold and fear!
> What a change of flesh is here![30]

Or as he records it elsewhere . . . "among the civilizations which are alive at the present day, everyone, apparently, has already broken down and is now in process of disintegration, with the possible exception of our own."[31] The most dramatic presentation of the "panorama" of history is repeated a little later:

> This is a message of encouragement for us children of the Western civilization as we drift today alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations around us. . . . The dead civilizations strew the deck of the ship of human fortunes; and we, and we

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[30] Ibid., IV, 4.

[31] Ibid., 3.

only, are left.[32]

The parallel overview of the mountain climbers with its primitive societies lying dormant on lower ledges and the ci-devant civilizations lying dead on higher ledges, a simile made famous in the United States by the cover of "Time Magazine," likewise expresses Toynbee's theoretic view of reality as a rhythm "fundamental in the nature of the Universe."[33] The mountain-climbers or civilizations are viewed as channels of élan, and the problem of history is viewed as one of making certain the élan is not baulked by the hardening or institutionalizing of society. The rhythm of challenge-and-response is always the same, whether the society is growing or passing into disintegration, argues Toynbee, for the somewhat astounding reason, that,

> Challenge-and-Response cannot fail to be found anywhere where there is Life, since our formula is simply a description of Life itself in terms of Will.[34]

In Toynbee's analysis of the West one can see the application of his view of reality worked out in a particular case. Motivated by concern for the future of western civilization, he invariably brings the result of his analysis to bear on the western contemporary situation. The "crucial

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[32] Ibid., 38.

[33] Ibid., I, 197.

[34] Ibid., VI, 177.

question on which the destiny of our civilization hangs," the "crux of the crisis," and the "crisis of the West," are favorite expressions in the Study. In Toynbee's first reading of the "crisis" of the West, the problem is envisaged in terms of the élan vital. Later he shifts to a second reading of the crisis in terms of a "Christian Weltanschauung."

The first reading of the "crisis" is found in the Volume Three analysis of growth, where Toynbee turns to the question of why the advances of a creative minority in the modern western world are being brought to a standstill. At first it is suggested that the "Yellow Press" might be responsible for "debauching the rest of Society" but this is rejected on the grounds that the "Yellow Press" was only a reflection of the retardation of the masses. When Toynbee has "really probed to the bottom of the mischief" he finds that, "This stagnation of the masses is the fundamental cause of the crisis with which our Western Civilization is confronted in our day."[35]

When the "crisis" is viewed in terms of institutions rather than people, the same blockage of élan is the ultimate explanation. In the section of the "Intractability of Institutions" Toynbee sees the "pernicious institutional anachronism" of the Parochial Sovereign State as that which "has

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[35] Ibid., III, 242.

become the chief obstacle to human welfare and indeed the archenemy of the Human Race."[36]

The general circumstances of breakdown of which the crisis of the West is but one case, are explained by reference to this ultimate view of reality as a rhythm. At the beginning of Volume Four Toynbee collects the various similes he has used in the first three volumes, the drivers of the backsliding cars, the climbers who fall to their death, and the piper who can no longer conjure the feet of the multitude into a dance. Then he restates his argument that they "define the nature of the breakdowns of civilizations" as a "loss of creative power in the souls of creative individuals," and "this failure of vitality on the leaders' side divests them of their magic power to influence and attract the uncreative masses."[37]

It would not be accurate to suggest that Toynbee's initial theoretic view of reality contains only the one principle of life as a rhythmic movement between rest and action. This universal rhythm is made more sophisticated by seeing it in a dynamic relationship between higher/lower, spirit/matter poles. This view has had many precedents, notably among the Gnostics in the late Roman empire, and it is not wholly

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[36] Ibid., IV, 221.

[37] Ibid., 5.

coincidental that Toynbee's one great hero among the Church Fathers, Origen, was strongly attracted by the advantages of explaining Christianity in a Gnostic framework.

Toynbee picks up his teleology from Smuts, and "purpose" in life is now subsumed as simply a manifestation of the universal movement of élan. Toynbee's analysis of the nature of growth is summarized and supported by Smuts' assertion that:

> Evolution is a fact of observation and experience, and it shows a persistent trend: from Matter to Life; from Life to more Life and to higher Life; from higher Life to Mind; from Mind to more and higher Mind and to Spirit [sic] in its highest creative manifestations . . .[38]

With his primary principle that the nature of reality is a pulsating rhythm alternating between rest and action, and the assertion that this élan moves upward through a series of stages in a great chain of being from matter to spirit, Toynbee's dynamics of society can be completed by the elaboration of an already implicit criterion of growth. As he sees it, " . . . Civilizations grow through an élan that carries them from challenge through response to further challenge and from differentiation through integration to differentiation again."[39] As in any system that begins with a monistic principle of élan, the problem of the individual and

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[38]Ibid., III, 127.

[39]Ibid., 128.

of separate "wills" soon comes to the fore. For the historian this problem poses itself in the form of the dilemma of whether "history" is the result of some unconscious factor, what Bergson calls the "great subterranean currents of thought," or is in some sense the work of individual personalities. With the help of Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee argues that the fundamental élan throws off smaller representations of élan.

> . . . so there have arisen privileged souls who have felt themselves related to all souls, and who, instead of remaining within the limits of their group and keeping to the [restricted] solidarity that has been established by Nature, have addressed themselves to Humanity in general in an élan of love. The apparition of each of these souls has been like the creation of a new species composed of one unique individual--the thrust of Life arriving at long intervals, in the person of a particular human being, at a result which could not have been attained all at once for the aggregate of Mankind.[40]

In Toynbee's interpretation of Bergson's passage he links the élan of the cosmos with that of society when he describes the "new factor" of "Personality" as that which breaks the vicious circle of primitive human social life in order to "resume the work of creation."[41] These new centers of élan must not be construed as moving billiard balls which set the others in motion through direct contact, but are seen

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[40] Ibid., 232, from H. Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, pp. 96-97.

[41] Ibid., 233.

by Toynbee in the context of his scale from matter to spirit. The problem seems to be one of distinguishing an élan of repetitive motion from an élan of creative or progressive motion. The solution is to measure the action of one man upon another according to whether it is a direct exertion of will-power, as in the case of the soldier and the statesman; or the indirect evoking of a response from another person, as in the case of the poet or artist. Direct action of will upon will is labelled "crude," and is written off as a "duress that has been imposed on it (another's will) 'more mechanico' or 'manu militari.'"[42] Spiritual action as high on the scale of being is expressed most clearly in this passage:

> In every kind of action, the agent's scope is limited by the nature of his field; and the scope of the 'practical' man of action is bounded by the confines of the personal and institutional relations through which he is operating. It is only when human action is transmuted--by the purging out of all its human passion and its human animus--from the gross medium of will into the etherial media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination, that it is able to transcend all limits of Time and Space to win its way into a field that extends to Infinity.[43]

This same distinction between a higher spiritual action and a lower mechanical action can be discerned in the action of a healthy and unhealthy civilization. A healthy

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[42] Ibid., 288.

[43] Ibid., 289.

civilization is one that has "inspired a voluntary allegiance in the hearts of people below its surface or beyond its borders." On the contrary the "ailing civilization pays the penalty for its failure of vitality by becoming disintegrated into a dominant minority which attempts to find a substitute for its vanishing leadership in a regime of force, . . . "[44]

So far we have been concerned to sketch out the main outlines of a study of history as seen from the perspective of Toynbee's early theoretic view of reality. A whole series of explanations of historical events rest upon the social dynamics just outlined.

As pointed out earlier Toynbee's analysis of the present crisis recapitulates his vision of reality as an élan vital. Stagnation, baulked energy, failure of creativity, and paralysis, were the clues with which one could understand the problems of the present. Toynbee's preoccupation with the present crisis and remedies for the crisis make it at least possible to interpret his Study as a tract for the times. There is considerable evidence for the argument that Toynbee resembled Marx in his attitude toward the "use" of historical studies. Walsh sees Marx as one who "needed the theory not so much for its speculative content as for its predictive properties."[45] Of Marx he says, "He wanted to

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[44]Ibid., I, 336.

[45]Walsh, Philosophy of History, p. 161.

find his way through the thicket of contemporary events, to make sense not of history as a whole but of what was happening at the time and what had happened in the comparatively recent past." This aspect of Toynbee as the prophet of the present and the future is noted by many of the major critics. Barraclough argues that Toynbee's concern with a survey of other civilizations was only "a preliminary task" and that his great concern was with the breakdown of the West.[46] Den Boer regards his effort as going far beyond the historian's task, and as adopting the role of the prophet.[47] Brinton notes "the predictor's purpose" of the "City of God" in the Study,--the efforts of Toynbee to answer questions about where we are going.[48] Dawson's analysis sees two parallel motives in Toynbee's work, the second of which he labels the "Hebraic prophetic mission" to justify the ways of God to man and to find a religious solution to the riddle of civilization.[49] Frankfort speaks of Toynbee and Spengler as writers born under the shadow of an impending war, and of Toynbee's "preoccupation with decay."[50] Geyl as one of the most

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[46]Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 118.

[47]Ibid., p. 241.

[48]Brinton, "Toynbee's City of God," 363.

[49]Christopher Dawson, Dynamics of World History (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), p. 400.

[50]Henri Frankfort, The Birth of Civilization in the Near East (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954), p. 23.

emphatic of the Toynbee critics, argues that he only pretends to investigate the phenomena, in reality he is a prophet.[51] Gottschalk thinks that Toynbee's tendency to transcend the usual concept of historical sources is due to the "boldness of [his] quest for the lessons of history."[52] Kohn credits Toynbee as being by far the most serious and reasonable of all the prophets who tell of decay, and refers to his Study as a "tract for our own age and its predicament."[53] Stone points out that the general reading public has sensed the contemporary concern in Toynbee's Study and that the public looks upon it "as a work of prophecy by which may be unlocked the secrets of the future."[54] Perhaps the contemporary relevancy of Toynbee's Study could not be better made than by glancing at the excited concern it has raised among contemporary statesmen. Mr. Abba Eban, in a 1955 address at Yeshiva University puts Toynbee's concern with the contemporary crisis in a somewhat more dramatic way by saying, "Professor Toynbee is not merely the historian of the twentieth century; he is the Attorney-General of the Almighty upon the Day of

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[51]Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet."

[52]Louis Gottschalk, "The Historian's Use of Generalization," in The State of the Social Sciences, ed. by Leonard D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 438.

[53]Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 351.

[54]Ibid., p. 111.

Judgment."[55]

When one assembles Toynbee's prophecies of what or who might rescue the West from complete breakdown and disintegration, the list is astonishing in its variety and dissimilarity of rescuers. A reader might wonder what kind of a "rescue" is in store for the West if the possible rescuers include the American Negroes, Communist Russia, the Papacy, Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups, the Bahai Movement, and possibly even the African Pygmies.

Taking these prophecies in order of their appearance the negroes are put forward in Volume Two as a possible conductor of élan in a Western society that is showing signs of joining the other civilizations in breakdown:

> The Syrian slave-immigrants who once brought Christianity into Roman Italy performed the miracle of establishing a new religion which was alive in the place of an old religion which was already dead. It is possible that the Negro slave-immigrants who have found Christianity in America may perform the greater miracle of raising the dead to life. With their childish spiritual intuition and their genius for giving spontaneous aesthetic expression to emotional religious experience, they may perhaps be capable of rekindling the cold grey ashes of Christianity which have been transmitted to them by us, until in their hearts the divine fire glows again. It is thus, perhaps, if at all, that Christianity may conceivably become the living faith of a dying civilization for the second time.[56]

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[55] Ibid., p. 335.

[56] Toynbee, A Study of History, II, pp. 219-220.

Twenty years later, Toynbee decides that the Negroes have turned "soft" under the "fascinating mirage of a middle-class Earthly Paradise which had been conjured up there at the North and in the West since the Civil War."[57] But it is much more credible to suppose that a historian whose judgments were usually based on a survey of milleniums was in this case expressing not so much a change in the "negroes" as a change in his requirements of any would-be saviors of the West.

The changing views of modern Russian Communism that Toynbee has held over the span of his historical work would make an interesting essay in themselves, but at present we are interested in the view of the "Russian Communist Movement" as a possible channel for the élan in the predicament of the Western Civilization's immanent disintegration. Here "salvation" is articulated in terms of the élan motif:

> Can we explain the apparent contradiction of Communist Russia's simultaneous centrifugal and centripetal movement vis-a-vis the Western Society in the formula that Russia, while resigning herself to her incorporation into the Great Society, is at the same time attempting to make a temporary withdrawal from the general life of the society in which she has been enrolled by force majeure; and that she is making this attempt to withdraw in order to play the part of a creative minority which will strive to work out some solution for the Great Society's current problems?[58]

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[57] Ibid., VII, 417.

[58] Ibid., III, 365.

This view of the "Russian Communist Movement" as playing a "creative role which will enable her to recast the general shape of Western life on a more or less Russian pattern" seems even more startling when it is advanced as "an explanation of the present posture of Russian Orthodox Christendom."[59] Again the view that will aid in understanding this "prediction" as part of a series of predictions is to see the "Negroes" and the "Russian Communists" as possible exemplars of the challenge-and-response rhythm, and thus as a possible breakthrough for the creative élan.

The next savior of Western Civilization that Toynbee sees--the papacy--is equally as difficult to harmonize with his earlier predictions of the American Negroes and the Russian Communist Movement, unless one understands the prediction as part of his search for a release of élan. The date is 1938, five years after his optimistic look at the Russian Communist Movement, and two years after his religious experience of the summer of 1936. The setting of this "hour of decision" or the "zero hour" is, of course, the eve of the outbreak of the second World War. Toynbee's sense of impending catastrophe finds expression in the phrase, "As we gaze round our spiritually devasted world in our generation,"[60]

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[59] Ibid., 364.

[60] Ibid., IV, 581.

and was urgent enough to impel him to send his notes on the unfinished volumes to New York for safe-keeping as the war broke out. The "papacy" (on the basis of its earlier success) is called upon to establish a new Christian Republic;

> The creative spirits in the Roman Church who set themselves in the eleventh century to rescue our Western World from a feudal anarchy by establishing a Christian Republic then found themselves in the same dilemma as their spiritual heirs who are attempting in our day to replace an international anarchy by a political world order. The essence of their aim was to substitute a reign of spiritual authority for the reign of physical force, . . . [61]

The measure of the success of Hildebrand and those who followed him was the measure in which they used spiritual weapons rather than physical or material. This criteria comes out of Toynbee's view of the creative élan proceeding from matter to spirit. It leads him to posit a highly idealistic account of Hildebrand's early victories. For example, he says, "No physical force was exerted in Hildebrand's act of deposing and excommunicating the emperor Henry IV; yet the moral effect of the Pope's winged words upon the hearts of the Emperor's Transalpine subjects was so intense that within a few months it brought Henry to Canossa."[62] The explanation of the failure of Hildebrand, is given in an appeal to the theorem, "for the substitution of the material for the spiri-

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[61] Ibid., 535.

[62] Ibid.

tual sword is the fatal and fundamental change of which all the rest are corollaries."[63]

When Toynbee issues his plea in 1938, there lurks in his remedy a dangerous contradiction with his day-by-day experience as a working historian.[64] The plea that in this "zero hour of sin and shame" a second Hildebrand should come "to the fight and the rescue,"[65] and his program that all Westerners, both Christian and "Gentiles," "should call upon the Vicar of Christ to vindicate the tremendous title which Pope Innocent III has bequeathed to subsequent successors of Saint Peter,"[66] carries with it an inescapable plea for pacifism in the face of the threat of German militarism. Toynbee recognizes the dilemma toward which his system is pushing him, and hastens to work out a second analysis of Hildebrand only a few pages after his clear assertion that the "substitution of the material for the spiritual sword is the fatal and fundamental change of which all the rest are corollaries." The recognition of his problem can be seen in the

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[63] Ibid., 538.

[64] Toynbee worked for five years in the Foreign Office of the British Government (Turkish Affairs in Political Intelligence) and was responsible among other things for the writing of the atrocity accounts so effective in swaying American public opinion in the early years of the war. In the second World War he again entered government service.

[65] Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 584.

[66] Ibid., 583.

statement:

> And in our own later generation, when we find ourselves confronted once more by Hildebrand's dilemma, with the advocates of an uncompromising pacifism arrayed ancipiti Marte against the advocates of enforcing peace, we cannot pronounce that Hildebrand's choice was intrinsically the wrong one simply because it resulted in a disaster in Hildebrand's case.[67]

Toynbee's second explanation is an attempt to argue that it was not so much the use of force as the fact that Hildebrand and his successors "persisted in the use of force."[68] The argument here is an appeal from a consequence of his matter-spirit teleology back to a more fundamental assumption that Life is rhythmic action, and to stop this rhythm with one successful swing of the pendulum is to become petrified. The explanation then follows that the "Papal aegis that had been stretched over the devoted heads of the Plebs Christiana had turned into a cope of lead. This increasing top-heaviness was the mistake in the pontifical architecture which was bringing the building down in ruin."[69] The "history of the papacy" as interpreted from the standpoint of Toynbee's first theoretic structure of reality is envisaged as a series of routs and rallies beginning with Hildebrand's mistake of choosing to fight with physical

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[67] Ibid., 546.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., 572.

weapons down to the nineteenth century when "a Papacy which had once been the heart of the Western body social seemed to have become an atrophied member, in which the blood no longer coursed and the life no longer throbbed."[70] It is important to take a closer look at the "Papal aegis" that "had turned into a cope of lead." Toynbee defines it as "a modern centralized autocracy" and as "papal pretensions." He praises the Conciliar Movement as an offer of salvation to the Papacy. He speaks of the "price . . . of its rehabilitation" as the "introduction of a parliamentary element into the constitution of the Western body ecclesiastic."[71] With characteristic confidence in his interpretive principles Toynbee dramatizes the scene in these words:

> Would the Papacy be willing to atone for its past and assure its future by bowing, in this matter, to the will of Western Christendom? Once again a Pope had to make a decision which was momentous for the fate of the Western World as well as for that of the Roman See; and, once again, the answer was in the negative. The Papacy rejected the parliamentary principle and opted for an unrestricted sovereignty in a restricted field as the alternative to accepting a limited constitutional authority over a loyal and undivided Christian Commonwealth.[72]

Nine years after his plea for a second Hildebrand, and following the end of the second World War, Toynbee issued

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[70] Ibid., 579.

[71] Ibid., 572.

[72] Ibid., 573.

a 1947 version of his view of the future. In this version, "what may happen is that Christianity may be left as the spiritual heir of all the other higher religions. . . . "[73] And in view of the 1938 prediction of a second Hildebrand, we notice that the 1947 version has two parts. Not only will there be a universal Christianity, but the "Christian Church as an institution may be left as the social heir of all the other churches and all the civilizations."[74] The reader is not left in doubt that Toynbee has a vision of the triumph of the "Church herself in her traditional Catholic form, which, on the long historical view, is the form in which one has to look at her."[75] In even greater detail he marks out the features of Roman Catholicism:

> The Church in its traditional form thus stands forth armed with the spear of the Mass, the shield of the Hierarchy, and the helmet of the Papacy.[76]

Many critics have noted the fascination that the Roman Catholic Church has for the pilgrim-author of the Study, but our interest in the 1938 and 1947 predictions is related at present to the two different interpretations of the "history of the papacy" that are involved. In 1938, the

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[73]Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 240.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Ibid., p. 242.

[76]Ibid.

history of the papacy was sketched out as a sad and deplorable decline, analogous to the history of Athens, in which the papacy became fatally rigid and finally atrophied. The 1947 version of papal history has cut itself away from the old theoretic structure of reality, and the Papal aegis is no longer a "cope of lead" but his "heavy panoply of institutions, (the spear of the Mass, the shield of the Hierarchy, and the helmet of the Papacy) in which the Church has clad herself is the very practical one of outlasting the toughest of the secular institutions of this world, including all the civilizations."[77] Toynbee continues in the same vein, that these institutions "are the toughest and the most enduring of any that we know and are therefore the most likely to last--and outlast all the rest." The complete break with the first view, which Barraclough pointed out as the old Creighton view,[78] but which was an adaption of Creighton's Protestant Liberal interpretation placed on Toynbee's élan foundation, can be seen in the reconstructed judgment of the 1947 version. Now he argues that "The history of Protestantism would seem to indicate that the Protestant act of casting off this armour four hundred years ago was premature." He then makes the startling suggestion that a way to universal order would

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[77] Ibid.

[78] Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 533.

be to have the secular power "subordinated to religious authority."[79]

While it is instructive to bring together differing interpretations of the same historical events, clearly Toynbee's second version of papal history grows out of a different orientation which we shall shortly consider. One more prediction in the early volumes of the rescuers of the West should be noted. If the Negroes in the second volume are possible conductors of creative élan in the crisis of Western stagnation, and Volume Three holds out hope that the Russian Communist Movement may play this role, and Volume Four shifts to a hope in the universalism of a regenerated papacy, we should not be surprised that a new channel of élan is glimpsed in Volume Five. Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups may seem to have little in common with the ideology and program of the Russian Communist Movement and not much more with the papacy, and the American Negroes, but the common link is the fact that they may be a symptom of spiritual life in a civilization which shows all the signs of sterility, materialism and stagnation.

Protestant Revivalism and the Oxford Groups are symptoms of spiritual life because they reveal an "awakening to the sense of sin." This is a valuable symptom in a civiliza-

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[79]Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 241.

tion because it offsets the sense of drift which acts as an opiate. In contrast, "the sense of sin has the effect of a stimulus because it tells the sinner that the evil is not external after all, but is within him and is therefore subject to his will. . . . "[80] Toynbee finds this valuable "sense of sin" in the Hellenic and Syriac civilizations and tentatively in the Mayas and Sumeric societies. An interesting example of a 'sense of sin' in the early Hellenic society shows how Toynbee clearly abstracts the "sense of sin" from a Hebrew-Christian context in which "sin" is defined in terms of a divine-human relationship, and generalizes it into a feeling of dissatisfaction. On an *élan* foundation the "sense of sin" becomes "the pent-up religious feeling for which the Hellenes of the sixth century B.C. were eager, above all, to find a normal outlet."[81] Turning to the riddle of the destiny of our Western Civilization in the "critical act of the tragic drama," Toynbee again phrases his prediction in a dramatic rhetorical question:

> But we may anxiously scan the landscape of our contemporary spiritual life for any symptoms that may give us ground for hope that we are regaining the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been doing our worst to sear and sterilize. Dare we allow ourselves to see at any rate a favorable omen in the emphasis that is laid upon a conviction of sin in the 'revivalist' version of Protestantism

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[80] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, V, 432.

[81] *Ibid.*, 438.

> which has been rife on the English-speaking fringe of the Western World during the last two hundred years and which--winning its first foothold in a nascent industrial proletariat, and spreading thence to a rising lower-middle class--has lately been carried into the citadel of a paganized dominant minority by the shock-tactics of the so-called 'Oxford Groups'?[82]

In a chapter designed to explain the meaning of the self-characterization "a Christian Historian," Toynbee's changing views of Christianity are of great significance. It has been noted that this self-characterization appears in the latter volumes, that it coincides with the religious experience of 1936, and that it can be correlated with a change from an early Humanism to the later hostility to Humanism. We have regarded as of prime importance the first volume assertion that the Study was an attempt to transpose the botanists' and zoologists' image of evolution into terms of human history, that this conception should be a guide "throughout our Study," and that it excluded the bean-stalk or "Christian scheme of history." An objection might be raised at this particular way of grouping the evidence, that it overlooks the repeated use of Christian terminology, Christian institutions and examples in the early volumes, and altogether attempts to establish a false antithesis in the Study.. The answer to this objection can be found by comparing his early view of Christianity with discussions of

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[82] Ibid., 439.

Christianity in the later volumes. Briefly stated it may be argued that up to the fifth volume passage in which Toynbee exhorts man to follow St. Augustine out of the City of Destruction to the "civitas Dei," and which he describes methodologically as adopting the Augustinian-Platonic Weltanschauung, he sees Christianity in terms of the élan view of reality. After this turning point, Toynbee becomes concerned with Christianity as it affects his fundamental outlook, and he writes his last four volumes in an attempt to explore and apply a "religious meaning" to history. This attempt to reconstruct the study of history without discarding an earlier foundation results in the many ambiguous interpretations of his last four volumes, and his final summation of ambivalence expressed in the phrase "wavering between the beanstalk and the pollarded willow."

To avoid confusion, it is advisable to look first at Toynbee's treatment of various doctrines generally identified with traditional Christianity, and then examine the place he gives to Christianity in his scheme of world history.

Although the term "God" appears repeatedly in the Study, in the early volumes the term is abstracted from its traditional context and defined in relationship to the élan. There is actually a rather free use of the term in Volume One. Sometimes it is used to designate the "eternal and

ubiquitous" power or action in the universe.[83] As a synonym for the rhythm of the universe, Toynbee argues that it makes little difference whether we call it "God" or "Élan Vital." But on other occasions he uses the term "God" to designate just one phase of the two-phased rhythm of the Universe. This is clearly the case in the discussion of the nature of the geneses of civilizations when he selects the Sinic expression of the rhythm of the universe as being more apt than the exposition of Empedocles and Saint-Simon. The term "God" is made synonymous not with the rhythm of the Universe as a whole, but with the "static condition" or the Yin phase of the rhythm. Here is the Sinic expression with which Toynbee agrees,[84]

> The Ultimate Principle has operated from all eternity, and now ceaselessly operates by a dynamical process in virtue of which Animate and Inanimate Nature has existed from all eternity. . . . The Ultimate Principle, in its active expansive operation, constitutes and produces the Yang or Positive Essence, in its passive intensive operation it constitutes and produces the Yin. . . . Not only did all material and mental existence of which we are cognizant originate by the process described--if we may speak of the origination of that which has existed from eternity--but all existences do now subsist in virtue of the same process, operating in ceaseless repetition.

This Sinic conception of Yin and Yang is equated with

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[83] Ibid., I, 249.

[84] Ibid., PP. 202-203.

a "modern Western Physical Science" explanation of a change in equilibrium. In Smuts' explanation a change in equilibrium "is an inherent character of the physico-chemical structure as such, and is explicable on purely physical and chemical principles which do not call for the intervention of an extraordinary agent."[85] Toynbee then proceeds to reduce the many religious and mythical explanations of change into the terms of an immanent rhythm of the cosmos, as a change in equilibrium. The various religious interpretations of change in life are easily disposed of by Toynbee's dicta, "The essence of the act is not its moral character but its dynamic effect."[86] On this reading the "God" and the "Satan" of the Biblical account become the "divine equilibrium" and the "Satanic instability" of the universal élan:

> The Devil's intervention has accomplished that transition from Yin to Yang, from static to dynamic, for which God had been yearning ever since the moment when His Yin-state became complete, but which it was impossible for God to accomplish by Himself, out of His own perfection. And the Devil has done more for God than this; for, when once Yin has passed over into Yang, not the Devil himself can prevent God from completing His fresh act of creation by passing again from Yang to Yin on a higher level. When once the divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic instability, the Devil has shot his bolt; . . .[87]

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[85] Ibid., 284.

[86] Ibid., 288.

[87] Ibid., 284.

Toynbee's reduction of Christian doctrines to the élan motif follows this same pattern. Just as the terms "God" and "Satan" are removed from any transcendent and moral connotation in order to appear as phases of a general rhythm so the figure of "Christ" and the doctrine of the incarnation in the New Testament "are readily translated into the language of our Modern Western Physical Science." Toynbee argues that it would not matter whether the incarnation is an "incarnation of God" or an "incarnation of the Devil" as long as the rhythm of the universe passed over from rest to action. This complete indifference as to the character of the person who provokes the struggle between God and Satan, between Yin and Yang, is justified by Toynbee's appeal to Smuts' "Physical Science" explanation that, "The individual and its parts are reciprocally means and end to one another; neither is merely self-regarding, but each supports the other in the moving dynamic equilibrium which is called Life."[88]

With this explanatory principle in hand, Toynbee declares that the essence of many myths can be readily extracted. The imagery of the myths can be translated into the formula of science "that genesis is a function of interaction."[89] An interesting example of this process of reductionism is found in his treatment of another part of the

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[88] Ibid., 286.

[89] Ibid., 299.

Christian corpus, the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness. Based on the formula that it is the action of the élan that matters, the "change from passivity to activity, from rest to motion, from calm to storm, from harmony to discord, in fact from Yin to Yang," the story of the temptation is interpreted as follows:

> The action may be either dynamically base, as when the Ancient Mariner shoots the Albatross or Loki shoots Balder with the blind God Hoder's hand and the mistletoe shaft; or dynamically sublime, as when Jesus, in the temptation in the wilderness which immediately follows his baptism in Jordan, rejects the traditional Jewish role of the militant Messiah who was to raise the Chosen People to dominion in this world by the sword. The essence of the act is not its moral character but its dynamic effect. The Ancient Mariner's act changes the fortunes of the ship and her crew; Jesus' act gives the conception of the Messiah a new turn and therewith a power which had not resided in it before.[90]

The Genesis account of the Fall of Man goes through the same process of a reduction to the élan motif. Toynbee describes it as a symbolic representation of the truth perceived by an earlier generation that there is a universal rhythm in the affairs of men from an achieved integration to a fresh differentiation. Stripped of any religious, moral or transcendent significance, the "Fall of Man" is in essence a dynamic act in which Eve's eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge "symbolizes the acceptance of a challenge to abandon the achieved integration and to venture upon a fresh

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[90] Ibid., 288.

differentiation out of which another integration may--or may not--arise."[91]

One must be careful in this analysis of the élan motif not to reduce Toynbee's exposition to a simplistic Hobbesian mechanism. Toynbee seeks to avoid any necessitarian doctrine by allowing for an act of will on the part of individuals in the drama of life. The individual will seems to have the choice of acting and thus becoming the vehicle of élan, or of refusing to act and consequently remaining sterile and uncreative. This means that every creative moment consists of two decisions to act. First an individual will take a dynamic action which re-liberates the élan from the Yin stage to the Yang, and then the individual will must make an act of resignation [called by Toynbee "this activity through passivity"] which "brings on another cosmic change." As Toynbee expresses it, "Just as the dynamic act in the first phase of the ordeal shook the Universe out of Yin into Yang, so the act of resignation in the second phase reverses the rhythm of the Universe--guiding it now from motion towards rest, from storm towards calm, from discord towards harmony, from Yang towards Yin again."[92]

On this distinction between a cosmic rhythm of the

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[91] Ibid., 290.

[92] Ibid., 293.

universe and man's freedom either to cooperate or not to cooperate with it, Toynbee builds his vast structure of man-in-process-of-civilization. As long as an individual or a group of individuals act dynamically they liberate the élan to seek new levels on the matter-spirit cosmic graph. If their decision is to be truly creative it must reflect a willingness to participate both in the action of differentiation [the Yang stage variously described as Satan by Christian theologians, as "Hate" by Empedocles, and as the active expansive operation of the Ultimate Principle by Sinic thinkers] and in the action of resignation [the Yin phase variously described as God by Christian theologians, as "Love" by Empedocles, and as the passive intensive phase of the Ultimate Principle by Sinic thinkers].

By equating God and Satan with two phases of élan, both necessary in the cosmic rhythm, Toynbee has discarded any explanations in which transcendent interruptions are conceivable or desirable. As he describes it 'no demon is,' or can be, 'at work.' This seems to mean in Toynbee's view that an adequate analysis of growth or disintegration can be made in terms of the change in equilibrium, and need not have recourse to a transcendent God or devil. It leads to his insistance upon analyzing civilizational breakdowns as suicides, from within rather than from any external factor such as military attacks. The empirical analysis of breakdowns as

suicides is actually a process of rounding up a series of examples to illustrate a principle to which he is committed in the élan motif. In Volume Eight when Toynbee has given up the élan explanation he is able to find evidence of breakdowns which are not suicides but are the result of a militant encounter between civilizations.[93]

With "God" and "Satan" interpreted as necessary phases of a cosmic rhythm, it is apparent that Toynbee's analysis earlier of how a "sinful soul comes to grief," or how a civilization comes to destruction, can not imply that it was "by the impact of some external agency's immoral or unmoral exercise of power."[94] The explanation must be that the sinner refuses to cooperate with the creative cosmic rhythm. As a prime example Toynbee gives the case of the Jews who, after responding to the challenge of a 'Time of Troubles' by rising to a higher conception of Religion, 'rested on their oars' and thus "they 'put themselves out of the running' for serving once more as pioneers in the next advance of the Syriac spirit."[95]

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[93] Ibid., VIII, 447. "In both tragedies a hard-pressed civilization responded to the challenge of barbarian aggression by succumbing to a militarism that had originally been foreign to its nature; and in both, likewise, this militarism was eventually fatal to its addicts as well as to their victims."

[94] Ibid., IV, 257.

[95] Ibid., 263.

Toynbee tries to give content to the term "moral" by relating it to the "cosmic tug-of-war between Life and Matter." He still speaks of the "moral responsibility for the breakdowns of civilization" even though his system constantly threatens to explain the failure simply as the "flagging of the Promethean élan" or "the failure of the Promethean élan."[96] An example of his problem is his desire to condemn the Spartans, Osmanlis, Nomads and Esquimaux while advancing as an explanation of their predicament the simple description that there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoitering the course of the road ahead. The whole passage reads:

> The equilibrium of forces in their life is so exact that all their energies are absorbed in the effort of maintaining the position which they have obtained already, and there is no margin of energy left over for reconnoitring the course of the road ahead, on the face of the cliff above them, with a view to a further advance.[97]

On the basis of the cosmic tug-of-war between Life and Matter Toynbee can call an action bad if it tends toward the mechanization of Life, and good if it tends toward the spiritualization or etherialization of Life. Applied to individual action in the context of a civilization, good interaction between individuals achieves growth, and bad

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[96] Ibid., 132.

[97] Ibid., 130.

interaction brings disintegration.[98] Bad integration is equated with mechanization, resorting to total mimesis, or the use of force, in short "the mastery of matter over Life."[99] Good interaction on the other hand, is equated with leadership by illumination and example, the radiation of the major charm of genius, in short, "the triumph of Life over Matter."

A whole series of applied judgments follow from this criterion. The breakdown of the Orthodox Christian Civilization can be traced back through a fatal chain of causation to Leo Syrius's enforcing of the claim of the superiority of the state over the church, which was in effect "to check and sterilize the tendencies towards variety and elasticity and experimentation and creativeness in Orthodox Christian life; . . . "[100] St. Francis and St. Dominic were able to put fresh life into the Christian institutions of monachism because "Saint Francis wholeheartedly followed the path of Gentleness while Saint Dominic did not walk exclusively in the path of Violence."[101] Athens brought tragedy on the whole of Hellas because she "transformed herself from a

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[98] Ibid., 122.

[99] Ibid., 125.

[100] Ibid., 353.

[101] Ibid., 370.

'liberator of Hellas' into a 'tyrant city.'[102] Hildebrand, "in choosing the alternative of meeting force by force" started the fatal and fundamental change of substituting the material for the spiritual sword[103] and brought spiritual disaster on the Western World. Zealot reaction to the impact of an alien culture is both a disastrous error and a deadly sin because it is an attempt to fight the aggressive culture with its own weapons.[104]

While this discussion has primarily focused on the relationship between Toynbee's early view of Christianity and his élan structure of reality, and has sought to avoid the introduction, however tempting, of later changes of view, it may be legitimate to digress for a moment to show the consequences of the moral criterion Toynbee has worked out in or with his élan motif. This brief digression will help to emphasize the fact that Toynbee is working out of a system which he buttresses by illustrations, and that his criterion of growth does not follow from the evidence but from his root view of reality. The strange interpretations of historical events which grow out of the system are perhaps nowhere better illustrated than by his treatment of Machiavelli. It may also be noted that Toynbee's trouble over "Machiavelli" is

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[102] Ibid., 503.

[103] Ibid., 538.

[104] Ibid., V, 331.

one of the important indications to him that his original foundations are inadequate. While he ruled out by re-definition a traditional Christian concept of "sin," he yet finds himself confronted with problems which call for a more adequate frame of reference than an immanent élan en route from Matter to Spirit. Creative personalities, he argues, are those individuals who have followed the path of etherialization rather than mechanization, of gentleness rather than force. Toynbee exhibits eight historians, in an "empirical survey" of the working of the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return who provide "a conspicuous example of that process of etherialization which we have taken as our criterion of growth."[105] These historians in the first chapter of their careers "set themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men by the obvious and crude and finite 'direct method' of bringing their wills to bear upon the wills of their neighbors. Compelled to withdraw from practical life these men have found a new form of action on a new plane.

> The ci-devant soldiers and statesmen who once produced an effect on their fellow men by the direct exertion of will-power, have been taught by necessity to invent the alternative method of creating works of art; and just because it is more etherial, this alternative method is more effective. . . . It is only when human action is transmuted--by the purging out of all its human passion and its human animus--from the gross medium of will into the etherial media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination,

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[105] Ibid., III, 288.

> that it is able to transcend all limits of Time and Space and to win its way into a field that extends to Infinity.[106]

Machiavelli is one of these eight creative spirits discussed in Volume Three of the Study. Toynbee finds that Machiavelli and Italy were facing a challenge similar to the contemporary challenge confronting the European states in 1927. The challenge was how to transmute "political pluralism and political strife into political concord and political solidarity."[107] Toynbee suggests that both the Italian challenge and our present European challenge can only be solved by a stroke of Machiavellian genius:

> It will be seen that the task which confronted Italian statesmanship in Machiavelli's generation, and which likewise confronts European statesmanship in ours, is a task of peculiar difficulty; if the problem can be solved at all, it can only be solved by some stroke of genius; and, in the Italy of Machiavelli's generation, Niccolo Machiavelli himself had many of the qualities for serving as the man of the hour.[108]

After a discussion of Machiavelli's qualities and experiences, Toynbee concludes that he was the man of the hour and he did make an effective response. As he puts it, "The break in his career was complete: yet, in putting him to the proof of this tremendous personal challenge, Fortune did not find Machiavelli wanting in the power to make an

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[106] Ibid., 289.

[107] Ibid., 305.

[108] Ibid., 306.

effective response."[109] Spurred on by the perfection of "Machiavelli" as a case of creative withdrawal-and-return, Toynbee praises the work of the Florentine:

> This was the origin of The Prince; . . . He was addressing himself once more to the one vital problem of contemporary Italian statesmanship in the hope that perhaps, even now, he might help to bring that problem to solution by transmuting into creative thought the energies which had been deprived of their practical outlet. If The Prince had happened to inspire some living Italian princeling--if a Medici or Este or Sforza or Gonzaya had employed the author's methods to attain the author's ends--it is not inconceivable that Machiavelli might have lived to see the political union of Italy accomplished; . . . [110]

The conclusion reached by Toynbee is that Machiavelli's The Prince is not a failure even though its immediate effect was not achieved. His return to the World "on a more etherial plane on which his effectiveness has been vastly greater" is proven by the fact that Machiavelli the political philosopher has influenced the course of history to a much greater extent than Machiavelli the practical politician could have hoped to do. In a summary paragraph his achievements are these;

> For, in finding his 'true nourishment' in his communion with the Ancients, Machiavelli was really finding his opportunity to perform his life-work. In those magic hours of 'catharsis' when he rose above his vexation of spirit, Machiavelli succeeded in transmuting his 'practical' energies into a series of mighty

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[109] Ibid., 307.

[110] Ibid., pp. 308-309.

> intellectual works--The Prince and the Discourses on Livy and The Art of War and The History of Florence--and these fruits of a Florentine politician's broken career have been the seeds of our modern Western political philosophy. The thought which these famous books put out into the World is still living and working in our thought today.[111]

Toynbee soon changed his mind about Machiavelli's 'creative thought' and his "effective" solution. The rather astonishing reversal of judgment begins in Volume Four, although it is relegated to the sixth annex in a series of seven. However one must take into account that Toynbee's first interpretation of Machiavelli in Volume Three belongs to the first set of volumes, that it was planned and written between 1927 and 1933, and that it represents the results of his initial enthusiasm for the élan rhythm. His change of interpretation of Machiavelli begins in the second batch of volumes in an annex which may have been written as late as March, 1939. It occurs in the volumes in which Toynbee testifies to a change of religious orientation, and undoubtedly reflects as well the sobering shift in world affairs. The emergence of Hitler and Mussolini and the threat of a second World War, which Toynbee in 1927 did not expect to happen for at least another century, must have had a strong effect on his earlier enthusiasm for the genius of Machiavelli. It is also pertinent to note the effect of the critics on Toynbee's views. After the first three volumes had appeared at least

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[111] Ibid., 310.

two important historians addressed themselves to Toynbee's criterion of etherialization. On a closely related matter G. F. Hudson of Oxford wrote:

> What troubled me in my reading of the chapters on "Challenge-and-Response" was the fear that too much emphasis on the role of hard conditions in producing Civilization may work in favour of the 'heroic' Nazi idea, . . . It seems to me essential to distinguish between the value of different kinds of responses . . . [112]

And H. A. L. Fisher questions the ambiguities of a Withdrawal-and-Return pattern which allows Toynbee to include such a minor figure as Ollivian in the list of great men, while ignoring such dynamic personalities as Napoleon and Darwin because they do not have such a clear-cut withdrawal experience in their lives.[113]

Whatever the full explanation of the motives for a change may be--the change itself is unmistakably set out in the annex essay on "Militarism and the Military Virtues." Toynbee now sees Machiavelli against a background in which the West is compared with a spiritual void, a house untenanted by the Christian spirit that had formerly dwelt in it. Machiavelli is no longer the genius, or the 'man of the hour' who finds his "true nourishment in his communion with the Ancients," but is rather a false prophet worshipping on the

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[112] Ibid., IV, 650.

[113] H. A. L. Fisher, Pages From the Past (Oxford: University Press, 1939), pp. 219-220.

altar-steps of the Abomination of Desolation. The passage reads:

> As it happened, these two religions were virtually the same; they were, both of them variants of the punitive idolatrous worship of the tribe or state; and therefore the modern Western apostate from Christianity, in a search after a new god, found the same idol awaiting his adoration in whichever of the two alternative directions he cast his eyes. Machiavelli consulting his Livy and Rousseau his Plutarch and De Gobineau his Sturlason and Hitler his Wagner were each led, by his respective literacy or musical oracle, to the altar-steps of the same Abomination of Desolation: the Totalitarian Parochial State.[114]

Machiavelli reappears in Volume Five and on this occasion is used as a manifestation of the phenomenon of "abandon" in the disintegration of the medieval Italian city-state cosmos. Unlike his heroic and praiseworthy creative withdrawal-and-return as noted in Volume Three, Machiavelli becomes the incarnation of the mood of "abandon." This unheroic role as Toynbee defines it,

> . . . implies something more than a mere external rack and ruin. It means a state of mind in which antinomianism is accepted--consciously or unconsciously, in theory or in practice--as a substitute for creativeness.[115]

Toynbee's change of interpretation of Machiavelli cannot be explained away by identifying one interpretation with Machiavelli's theory and the other with his person. In both cases Machiavelli's political theory is the focus of

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[114]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, pp. 645-646.

[115]Ibid., V, 399.

attention, and The Prince is singled out in Volume Three as creative thought, as a stroke of genius, as a living and inspiring effective response. In Volume Five "the Thrasymachean political theory of Machiavelli"[116] becomes a manifestation of the characteristic behavior of individuals in disintegrating societies.

By Volume Eight Machiavelli's decline and fall is complete. Now he is enrolled among the prophets of a Western Gentile Nationalism, responsible only for 'inspiring' a secular Zionist act of impiety and presumption in the modern Zionist movement, and stripped of his mantle of political philosopher, author of "mighty intellectual works," he is dismissed as "the Florentine publicist Niccolo Machiavelli."[117]

Finally in Volume Ten when Toynbee intended to reconsider the "Pleiad of historians,"[118] Machiavelli is quietly dropped from the list of five creative historians.

The second phase of the effort to account for Toynbee's view of Christianity under the élan motif is concerned with his assessment of Christianity as a factor in world history. By isolating discussions of the role of Christianity in history there is further support for the above argument

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[116] Ibid., 403.

[117] Ibid., VIII, 300.

[118] Ibid., III, 290.

that his interpretation rests upon a more basic assumption as to the structure of reality.

Toynbee's usual treatment of the role of Christianity is to see it in relation to Greek civilization and Western civilization. The relationship is usually stated in biological terms and a summary list of the interrelationships shows one rape,[119] one normal birth,[120] one "monstrous birth,"[121] one miscarriage,[122] and one marriage.[123] The first case appears in Toynbee's pre-Study works. In the writings of 1922, Toynbee describes the Christian Church as the last phase of Graeco-Roman Society, argues that this Society was violated by the barbarians, and the result of this intercourse was the birth of our Western civilization. In the second case, found in the early parts of the Study, Toynbee has excised the violence of the rape but has continued the use of the birth analogy as a significant description of the relation between the Western Civilization and Greece. The account may be paraphrased as follows: the Hellenic Civilization died by its own hand, the internal proletariat escaped

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[119]Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 12 and p. 328.

[120]Toynbee, A Study of History, V, 190.

[121]Ibid., VII, 539.

[122]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 117.

[123]Toynbee, Hellenism, p. 177.

from the disintegration, formed itself into the Catholic Church and succeeded in bringing to birth our Western Civilization. The barbarians in this second version did not have "the spirit to compete with the Catholic Church for the paternity of a new civilization."[124] The date of birth Toynbee fixes as sometime between 600 A.D.[125] and 800 A.D.[126] The first two versions of the role of Christianity as stated above can be reconciled without much difficulty. The first case may be considered as a tentative, and preliminary version of the second. One should recognize that in both accounts Christianity plays the role of the culture-bearer, and that the chrysalis view of the early volumes of the Study is the fully developed product of the pre-Study tentative versions. In this chrysalis role of the church two matters are of great importance. The description of the church as a chrysalis or womb of the West is grounded upon Toynbee's first theoretic structure of reality. History as the constant rhythm of the élan vital provides an interpretive framework within which the church finds a place as a channel of the élan. On one occasion Toynbee describes the church as a "sucker" sent out by the Hellenistic Society which fastens on to the West. The second matter of interest in the

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[124]Toynbee, A Study of History, II, 321.

[125]Ibid., IV, 185.

[126]Ibid., V, 190.

chrysalis role of the Church is the interpretation of Christianity which grows out of it. Throughout the early volumes of the Study, Toynbee reiterates the view that "Christianity was a syncretism or nothing."[127] Consonant with his assumptions that the élan moves upward from matter to spirit, from crude force to peaceful persuasion, Toynbee depicts Christianity as a peaceful and hence a successful response to Hellenism. His interpretation reads that "Judaism had only defied Hellenism as a forlorn hope and Catholic Christianity had not defied Hellenism at all but had found its field of action in the Hellenic World as a Syro-Hellenic syncretism. . . ."[128] This syncretism consisted of translating the Christian Syriac spark into the terms of Hellenistic philosophy. Arguing according to his system that the new spark must be made attractive, and to be made attractive it must be made intelligible, he not only speaks of the "legitimate," "successful" Hellenizing of the Syriac spark,[129] but of the necessity of this syncretism.[130]

Toynbee's rather superficial views on the content of Christianity as a syncretism into which he was led by the biological thrust of his élan motif, come under review in the

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[127] Ibid., II, 287.

[128] Ibid., 374.

[129] Ibid., V, 539.

[130] Ibid., 366.

final volumes of the Study. In Volume Seven he succeeds in reversing his earlier account of Christianity as a peaceful response--as a movement which did not defy Hellenism at all, into an account of the first seven centuries of Christian history as a contest between Paganism and Revelation.[131] The "successful," "legitimate" and "necessary" synthesis of a Syriac spark with Hellenistic philosophy, turns out to have been merely a verbal, "would-be reconciliation." Not only did it fail to solve the problem of reconciling a religious truth with a scientific truth, but this verbal accommodation made it harder for souls born in a later generation to solve the problem "than it would have been for them if their predecessors had shirked the issue and refrained from meddling."[132]

It is clear that such a radical re-reading of the history of the early Christian church cannot be described as a modification or development of his earlier views. Some light can be shed on the change by returning to explore the shift Toynbee makes from his Volume Five description of the "normal birth" of the West to his Volume Seven description of the same relation as the "monstrous birth" of the West. The reader who has followed the "intelligible units of Study" as outlined in Volume One, and has regarded Western civiliza-

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[131] Ibid., VII, 474.

[132] Ibid., 475.

tion as a fairly sharply defined society which has existed from about 600 A.D. to the present, finds considerable confusion in the Toynbee version of Western civilization that dominates the later volumes. From Volume Seven onward Toynbee begins to talk about Western civilization as two civilizations.

The new picture of the Christian Church and Western Civilization as Toynbee works it out in his post-second World War volumes may be sketched in this way. Following the disintegration of the Graeco-Roman Civilization, the Christian Church attempted to fashion itself into a Respublica Christiana. This Respublica Christiana, which Toynbee calls an "ecclesiastical civilization"[133] was a spiritually higher order of society than the civilizations Toynbee had been describing up to that time. The shaping of this ecclesiastical civilization was in the hands of the papacy, and its formative period seems to extend from Gregory in the seventh century to a climax in the time of Hildebrand and his successors.[134] In this Civitas Dei, "The secular parochial princes of a Western Christian World were to dwell together in unity under the presidency of an ecclesiastical shepherd; . . . "[135] But this ecclesiastical civilization

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[133]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 202.

[134]Toynbee, A Study of History, VII, 403.

[135]Ibid.

suffered what Toynbee calls a "breakdown,"[136] or a "miscarriage,"[137] or it was "politically debauched by its own founder."[138] Aside from the question of the cause for its breakdown, it is apparent that Toynbee has divided the Western Civilization of Volume One into these two civilizations. For example he speaks of the non-Western World as one which "had rejected the Early Modern Western ecclesiastical civilization," and now, "found itself constrained in the end to adopt the Late Modern Western secular civilization unreservedly."[139] He adds the Western ecclesiastical civilization to his former list of twenty-one civilizations, making now "twenty-two known civilizations."[140] The footnote explains the additional civilization in the words, "On a count in which a Medieval Western City-state cosmos is given the status of a civilization distinct from the main body of the Western Society." The status of a distinct civilization is also given to this Medieval Western City-state cosmos in the annex of Volume Seven, where Toynbee traces out its breakdowns and its reaching of a "universal state" in the emer-

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[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 117.

[139] Ibid., p. 202.

[140] Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 392.

gence of the Napoleonic Empire.[141]

The division of Western Civilization into two distinct civilizations leads to an interesting reconstruction of that society which the reader of the Study would customarily regard as the West. In place of the view that Western civilization was born a feeble infant from the womb of the church in the time of Gregory the Great, is a new description of a thirteenty-century "monstrous birth of a Modern Western secular civilization from the womb of a Medieval Western Respublica Christiana."[142] The "monstrous birth" is described in an alternate phrase as a secular civilization "that breaks out of a body ecclesiastic."[143] On the basis of a new concept of development this new civilization in Toynbee's eyes has little claim on the historian's time or interest. As he remarks, " . . . on this showing, a Western post-Christian secular civilization might at best be a superfluous repetition of the pre-Christian Hellenic Civilization, and at worst a pernicious backsliding from the path of spiritual progress."[144] From Volume Seven onward this civilization is called the "Late Modern Western secular civilization," the "post-Western Christian Civilization," or "deconsecrated

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[141] Ibid., VII, 571.

[142] Ibid., 539.

[143] Ibid., 545.

[144] Ibid., 445.

society," and is regarded as a "supreme tragedy."[145]

It is obvious that this view of the West as a "monstrous birth" and as a "supreme tragedy" cannot be part of the original interpretative framework provided by the élan structure of reality. On the assumption that Life is a universal rhythm of Yin and Yang and that human history can be understood as an extension of this rhythm Toynbee was led to conclude that, "Every species of living creature is an earnest of growth, inasmuch as it is the fruit of some past creative mutation of an antecedent species and might become in its turn the seed of some further creative mutation into yet another species; . . . "[146] But here is the case of a new civilization coming to birth whose very existence is a mistake. Instead of being a new opportunity for the élan to attain its goal, it requires some kind of an evil life force, and to think of it in these terms is to break apart the monistic life principle with which Toynbee began his Study into a radical dualism of a good and evil élan.

The situation is similar in epistemology where Toynbee had felt that this élan motif delivered him from egocentrism by eliminating subjective value judgments and by affirming the philosophical equivalence of all representa-

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[145] Ibid., 447.

[146] Ibid., IX, 392.

tives of the species.[147] The view that the Christian Church served in a chrysalis role, as a channel of élan, is a logical extension and application of this basic position and seemed to maintain the "discreet attitudes of neutrality" that a scientific historian should possess. It is evident from his Volume Five struggle to admit the possibility of a judgment of value with regard to higher religions that Toynbee felt that he had maintained a scientific, and neutral historical position, quite free from value judgments. He asks,

> Are we warranted in taking a liberty with religions that we have scrupled to take with civilizations? At an early point in this Study we debated whether we should take account of possible differences of value in comparing one civilization with another, and in this case we decided not to presume to act as judges or dividers. When we pass from the study of civilizations to the study of religions, are we going to abandon this discreet attitude of neutrality and to take the perilous plunge into passing judgments and meting measures?[148]

The argument that "Christianity was a syncretism or nothing" and that its various doctrines could be understood as mythical constructions of primitive intuitions of the universal rhythm, is also a logical extension and application of his prior assumptions as to the élan motif. But when Toynbee has developed the view that the Church is a higher species of

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[147] Ibid., I, 175.

[148] Ibid., V, 371.

society, that the birth of a civilization can be either an aberration or a success on the grounds that it interferes with or assists in the growth of a higher religion, it is clear that he is revising his "previous tacit and uncritical assumptions"[149] not only about the value of religion, but about the neutral epistemology and the theoretic structure of reality with which he began his Study.

From the comparatively minor place of religion in the early volumes, when it is treated descriptively by a scientific historian holding a "discreet attitude of neutrality," Toynbee has moved to the position that religion provides the intelligible unit of historical study,[150] and becomes the criteria for "good" and "bad" civilizations.[151] Furthermore, religion holds out the hope of deliverance from an epistemological dilemma posed by relativity,[152] and addresses itself with destructive force[153] to Toynbee's earlier faith that ultimate reality is a universal rhythm, and that the study of history is the task of uncovering this rhythm in human affairs. One may speak of Toynbee's initial assumptions

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[149] Ibid., VII, 422.

[150] Ibid., 449.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid., IX, 402.

[153] Ibid., VII, footnote on p. 421.

about the nature of reality as a faith not only on purely theoretic arguments but also because Toynbee himself recognizes in Volume Seven that his Volume One "discreet attitude of neutrality" was really not what it seemed. This recognition comes to light when Toynbee discusses the inadequacies of his own "chrysalis" interpretation. At this point he readily admits his earlier view rested on a judgment with regard to absolute value.

> On this view, universal churches have their raison d'etre in keeping the species of society known as civilizations alive by preserving a precious germ of life through the perilous interregnum between the dissolution of one mortal representative of the species and the genesis of another. In this repetitive process of the reproduction of civilizations, which is assumed to have an absolute value as an end in itself, the churches are useful and perhaps necessary, but secondary and transitional phenomena. . . . The writer of this Study had to confess that he, too, had been satisfied for many years with this rather patronizing view. . . .[154]

As we have argued above, there is a coherence in Toynbee's early views when they are recognized as the superstructure built on the élan motif. An overview of civilizations, cultural dynamics, crisis analysis and the place of religion in history are made intelligible in Toynbee's estimation by referring them back to the universal élan. His own action as an historian is similarly made intelligible to him by seeing it as an expression of the élan motif. When he

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[154] Ibid., pp. 392-393.

comes to a "parting of the ways" in Volume Five and decides to follow Augustine, Toynbee begins a reconstruction of his Study on a new theoretic structure of reality, and begins to see himself in a new role as a "Christian Historian." One might state it briefly that in the first part of the Study Christianity is interpreted in the light of the élan motif, whereas in the later volumes, Christianity, as one of the great intuitions of mankind, becomes part of the basic interpretive foundations.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the period of Toynbee's historical labors, few historians would deny that the fashion in historical literature had been set by the monographs and specialized studies. And very few of the historian-critics of Toynbee have failed to conclude their criticism of A Study of History without expressing admiration for the courage and ambition of this attempt to reverse the tide of monographic historical studies in favor of an attempt at a universal synthetic history. There may be a psychological explanation yet to be uncovered by some Toynbee biographer for this drive to write a universal history, but for the student of Toynbee's historiography there is an interesting ideological explanation for the ambition to write a universal history which can be found in the intellectual development of Toynbee. The ideal of a universal history enters Toynbee's thinking sometime between the years 1921 and

1927. Toynbee finds the justification for his synthetic universal history by an appeal to the rhythmic nature of scholarship itself. Just as there is an alternating rhythm in the universe of nature and the universe of events, so there is the same rhythm in the universe of knowledge.

> For the alternation perpetually recurs in virtue of the very nature of thought. When the mind is employed in finding facts, its sheer success inhibits it sooner or later from fact-finding uninterruptedly ad infinitum. . . . Then the mind changes its activity perforce and employs itself for a season in making syntheses and interpretations. . . . This rhythm is native to thought in all its different channels.[155]

The alternating rhythm according to Toynbee's calculation not only makes rational his drive toward a new synthesis, but offers an explanation of a state of affairs in which the dominant trend is toward fact-finding. The fact that the great majority of his contemporaries are in disagreement with him can be explained by regarding them as involved in a stagnant, sterilized, mechanized Yin phase of historical scholarship. On this view Mommsen is illustrative of the encyclopedic, historical worker who has been caught in the subjugation of this ancient kingdom of historical thought by the modern "Industrialism of Western life."[156] The tendency of Lord Acton and the Cambridge History series to compose a universal history (in a manner quite contrary to the Toynbee

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[155] Ibid., I, 3.

[156] Ibid.

method) by joining together a number of monographic fact-finding studies is explained by Toynbee as the tragic "sterilizing influence of industrialism upon historical thought."[157]

By an appeal to the rhythmic nature of scholarship Toynbee can argue that it is time for a change in historiography, even though only a few historians such as H. G. Wells and himself recognize this need.[158] By a further development of his view that the élan finds expression only in creative individuals, he can explain his own breach with his fellow historians, the mystic inspiration that accompanies it, and the hostility of those who remain in the Yin stage. The argument for a new creative synthetic history of almost superhuman magnitude by a creative historian who will give expression to a new Yang phase in historical studies is an extension and application of Toynbee's general theory of cultural dynamics and may offer a psychological explanation for Toynbee's vast undertaking.

Drawing on Bergson and Smuts, Toynbee analyzes the process of growth as the work of creative individuals.

> The individuals who perform this miracle of creation, and who thereby bring about the growth of the societies in which they arise, are more than mere men. They can work what to men seem

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[157] Ibid., 46.

[158] Ibid., 4.

> miracles because they themselves are superhuman in a literal and no mere metaphorical sense.[159]

The explanation for the vision which carries Toynbee into such an enormously ambitious universal history may be found in the Bergsonian teaching which Toynbee finds so inspiring that, "Henceforward, the soul has a superabundance of life; it has an immense élan; it has an irresistible thrust which hurls it into vast enterprises. . . ."[160]

Again by referring to the élan motif with its concomitant theory of cultural dynamics Toynbee seeks to explain the sharp and even hostile criticisms of the professional historians. In 1933, before his Study came into the hands of his critics, his theoretic view was that:

> The emergence of a superman or great mystic or a genius or a superior personality inevitably precipitates a social conflict. The conflict will be more or less acute, according to the degree in which the creative individual happens to rise above the average level of his former kin and kind. But some conflict is inevitable, since the social equilibrium which the genius has upset by the mere fact of his personal emergence has eventually to be restored either by his social triumph or by his social defeat.[161]

And the response of the creative individual to his time-bound, Yin stage contemporaries is dictated by the élan motif. As the élan is attractive by virtue of its quality of

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[159] Ibid., III, 232.

[160] Ibid., 234.

[161] Ibid., 236.

living-ness, so the creative "personalities that have succeeded in attaining self-determination through self-mastery find, . . . that, having been lifted up, they cannot rest until they have drawn all men unto them; . . . "[162] Quoting from Bergson, Toynbee describes this action of the creative soul who is faced by hostile critics as an act of addressing "themselves to Humanity in general in an élan of love."[163]

The curious way in which the Toynbee controversy has developed since the publication of A Study of History is a witness to the enduring attitudes and views which Toynbee derived from the élan motif. One might normally expect that the scientific study of the past, based on empiricism rather than transcendentalism as Toynbee avers, would lead to a sharp exchange of views as to the validity of the laws and the evidence which supports them. Many of the critiques of the first batch of volumes started to follow this expected pattern, but the controversy since then has been marked by Toynbee's refusal to become involved in a battle over the evidence.

In 1960 Philip Toynbee, the son of Arnold J. Toynbee, described the 1950's as the years of the "Toynbee hunt." He is correct in underscoring the one-sided aspects of the

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[162] Ibid., 234.

[163] Ibid., 232.

controversy, and the bitter tone of the polemic directed at his father. However the tone of the polemic may in part be explained by the sense of frustration which the critics often express in their tilt with the author of the Study.[164] Toynbee's defense of his Study has been marked by these characteristics: an attempt to disarm the historian-critics by an appeal to the rhythmic élan of historical scholarship; a studied effort to respond to the critics in an élan of love; and the suggestion that his "insights" are the mystically received intuitions which have not yet been vouchsafed to the pedestrian, time-blinded professional historian. First his major defense of his system has been a Volume Nine argument that professional historians are men who have been by-passed in the creative advance of the new sociologist-historian.

> The figure of the typical antinomian latter-day Western historian caught fast in bondage to an invisible pattern whose dominion over him was secure just because he believed himself to be proof against ever entertaining any such idea, was, of course, a living witness to a relativity of historical thought that was the looking-glass through which we forced our entry into the vista of our present Study. This captive mammoth was a unique twentieth-century relic of a now old-fashioned-looking Western intellectual fauna which, save for this single surviving representative, had become extinct because its habitus had been too nicely adapted by the goddess Natural Selection to the temporary exigencies of an

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[164]Professor Geyl's shift from a moderate, considered critique in 1946 to a harsh and censorious rebuttal in 1956 is the best example of this growing sense of frustration among the Toynbee critics.

> eighteenth-century Western intellectual environment.[165]

Secondly his response to the critics in direct controversy, apart from this Volume Nine attack on their anachronistic views has been characterized by the mellow, tolerant spirit one might expect to find in Bergson's creative personality, who addresses himself to Humanity in an élan of love. A good example of this gentle response is found in Toynbee's 1956 rejoinder to a very strong attack by Professor Geyl in the Journal of the History of Ideas. Toynbee's one-page comment begins:

> What struck me in reading the two reviews of my book by Professor Fiess and by my old friend Professor Geyl is that they agree with one another, and that I agree with them in their view of what I am trying to do.[166]

Another example of the gentle response may be found in the "Toynbee-Jerrold Controversy"; one of the few occasions in which Toynbee allowed himself to be brought into a published debate on his views. The London Times carried an interchange of correspondence between Arnold Toynbee, Douglas Jerrold and other interested parties in the Spring of 1954. Toynbee's four brief replies to Jerrold reveal a remarkably conciliatory and gentle spirit in the midst of a sharp

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[165]Toynbee, A Study of History, IX, 197.

[166]Toynbee, Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (June, 1955), 421.

exchange of views between Toynbee's defenders and detractors.[167]

Thirdly, the belief that the nature of reality is a rhythmic élan is employed by Toynbee to support the argument that there are advanced souls who gain an intuition of the meaning behind the facts, which must be passed on to historian-contemporaries still caught in the Yin stage. Thus Toynbee's defense along the lines of an esoteric mystic experience has shifted the development of the controversy from a systematic rebuttal on empirical grounds to a more nebulous[168] and frenetic attack on Toynbee's abilities, claims, and influence.[169] Toynbee's seven mystic experiences in the "process of progressive initiation"[170] into the Beatific Vision[171] by which a meaning may be found in the human spectacle,[172] are recorded in Volume Ten.

The relation between Toynbee's defense of the Study and his view of reality as a rhythmic élan even continues

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[167] Counsels of Hope (London: The Times Publishing Company, 1954).

[168] Ibid. See the editor's leading article entitled "Clouds and Sledge-Hammers," p. 26.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Toynbee, A Study of History, X, 129.

[171] Ibid., 126.

[172] Ibid.

into the later volumes of the Study and into the post-Study controversy. This is unusual in the sense that one does not expect this appeal to the élan motif after it has been dropped out of the Study from Volume Five onward as the basis for an overview of history, a cultural dynamics, and an explanatory principle of the Western crisis. But the appeal to the élan motif in the later volumes is limited to polemical usage--as a convenient and effective rebuttal of the critics along historical lines.

In the question of the purpose of history-writing, the normal early volume exposition of the purpose or inspiration of history-writing is framed as an aspect of the universal élan rhythm. Toynbee returns to the same subject in a later volume but this time there is a reconsideration or restatement of the subject in terms of a second structuring of reality.

Toynbee's first view of what history is, using the word in Herodotus' sense of ἱστορία, may be found in the opening pages of the Study. After developing the analogy between biological life and the life experiences of human societies as multiple expressions of the universal élan, Toynbee comes to the following conclusions about the historian's task:

> In the light of these conclusions on matters of historical fact, we can draw certain other conclusions regarding History as a humane study.

> Its true concern is with the lives of societies in both their internal and their external aspects. The internal aspect is the articulation of the life of any given society into a series of chapters succeeding one another in time and into a number of communities living side by side. The external aspect is the relation of particular societies with one another, which has likewise to be studied in the two media of time and space.[173]

A full and fair exposition of what Toynbee includes in the "purpose" of the historian would have to record his view that there is a secondary purpose or cultural by-product to the historian's task. This purpose is referred to as the experience of "catharsis." We come across the first reference to catharsis in the 1921 draft of the Study which may be the one composed on the Orient Express in September of that year. During this time Toynbee was attempting to write his Study as a drama,[174] and specifically opposes the view that history is a search for scientific laws. One can speculate in the absence of any further information about "catharsis" that Toynbee envisaged the use of history as a kind of purging experience for the historian and his reader; probably to purge out the nationalistic and parochial spirit that had brought earlier societies to a tragic end.

By the time the systematic notes of 1927-1929 were completed, Toynbee had accepted the methodological clue of

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[173] Ibid., I, 46.

[174] We have discussed his use of Sophocles' Antigone as a possible master-plot in chapter four.

Teggart and had begun the attempt to establish the scientific law pattern which the universal rhythm of the élan, in his view, should provide. But even though he had rejected the analogy of history and drama as the basis for a historical method, he retained the idea that the study of history serves the purpose of a catharsis. The cathartic purpose is now attached to the élan motif by the argument that the historian is moved from the Yin, [passive, receptive state] into the Yang, [creative, writing state] by means of several stimuli, among which is the cathartic experience of the "Communion of Souls."

In the later volumes of the Study, the major purpose of historical study has shifted from an analysis of the internal and external aspects of the lives of societies to a religious calling. The Volume Ten passage to be put alongside the Volume One discussion of purpose reads:

> Why do people study History? Why, to put the question ad hominem, had the writer of the present work been studying History ever since he was a child and been spending thirty years on this book which he was now finishing? . . . The present writer's personal answer was that an historian, like anyone else who has had the happiness of having an aim in life, has found his vocation in a call from God to 'feel after Him and find Him'. . . . In beginning by asking ourselves why we study History we have begged the question. What do we mean by History? And the writer, continuing to speak simply for himself from his personal experience, would reply that he meant by History a vision--dim and partial, yet (he believed) true to reality as far as it went--of God revealing Himself in action

> to souls that were sincerely seeking Him. . . . The historical angle of vision . . . shows us human souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the gift of the Spirit, moving, through a fateful exercise of their spiritual freedom, either towards their creator or away from Him.[175]

In this comparison of a Volume One definition of the nature and purpose of history with a Volume Ten definition one is able to see the shift from an élan motif to some kind of a religious transcendental framework and the case is similarly as interesting and instructive with regard to Toynbee's views on catharsis. In the notes of 1927 the cathartic value of historical scholarship was noted as an important feature of the historian's motivation and purpose. By the time the Study is completed in 1952, the West has lost its historical significance for Toynbee and it appears from the absence of any mention of catharsis that there is no longer any driving need to purge the Western historians of parochialism and the Westerners of nationalistic spirit in order to save the Western civilization. A call to repentance seems to have replaced the earlier hope that by holding up the tragedy of past civilizations Westerners would emerge from a cathartic experience and open up new channels of élan. By Volume Six the shift from a hope in catharsis to a hope in repentance has taken place, and the historian breaks into a direct plea to his contemporaries that "we may and must pray that a

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[175]Toynbee, A Study of History, X, pp. 1-2.

reprieve which God has granted to our society once will not be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and with a broken heart."[176] The same shift from catharsis to a call for repentance is given epistemological application as Toynbee addresses himself to his fellow historians. In the Toynbee-Jerrold controversy of 1954, Toynbee's major contention is that Jerrold has misinterpreted history because of pride. The antidote is:

> In this grave hour let us in the West beware of asserting: 'God, I thank Thee, that I am not as other men are.' Christ counsels us to pray: 'God, be merciful unto me a sinner.' Christ's is the counsel of hope. The publican is laying himself open to the possibility of salvation; the Pharisee is making himself fatally proof against it.[177]

And to re-emphasize the direct plea to Jerrold the historian, Toynbee's next letter continues, "Mr. Jerrold has not yet told your readers what is his response to the Baptist's cry. In the present correspondence, so far, 'Only the echoes, which he made relent, Rung from their flinty caves, Repent! Repent!'"[178]

Toynbee's Second Theoretic Structure of Reality

This investigation of the term "Christian historian"

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[176] Ibid., VI, 321.

[177] Counsels of Hope, pp. 15-16.

[178] Ibid., p. 29.

has carried us through an initial stage of Toynbee's work where he attempted to develop a coherent historical view on the basis of an élan structure of reality. In place of the discarded "beanstalk view" which he called the relic of a Christian scheme of history, he envisaged reality in terms of a universal rhythm which in the world of events takes the form of innumerable civilizations, like the suckers that spring to life from the trunk of the pollarded willow. The absence of the self-characterization of "Christian historian" in the early plans of the Study from 1921 through the completion of the first three volumes in 1933, and the corresponding personal references of Toynbee to his agnostic period helped to confirm the argument that Toynbee's Study began as naturalistic historicism.[179] The many references to Christianity as a theology and as an institution which can be found in the first three volumes did not refute the thesis but on closer analysis demonstrated more clearly the pervasive power of the élan structure to reinterpret traditional

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[179]This term is effectively used by Carlo Antoni, disciple of Croce and professor of the history of modern philosophy at the University of Rome, in his excellent study From History to Sociology (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1959). He defines "naturalistic historicism" [as distinct from metaphysical historicism and aesthetic historicism] as the tendency to assume that the similarities between nature and history are more significant than the differences. As a consequence these historians attempt to apply the categories of positive science to historical phenomena, thus resolving history into sociology. Preface xix.

doctrines as mythical expressions of the universal rhythm. The role of the church in the historical process was described as a temporary vehicle for a baulked élan in the transitional state between a dying civilization and a new civilizational form.

Toynbee's use of the adjective "Christian" before the word "historian" is greatly clarified when one sees that he is using the word "Christian" with reference to a second theoretical structuring of reality with which he hopes to resolve his earlier difficulties. This second theoretic structure is introduced into the second batch of volumes, which were written in the years 1933 through 1939. But its major outworking comes in the final batch of volumes, as is evidenced by Toynbee's need to reconstruct the format of the post-war volumes, and by the number of reconstructed interpretations which he develops in Volumes Seven to Ten.

This second view of reality can be distinguished from the first by recognizing that it is dualistic as opposed to the monistic universal rhythm Toynbee uses in his early Study. The dualism usually appears as a distinction between the mundane and the supra-mundane. In the Preface to Volume Four, written in March of 1939 (although the fourth volume itself was begun in 1933), Toynbee thanks Augustine for a glimpse of a supra-mundane vision. His comment is that "Of course the author of this tale of two cities had a supra-

mundane range of vision in comparison with which no appreciable difference is made by a few thousand terrestrial miles or years more or less; and a glimpse of this vision is the boon for which the present writer is the most deeply grateful to the writer of De Civitate Dei.[180]

The section in the Study to which this Preface refers is the familiar Volume Five "turning point" where Toynbee elects to follow Augustine "out of the shattered prison-house of the City of Man into the infinite liberty of an inviolate and inviolable City of God,"[181] and the companion passage in Volume Six which relates Augustine's way of "transfiguration" to the individual soul who is caught in a disintegrating civilization. These are parallel and complementary passages in the Study even though they appear in succeeding volumes. In the context which includes both discussions, Toynbee is dealing with "The Process of Disintegration." In Volume Five Augustine is introduced as a way of escape from "Schism in the Body Social." In Volume Six Augustine is again introduced as a way of escape from "Schism in the Soul." Both passages may be called "turning points"[182] in the Study; the

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[180]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, Preface p. ix.

[181]Ibid., V, 374.

[182]We have recognized the importance of the Volume Five "Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Explorer," on page sixty-one, and the importance of the Volume Six "Augustine" passage in the chapter on "Toynbee the Student of Life" on page two hundred and sixty-six.

first with regard to the history of societies, and the second with regard to the history of individuals. It is significant that the insights of Augustine do not appear in any of the early outlines of the Study.

It is important to recall these epistemological turning points in this chapter to show that there is a deeper significance to the passages than the epistemological shift. Toynbee is in effect discarding his monistic principle of the universal rhythmic élan for a second structuring of reality. His search for an abiding form in the flux of historical change no longer rests on the assumption that the élan moves rhythmically in an objectively verifiable law-pattern, but that reality has a supra-mundane dimension--that there exists a "Unique and Omnipotent God." As Toynbee expresses it, "The closing sentence of this last quotation brings us back to the now familiar forking-point of the road which we are attempting to survey; but this time we have not to follow out the branch leading towards a cosmic Law, which we have explored already, but the other branch which leads towards a Unique and Omnipotent God."[183]

It is instructive to note that Toynbee distinguishes himself from "our modern Western school of humanists" on the basis of his second structure of reality; namely, that they

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[183]Toynbee, A Study of History, VI, 34.

fail to recognize a basic distinction in the mode of terrestrial and spiritual being. He accuses them of "planning to reach Heaven by raising a titanic Tower of Babel on terrestrial foundations in three dimensions--as though it were sheer physical distance, and not any difference in mode of spiritual being, that divided and distinguished Heaven from Earth."[184] Gibbon is mentioned in Volume Ten as an example of the humanist who constructs his historical views on a narrowly mundane view of reality.

> Instead of asking the historian's elemental question 'How has this come out of that?' with the spiritual humility that would have allowed his answer to expand to the full measure of its potential dimensions, the self-assured child of a post-Christian Western secular enlightenment cramped the fruitful question from the outset by introducing into it a specious qualification. 'How on Earth has this come out of that?' was the form in which Gibbon recast, in his own style, the question that had been planted in his mind by its heavenly visitant; and, in thus automatically ruling the supra-mundane dimension of Reality out of his reckoning, he was unconsciously precluding himself from finding the treasure hid in his field, . . . [185]

As long as Toynbee remained within the framework of his original monistic view of reality his task as historian could be directed toward the uncovering of the universal rhythm in its law-patterns, and toward a description of 'man

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[184] Ibid., 14.

[185] Ibid., X, pp. 106-107.

in process of civilization,' but a different conception of history follows from Toynbee's changed assumptions as to the nature of Reality. Now history is more than man in process of civilization, it is a "perennial encounter between Man and God."

An example of this change may be found in Volume Eight. The context is similar to the Volumes Five and Six passages in which Augustine was introduced respectively as a way out of the "schism in the body social" and a way out of the "schism in the soul." It revolves around the question of the "responses of the soul" in a civilization which has suffered an assault from a neighboring contemporary society. Toynbee discards the various reactions of the victim to the assault as unsuccessful attempts to re-perform the miraculous act by which a creative minority of Primitive Mankind had once succeeded in passing over from the Yin-state of an apparently hard-set stagnation into the Yang-movement of an astounding renewal of progress. Just as in the Volume Five and Six passages in which the inescapable pessimism of the monistic rhythm was avoided by recourse to a supra-mundane Reality, so in Volume Eight the answer to the pessimistic question "Was this the end of the story?" is found in an appeal to a view of Reality which transcends the earlier monism.

> Perhaps the true answer to this anxious question was that this might well be the end if the whole

> story was comprised in the history of Civilization, but not if Man's attempt at Civilization was no more than one chapter in the story of a perennial encounter between Man and God.[186]

A few pages later, the "perennial encounter" which gives significance to the repetitious clash of civilizations is described as a situation into which there comes "a new revelation of the nature of God and of the character of Man's relation to Him."[187] And a concrete example of this "eruption of eternity into time," to use the phrase Toynbee borrows from Berdyaev, is the story of the encounter between Jewry and Hellenism. Toynbee carefully points out that the significant moment in the encounter "was thus not achieved in any episode among the vicissitudes of alternating victory and defeat in these two civilizations' long-drawn-out duel" but "it was manifested in the transcending of both these civilizations by a newly revealed higher religion that had made its epiphany 'above the battle' which Judaism and Hellenism were fighting with one another."[188]

In the last thirty pages of the Study there is considerable evidence to show that Toynbee was coming to the realization that the "encounter" theme of history and the "man-in-process-of-Civilization" theme are irreconcilable,

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[186] Ibid., VIII, 624.

[187] Ibid., 627.

[188] Ibid.

and that they rest upon different views of Reality, and that the "encounter" theme has a Christian origin.

> As for the grand epic whose theme is History herself, this stands in two rival versions which cannot be reconciled, . . . H. G. Wells in The Outline of History has written an epic poem on the theme 'Man Makes Himself' which is explicit in the title of a subsequent book from the pen of an eminent Western archaeologist of the next generation. This bleak assertion is a post-Christian Western Man's defiant answer to the Psalmist's joyful assurance that 'the Lord He is God' and that 'we are His People and the sheep of His Pasture' because 'it is He that hath made us and not we ourselves'; and that verse enunciates the theme of History as a series of encounters between Man and his Creator in which a Paradise that has been lost through a Fall is regained through a Redemption, and in which this deliverance of God's creature is achieved at the cost of a passion that Christ has suffered 'for the means of grace and for the hope of glory.'[189]

If Reality is viewed as a dualism of Time/Eternity, Mundane/Transcendent, and historical events are to be understood as an encounter between Man and God rather than as Man-in-process-of-civilization, the historian ought to focus his attention on the encounters of the past in order to help his contemporaries to understand the past and the present. This re-focusing of the historian's work takes place in the Study as Toynbee writes the last four volumes. It may be described as a re-focusing, or as a second "overview" of history which replaces the first "overview" of the early volumes.

In the first overview as Toynbee states it in the

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[189] Ibid., X, 118.

first four volumes, he uses the poetic metaphors of the "Ancient Mariner" and addresses himself to his contemporary "children of the Western Civilization as we drift to-day alone, on the 'wide wide sea' of human history, with none but dead or stricken civilizations around us . . . and we, and we only, are left." As argued earlier this overview is not a temporary flight of poetic fancy but a consistently worked out expression of his early monistic principles, and is repeated in a series of parallel metaphors.

The second overview is also expressed in dramatic metaphors, and is likewise rooted in a theoretic structure of reality. What strikes the eye of the casual reader of the Study is the dynamic aspects of the second overview as contrasted with the first. To one accustomed to the dead and dying civilizations of the early volumes, to the solemn question of whether or not the West will have sufficient élan to make a creative response to its internal problems, the later volume dynamic encounters between the World and the West, the sudden coming to life of the Mexic and Andean Societies, the awakening of the Jewish fossil, and other appearances of unexpected life, unmistakably suggest that a radical re-focusing of the contemporary scene has taken place.

Before analyzing the second overview, and this expansion of the whole Study in terms of encounters, it would be worthwhile to observe several remarks Toynbee makes in the

early volumes. In the Preface to Volume Four there is an interesting indication that as late as 1939 Toynbee felt that the greater part of his work had been accomplished with the completion of the first six volumes. He remarks that "these three volumes contain Parts IV and V of the thirteen parts which are set out in the plan of the book on p. v above. The writer hopes to publish the remaining eight parts in one more batch of volumes, as he believes that the five parts contained in the first six volumes will prove to amount, in aggregate length, to rather more than two-thirds of the whole work."[190] As a matter of fact the first six volumes of the Study contained two thousand, three hundred forty-seven pages of text, but Toynbee's changing views were about to extend the remaining eight parts into an almost equal-length second half. After the second World War he completed the Study with the last four volumes containing two thousand, fifty-three pages of text. While one should not read too much significance into this expansion of the text, yet it serves as supporting evidence for the argument that the theoretic changes which began in the middle batch of volumes required considerable alteration in the historical reconstructions in the final batch of volumes. The most significant change takes place in Part XI which had been scheduled as a discussion of

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[190] Ibid., IV, Preface vii.

"Rhythms in the Histories of Civilizations" and was changed to "Law and Freedom in History." In the preface to Volume Seven Toynbee speaks of it as being "treated very differently from the original design." The expansion of this Part is in terms of a major textual addition of two hundred twenty pages on the topic of the encounter between the modern West and contemporary societies. The curious way in which Toynbee introduces the topic of the "World and the West" may reveal his underlying feeling that the change is not at all in harmony with his early overview and original plan. For example he gives the reasons why the history of the encounters between the Modern West and its contemporaries is "comparatively unilluminating" and notes that it is "an imperfect specimen." However he then proceeds to devote the next two hundred twenty pages to an analysis of the encounters with the Medieval West, and merely the last forty-eight pages to an analysis of encounters between an assortment of other civilizations.

One other preliminary task remains before we can sketch out the new "encounters" overview, and see its relationship to the second theoretic structure of Reality in the Study. It is important to examine Toynbee's assertion that the "encounter" is simply an extension of the Study in terms of the universal rhythms with which the Study began. The argument is stated in Volume Eight, just prior to the full

exposition of the encounter overview. Briefly the argument reads that history has not been fully intelligible to us because we have been studying single civilizations instead of the encounters between civilizations. He concludes, "It thus appears that the genesis of each of the higher religions that were still alive in the twentieth century of the Christian Era becomes intelligible only when we expand our field of study from the ambit of a single civilization to embrace encounters between two civilizations or more."[191] But it requires only a return to the first volume arguments to see that this is a falsification of his own previous methodology. The hope of the Study rested upon the use of the comparative method; so that "having decided to attempt a comparative study of the twenty-one representatives of the species which we find at our command, we may now start our inquiry . . . by considering how civilizations come into existence."[192] The crux of the Volume Eight argument for expansion of the Study is the word "intelligible." The early volume attempt to make history intelligible did not fail because Toynbee restricted himself to the "ambit of a single civilization," but because the élan structure of reality was unable to provide an adequate principle of historical explanation. Actually the

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[191] Ibid., VIII, 90.

[192] Ibid., I, 183.

shift he is advocating in Volume Eight is not from the consideration of one civilization to a consideration of the collisions of several civilizations, but from an earlier belief that the comparison of civilizations would reveal the universal law-patterns of societal life to the belief that only in a transcendental framework of Reality will the "thread" of history become apparent.

Before examining the second overview, a summary of the first, drawn from a Toynbee source outside of the Study may provide useful insights. In the interwar years, Toynbee gave a summer lecture at Oxford on the topic, "The Graeco-Roman Civilization." Relating the failure of the Greek civilization to the present experiment of Western civilization, he cautioned Western optimism by saying,

> No known civilization has ever reached the goal of civilization yet. There has never been a communion of saints on earth. In the least uncivilized society at its least uncivilized moment, the vast majority of its members have remained very near indeed to the primitive human level, and no society has ever been secure of holding such ground as it has managed to gain in its spiritual advance. All the civilizations that we know of, including the Greek, have already broken down and gone to pieces with the single possible exception of our own Western civilization. . . . [193]

The second overview of Toynbee's Study is in sharp contrast to the first. Instead of an internal challenge that

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[193]Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 56.

the West faces in its aloneness on the sea of life, Toynbee now sees a series of external dynamic encounters between the West and its living contemporaries. Instead of a problem to be solved by the West in order to release its creative élan Toynbee now sees the Western civilization "as an aggressor" in a concatenation of military and cultural encounters. Instead of a hope that the West will find a creative solution that will lead the rest of the World by imparting the divine fire of the élan from one soul to another 'like light caught from a leaping flame,' Toynbee hopes that the bitter encounter between the World and the West may give "occasion for a higher religion to make its appearance on the stage of History," for, "the entry of this new actor signifies the opening of a fresh play with a different cast and plot."[194]

This second overview is advanced by Toynbee as a master-plan which accounts for both the past and the present. As an account of the past the encounter then makes intelligible all of the higher religions and almost all of the civilizations.

> In fact, the histories of all the higher religions and all the civilizations except the Mayan and the Sumeric and the Indus Culture and the Shang Culture could have been housed by an imaginary twentieth-century Herodotus in the authentic Herodotus' capacious house of many mansions; and in taking a concatenation of encounters as the ground plan for his masterpiece of literary architecture, Herodotus was

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[194]Toynbee, A Study of History, VIII, 476.

> showing a penetrating insight into the structure of an oecumenical historian's subject-matter; . . . [195]

As an account of the present the "encounter" overview yields this dramatic setting for the twentieth century.

> Future historians will say, I think that the great event of the twentieth-century was the impact of the Western civilization upon all the other living societies of the world of that day. They will say of this impact that it was so powerful and so pervasive that it turned the lives of all its victims upside down and inside out--affecting the behavior, outlook, feelings and beliefs of individual men, women, and children in an intimate way, . . . [196]

While this change in overview from the early-volume picture of the lonely, drifting West to the late-volume picture of the dynamic encounters between an aggressive West and its living contemporaries appears obvious to the general reader of the whole Study, one must still substantiate the fact that a real change has taken place. If this is more than merely a shift in dramatic metaphors, it is then important to relate the change in overview to the more fundamental change which is taking place in Toynbee's theoretic structure of reality.

The fact that a real change has taken place may be established by observing that Toynbee has had to re-vitalize a number of the dead civilizations of the first overview in

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[195] Ibid., 463.

[196] Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 214.

order to develop his second overview. It is instructive to note than an "encounter rhythm" does not simply complement the growth rhythm but actually drives out the earlier notion of a "disintegration rhythm" projected in Volume Five as the true completion of the rhythmic theme. But first let us turn to the resurrected societies.

Toynbee's Universal history as the history of the Promethan élan, the "inner creative factor" led him to make decided judgments on contemporary history which found expression in his first overview. A review of these judgments will show that the picture of the West drifting alone with none but dead or stricken civilizations strewing the deck of the ship of human fortunes, is not merely poetic fancy. In Volume Four Toynbee says,

> On this showing, we may pronounce that the ci-devant Central American Civilization, as well as the ci-devant Andean Civilization, has now been completely incorporated into our Western body social; and we can point to other ci-devant civilizations which have been incorporated into other bodies social with comparable completeness in other times and places. The Babylonic Society, for example, merged its identity in the Syriac body social. . . .[197]

In Volume Five the same view of the contemporary scene is repeated.

> This a priori probability can be tested in the case of our own Western Civilization, which by now has swallowed--and in some degree digested

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[197]Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 81.

> and assimilated--at least eight alien societies: the Mexic, the Andean, the Hindu, the Iranic, the Russian Orthodox Christian, the Japanese Far Eastern, and the main bodies of the Far Eastern and Orthodox Christian societies in China and in the Near East. The number of victims rises from eight to ten if we reckon in the Yucatec and Arabic societies, while their Mexic and Iranic neighbors had respectively succeeded in devouring on their own account before these two gorged beasts of prey were preyed upon in their turn and disappeared down our Western Society's all-devouring throat.[198]

Toynbee concludes the picture of the contemporary scene with the prophecy that, "If we do live to see a Westernized Japanese governing class share a Westernized Russian governing class's fate, then we shall have seen the whole 'man-power' of ten disintegrating civilizations absorbed--with all previous social distinctions now confounded and effaced into the gigantically swollen internal proletariat of the single civilization of the West."[199]

This overview depends for its validity upon the élan structure of reality, with its accompanying theory of social dynamics to the effect that a disintegrating civilization is one which has broken down and is consequently "mechanically dispatched to the same grim goal on a travelling belt of interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked."[200] As far as the West is concerned

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[198] Ibid., V, 89.

[199] Ibid., pp. 89-90.

[200] Ibid., 13.

in the above picture of the contemporary scene, it is part of Toynbee's early view that the West was entering into its "universal state."

The bringing to life of the disintegrated or absorbed civilizations in order to complete the "encounter" overview takes place in Volume Eight. The passage is lengthy but of sufficient importance to warrant its reproduction.

> A striking example of a subjugation that had every appearance of being definitive was the prostration of the Mexic and Andean societies after the military overthrow of the Aztec and Inca powers by the Castilian pioneers of one of the civilizations of the Old World. Yet the judgment, hazarded in an earlier passage of this Study, that these two subjugated civilizations of the New World might be considered to have been completely incorporated into the Western Christian body social by the time of writing, might have to be suspended in the light of the surprisingly different denouement that had eventually declared itself in certain comparable cases.[201]

Toynbee's rapid change of historical judgment on these New World civilizations is at first confusing, and can only be understood as it is related to the change he has made from the élan foundation to that of encounter. Just as Machiavelli was praised in the early volumes as long as Toynbee needed an example of an élan response to the Italian challenge, and then was condemned in the late volumes when Toynbee decided that Machiavelli's response was nationalistic and

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[201] Ibid., VIII, 465.

secular instead of religious, so we have the case of the New World civilizations making several appearances in the Study according to the changing demands of Toynbee's overview.

As long as Toynbee labored under the first overview, in which he saw the Western Civilization as the sole survivor in the experiment of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization, and put his hope in the radiation of creative élan through gentleness and inspiration, he could value highly the colonizing of the Spanish in the New World. On several occasions Toynbee contrasts their peaceful occupation of the decadent Aztec and Inca societies with the ruthless brutality of the Protestant colonists of North America.[202] He speaks of them as "stepping into the shoes of the Aztecs and Incas--sparing the conquered in order to rule them as subject populations, converting their subjects to their own religion, and interbreeding with their converts."[203] The strong attack on the North American "Protestant method of conversion by extermination" is a negative example in his general theory of progress in the early volumes as has been observed earlier.

By the time Toynbee has begun to reconstruct his viewpoint in the middle batch of volumes, the Spanish activity in the New World is no longer held up as a case of

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[202] Ibid., I, 464.

[203] Ibid., 212.

conversion by example but is recorded as "the atrocities committed by the Spanish conquistadores in Mexico and Peru surpass the misdeeds of the Roman Army which pillaged Asia Minor in 189-188 B.C."[204]

When the transition of the middle volumes works itself out into a systematic overview of oecumenical history, and the encounter thesis becomes the framework of explanation, Toynbee's interest in the New World civilizations revives. Now the Spaniards appear in the Study as an example of sophisticated barbarians,[205] who plunder the New World in a "heinous crime." A little later he compares the "Spaniard's suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the Americas" to the barbaric suppression of the indigenous civilizations of the Old World by Alexander the Great's successors. The Spaniard's conquest of Mexico, Central America, the Inca Empire, and the Andean World is described as an act of crude violence and shattering subversiveness,[206] and Toynbee concludes in Volume Nine, "As for the living civilizations of the New World, they were at that moment losing consciousness through being brutally knocked on the head by Castilian conquistadores."[207] The Spaniards are not even left

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[204] Ibid., V, 46.

[205] Ibid., VII, 229.

[206] Ibid., VIII, pp. 117-118.

[207] Ibid., IX, 213.

with the praiseworthy virtue of having made the ethereal cultural advance of persuading their subjects to accept their religion. In Toynbee's post-Study works he describes the Spaniards as converting the Indians to Christianity by force.[208] Alongside Toynbee's very fluid interpretation of Machiavelli, and of the New World civilizations and of the Spanish activity in the New World, one may place his interpretation of Russia.

The difficulties of adequately interpreting the modern history of Russia should be granted from the outset, and it is not surprising that Toynbee's interpretation of Russia reflects the ever-changing contemporary optimistic or pessimistic phase of European relations with the Soviet Union. What is legitimate and instructive however, is to recognize the interpretive framework within which Toynbee's optimistic and pessimistic attitudes toward Russia are expressed.

In the early volumes Russia is regarded as part of the Orthodox Christian Civilization; Russian Communism as a regime which is "attempting to transform the complexion of society in Russia out of all recognition,"[209] and the whole thing as having passed through the breakdown into the stage of disintegration, and assimilation by the West.[210] By

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[208]Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 163.

[209]Toynbee, A Study of History, I, 34.

[210]Ibid., IV, 84.

seeing Russia in terms of the élan overview, and describing the Communist experiment as a part of the great process of assimilation and Westernization, Toynbee is able to advance his most optimistic view of Russian Communism. He sees it as the withdrawal of a creative minority in order to return with an answer to the problems of the West. "There are, of course, creative individuals at the back of all creative minorities, on the hypothesis that some individual human being is the ultimate author of every creative human act."[211] This Volume Three optimistic view of Russian Communism closely parallels his optimistic reading of Machiavelli during the same pre-1933 period. And just as Machiavelli loses his place in history as a praiseworthy example of a creative response, so the Russian experiment when lifted out of the élan framework rapidly becomes a "notorious example" of a Western philosophy which became a violent proletariat religion.[212]

When we come to the Volume Eight discussion of encounters, and Toynbee introduces the new overview of the West in dynamic encounter with the other living societies, Russia is brought back from the process of disintegration which was earlier described as "the travelling belt of

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[211] Ibid., III, 364.

[212] Ibid., V, 177.

interlocking cause and effect that can be neither reversed nor broken nor checked." Like the civilizations of the New World, Russia is re-vitalized to fit the new pattern.

> Yet this concentration of the World's attention and apprehension on this particular encounter between two contemporary civilizations was in no sense presumptive evidence that the Russo-Western conflict would continue to occupy the whole field.[213]

At first glance one is inclined to accept Toynbee's Volume Eight assertion that history as-a-series-of-encounters is the same as his Volume One history-as-a-rhythm-of-challenge-and-response. But what betrays this argument is the point made at the end of the following quotation that one particular encounter is "the stem from which all living branches of human history had ramified."

> If Herodotus had happened to be born into the post-Alexandrine instead of the pre-Alexandrine Age of Hellenic history, his unrivalled genius for finding a clue to the tangled skein which is every oecumenical historian's raw material would assuredly have led him to take this post-Alexandrine Kulturkampf, in preference to a pre-Alexandrine military conflict between the Achaemenian Empire and the city-states of European Greece, as the point of departure for his own reconstruction of a history of Mankind which presented itself to his eyes as a concatenation of encounters between divers civilizations in which the Spirit of Man had expressed itself. And indeed this brilliant Hellenic discoverer of the historical phenomenon of concatenations could have found no better vantage-point if the chance that so capriciously allots the time and place of each individual's birth had condemned

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[213] Ibid., VIII, 113.

> Herodotus to be born into a twentieth-century Western World: for, in the perspective of an observer posted in that society in that age, the story of the post-Alexandrine competition between the Syriac culture and Hellenism for the conversion of souls still manifested itself to be the stem from which all living branches of human history had ramified.[214]

Here is a return to the "primitive image of the magic bean-stalk" which Toynbee had so vigorously opposed in Volume One. He had dismissed it as an unhappy relic of a Christian scheme of history, and as the view of men who had "succumbed to the egocentric illusion by treating the transition from the one dispensation to the other as the turning point of all human history."[215] The fact that the encounter thesis means a return to a discarded bean-stalk view of historical reality is recognized by Toynbee in 1955 when he reflects on the writing of the Study in the essay "What I Am Trying to Do."

> . . . and my own belief is that there are some things in human affairs that have no pattern because they are not subject to scientific laws. One such thing, I believe, is an encounter between two or more human beings. . . . I think, in fact, that here we are in the presence of genuine acts of creation, in which something new is brought into existence; and this leads us back towards the Biblical view of history which was accepted in the West from the fourth century till the end of the seventeenth.[216]

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[214] Ibid., 463.

[215] Ibid., I, 170.

[216] Montagu, Toynbee and History, p. 6.

The bean-stalk view of historical reality had been discarded by Toynbee because it had appeared to impose arbitrarily chosen fixed points or turning points or absolutes in the flux of time. The adoption of the master metaphor of the pollarded willow and the assumption of the "philosophic contemporaneity" of all representatives of the species of civilization seemed to be a way of escape from the egocentric illusion. But now Toynbee fixes upon the "post-Alexandrine competition between the Syriac culture and Hellenism for the conversion of souls" as the "stem from which all living branches of human history had ramified." From this fixed point the history of the Graeco-Roman civilization no longer appears as the Greek struggle for self-articulation, the crisis of the Fifth Century B.C. and its resultant breakdown. Earlier in a summary statement in Volume Four he had discussed Graeco-Roman History in terms of the élan motif.

> From the opening of the fifth century B.C. onwards the whole of the rest of Hellenic political history can be formulated in terms of an endeavor to transcend City-State Sovereignty and of the resistance which this endeavor evoked. Before the fifth century closed, the obstinacy of the resistance to the accomplishment of this urgent political task had brought the Hellenic Civilization to its breakdown; and though the problem which had baffled an Athenian first attempt to solve it was eventually solved in a fashion by Rome, it was not solved in time to prevent the disintegration of the Hellenic Society from running its course to its final dissolution.[217]

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[217] Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 208.

Toynbee's first attempt to make intelligible the historical experience of the Greeks was to put them in the framework of the monistic élan view of reality. The "judgment of history" consisted of noting their failure to solve the problems of a dynamic living society; their baulking of the creative élan and the resulting inability to inspire "a voluntary allegiance in the hearts of people below its surface or beyond its borders."

Toynbee's second attempt to make intelligible the historical experience of the Greeks is to see them in the framework of the dualistic encounter view of reality.

> Looking back on Graeco-Roman history to-day, about thirteen hundred years after the date when the Graeco-Roman civilization became extinct, we can see that, in this perspective, the most important thing in the history of the Graeco-Roman world is its meeting with other civilizations; and these encounters are important, not for their immediate political and economic consequences, but for their long-term religious consequences.[218]

Events in the Graeco-Roman civilization are no longer intelligible or important in the measure in which they give expression to creative élan--to the solution of civilizational problems, but gain their significance in relation to the religious bean-stalk. The historian's interpretation of Hellenism takes its perspective from the second century B.C. rather than the fifth century, for "Hellenism's encounter

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[218]Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, pp. 219-220.

with Judaism in and after 175 B.C. was the most portentous single event in Hellenic history."219

The turning-point, the significant encounters, the fixed points in the time-flux for the historian are provided by the bean-stalk, or what Toynbee begins to refer to as the "key" or "stem" or "thread" of history. In an important footnote exchange with Dr. Edwyn Bevan in Volume Five, Toynbee starts to make explicit the "thread" of history that occupies the later-volumes of the Study. The discussion reached this agreement:

> In the present writer's view 'a unique beginning of something new in the history of Mankind' is to be seen, if anywhere, not in the flowering of a brilliant rationalism in the springtime of Hellenic history, but in the discovery or revelation of a new conception of God, and of Man's relation to God, which was made in the last phase of the dissolution of the Sumeric Society (if that is indeed the date and the provenance of Abraham), and which, ever since then has gone on gathering light through a series of epiphanies of which the culmination has been Christianity. This view . . . is not at variance with that of Mr. Bevan, as he has communicated it to the writer of this Study in a later letter in the same correspondence: 'I see I didn't make my view quite clear in one respect. I should hardly say that the significant central thread of History is the rise of Rationalism: I should say, rather, with you that the central thread is the preparation for the Kingdom of God and its partial coming' . . .220

Later on in Volume Five the "bean-stalk" that Toynbee

219Toynbee, Hellenism, p. 177.

220Toynbee, A Study of History, V, n. 7.

has adopted, despite his protestations against a bean-stalk view of history in Volume One, is further elucidated.

> It will be seen that while Judaism and Christianity appear to be 'philosophically contemporary and equivalent' . . . there is another angle of vision from which they present themselves in the quite different aspect of successive stages in a single 'ascending' process of spiritual enlightenment. In this picture Christianity stands, not side by side with Judaism, but on its shoulders, while they both tower above the primitive religion of Israel. . . . Before and below the Prophets, the Biblical tradition presents us with a Moses, and before and below Moses with an Abraham.[221]

When one re-reads Toynbee's polemic against the bean-stalk view in Volume One, his dismissal of contemporary historians who "dispose their periods in a single series end to end, like the sections of a bamboo-stem"; and his contempt for those who succumbed to the egocentric illusion of the Christian Weltanschauung by treating the transition from the Hellenic Civilization to the new dispensation of the Christian Church as the turning-point of all human history, it is hard to see how he expects to exempt his own Volume Five bean-stalk view from this same Volume One critique. To recognize that he does not subject his later views to his early historical relativism is to see in Toynbee a human foible often repeated in the history of scholarship, but it would seem to be a more serious criticism of an historian

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[221] Ibid., 119.

when his later views are portrayed by him as simply an expansion of the adequate foundations of his life-long Study.

In Volume Seven Toynbee continues the task of describing his religious thread of history. The bean-stalk appears as "the story of progressive spiritual experience of which Christianity was the climax."[222] In other descriptive phrases the bean-stalk is compared to "Stations of the Cross in anticipation of the Crucifixion," and the sections of the bamboo-stems are the "successive sufferings through which they won a progressive enlightenment."[223]

Clearly we have left the élan structuring of reality in which Toynbee claimed to be able to scientifically determine the laws of the universal rhythm. In its place is the structuring of reality into a dualism of mundane and supramundane, and behind the apparent flux of events there is no longer the immanent rhythm of Yin and Yang, but a transcendent 'friend behind the phenomena.' The historical method of a scientific, i.e., empirical induction of the laws of historical change has given way to an ambivalent historical methodology whereby the facts are scientifically ascertained but the meaning behind the facts is reached by religious intuition, divination or revelation.[224]

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[222] Ibid., VII, 424.

[223] Ibid., 425.

[224] Ibid., 427.

C H A P T E R VII

CONCLUSION

"How can these things be?"
Arnold J. Toynbee in 1952

In this paper, we have traced the methodological odyssey of one of the twentieth century's foremost historians. It would be easy for us to represent Arnold Toynbee as an a-typical historian, the curious and innovative scholar who has wandered from the main stream of historical thought. Indeed, the sheer weight of criticism has tended to support this view by appearing to isolate Toynbee and by masking the wide differences among his critics. Philip Toynbee, his son and a noted literary critic in his own right, described some phases of the Toynbee controversy as the "Toynbee hunt"; and it can be argued that the controversial aspects of the Toynbee question frequently obscure his proper relationship to the historical discipline.

The tendency to emphasize the peculiarities of Toynbee against the uniformity of the historical profession, the unity of the hounds versus the individuality of the fox, is immediately checked when we recognize the consensus of affairs in the profession itself. In the most recent presi-

R. R. Palmer describes historians as being in an "identity crisis." In his words, "As historians we claim to be a profession, but we do not quite know what the profession is."[1] By attempting to understand the dynamic character of historical thought in the twentieth century, we have opened up the possibility of understanding what Toynbee was trying to do. In A Study of History, our analysis has shown that Toynbee's struggle to become an effective historian was shaped by the tensions in British historiography in the early twentieth century. At first he identified "historian" in terms of the dominant "science of history" school that had developed in England between 1870 and 1910. To Toynbee, it seemed only a natural extension of the scientific motif to move from the fact-gathering stage of the British Rankeans to the law-making techniques of his own A Study of History in the 1920's. He expressed this sense of progress in methodology, indeed in scientific methodology, in the metaphor of the explorer. Toynbee used this metaphor sparingly but effectively in the early volumes of the Study to re-define the historian and to convey his sense of confidence and exhilaration in his huge new project. But the explorer metaphor also provided a clue to a basic change in Toynbee's methodology

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[1]R. R. Palmer, "The American Historical Association in 1970," The American Historical Review, LXXVI (February, 1971), 1.

and outlook. As his early confidence in the "law-making" technique began to evaporate, and as the problem of relativity grew more intractable, Toynbee turned to the explorer motif, not simply as a stylistic and romantic metaphor, but as a way of describing his methodological dilemma. In the later volumes of the Study, and in the post-Study writings, the explorer motif allowed him to hold to several unresolved and contradictory positions, justifying his methodological uncertainties by describing them as inherent in life itself. Thus, the epistemological problem had become a metaphysical dilemma--the ego-centric illusion could not be banished because in the nature of existence "we are bound to be self-centered."

In view of this important methodological shift that came to light in the explorer motif of chapter two, it became important for us to review the major methodological basis of the early part of the Study, and in chapter three we undertook this task. By tracing his view of historical method from his earliest writings, we were able to observe that Toynbee's development in his Oxford and London University years accorded with the pattern established by Stubbs and the "exact school of history" for professional and scientific historiography. It became apparent that Toynbee's experiences in the first World War were propelling him to reevaluate the nature of historical thought, and to demand that the

historical sciences be re-defined. This study showed that he felt cramped by the narrow definition of history as fact-gathering, and that he saw in Spengler's work in 1920 a breakthrough into a wider definition of the nature of history and the task of the historian. Although other historians had shared his distress with the limitations of the scientific school in a growing Methodenstreit in British historiography, it was an American historical theorist, F. J. Teggart who, in Toynbee's eyes, offered the clearest explanation for current problems in historical method and the best solution to them. By looking closely at the notes and early efforts of Toynbee up to 1927 and comparing them with his post-Teggart formulations, we were able to identify the extraordinary influence of Teggart on Toynbee's dream of writing a universal history, valid for the delineation of the past, and capable of providing prognostications for the future. In one sense, we may summarize chapters five and six of this study as a description of Toynbee's long wrestling with the law-making technique; his effort to use Teggart's "sovereign methodological clue" and then to extricate himself from it. But Teggart's influence on Toynbee cannot be measured only by the degree to which he uses or refuses to use the law-making technique. This study revealed Toynbee's strong emotional identification with Teggart's repudiation of traditional historiography. One could see it most clearly in Toynbee's attack on

contemporary British historians. It is unfortunate that Toynbee's sense of the inadequacy of Rankean historiography in the decade of the nineteen twenties, and his fear of what was happening to Western civilization in the postwar period should have been brought together and shaped by Teggart's conviction that the Western historical profession was traveling on a dead-end street. The coalescing of these fears and assessments added a very large emotional element to the situation. What might have been a fairly straightforward case of a historian testing the limits of contemporary historiography and electing to try to overcome these limits becomes, under Teggart's tutelage, a case of challenging the entire historical profession. By linking the failure of Western historians with the failure of Western civilization, and by offering his own law-making technique as a sharp and exclusive alternative, Toynbee turned the methodological discussion into a vast and often unfruitful controversy. Spurred on by Teggart's theory, Toynbee developed his own method as an either/or situation, and buttressed his position with descriptions of the antithesis between the anachronistically-inclined historians and the progressive sociologists. It is not surprising that the historians perceived the situation more as a threat to their existence than as a reasonable advance in historical method. As the controversy mounted, Toynbee felt it necessary to make greater claims for the scientific

validity of his method--a value-free, comparative study of civilizations. When Toynbee went over to a normative study of history in Volumes Four and Five, he was so entrenched in his earlier claims that he continued to treat the Study of History in its original framework and, as we saw in chapter three, to issue frequent defenses of his law-making technique throughout the entire Study. It would seem to me that the historical profession was not faced with the exclusive alternatives of continuing with the traditional Rankean fact-gathering historiography or of turning to a Teggart-Toynbee sociology. This essentially false dilemma pressed by Toynbee tended to short-circuit the methodological debate and created acrimony harmful both to the historical profession and to Toynbee himself. It is evident that the historian's task as envisioned by Stubbs and his scientific school of history was simplistic and inadequate. The British Rankeans, by offering a naive theory of historical facts and by reducing the complicated process of reaching historical understanding to a matter of seeing the facts or collecting the evidence, had routed the literary and amateur historians of the nineteenth century. But, in practice, they had covertly assumed various concepts of development by which they had selected the "facts" and turned them into an intelligible account. We have seen that in his early training as a history student and then as a professional historian, Toynbee had accepted at

face value this explanation by the scientific school of what the professional historian's method should be. In the nineteen twenties when Toynbee recognized the failure of this official version of historiography, he turned not to a more critical study of what he had been taught, but to Teggart's view that fact-gatherers needed to give way to law-makers. When Toynbee presented his fellow historians with the alternative either of remaining with the fact-gatherers (and hence becoming more and more anachronistic) or of turning their discipline into sociology, he overlooked the option of subjecting the entire process of historical thought to a fresh analysis. Unaware of the weaknesses in the Rankean model, yet unsatisfied with its results, he constructed an artificial dilemma for his fellow historians with his insistence that they join him in the re-definition of the historian as a law-discovering scientist.

It was far from reassuring when, in the last two chapters of our study, we found Toynbee himself expressing a growing lack of confidence in the law-discovering ability of the historian-sociologist, and an inclination to re-define the historian as a historian-theologian. If Toynbee had not forced an artificial breach between the historian as fact-gatherer and the historian-sociologist as law-discoverer, he might have avoided the largely fruitless controversy in the historical profession and, at the same time, galvanized

himself to a reconsideration of the basic processes of the working historian. In my opinion, when he undertook the task of law-discovering, he was not creating a new science of history, such as was implied in the romantic and heroic picture of "the Explorer." Instead, he was actually raising the problem, integral for every historian, of what concept of development the historian uses to make historical events intelligible.

W. H. Walsh, following Croce's distinction between chronicle ("a simple narrative") and history ("a significant narrative") describes the historian's task as follows,

> The Historian is not content to tell us merely what happened; he wishes to make us see why it happened, too. In other words, he aims . . . at a reconstruction of the past which is both intelligent and intelligible.[2]

Bury, Acton and others spoke of this problem as a search for the "key" of history or the "significance" of history and thought they found it in the idea of progress, the growth of freedom or a social version of biological evolution. In 1920, Toynbee thought he had found an adequate concept of development in the classical-humanist notion of the "wonder of man" as expressed in Antigone, then "groped for an answer" in Spengler's biological analogies. When he followed Teggart's lead after 1927, it was doubly exhilarating because he

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[2]Walsh, Philosophy of History, p. 32.

hoped to define certain uniformities in history which would provide a concept of development for him, and to do it in an utterly objective and value-free way. If he had been able to keep the effort of 1927 in proper perspective as another attempt to define and test out certain uniformities that he had discerned as occurring repeatedly, in similar fashion and in roughly comparable societies of the past, his initial fame might have been less but the long-term value of his writings might have been greatly enhanced.

What we face now is the prospect of having a very impressive set of volumes in the library of historical thought, which will remain largely unread because so much of the work represents a negative example of historical method. As a result, Toynbee's valuable insights into certain events and societies which are scattered throughout his volumes may well be overlooked. Even if this judgment is correct, it must be balanced with the recognition that Toynbee's personal odyssey is one of the fascinating chapters of twentieth century intellectual history. It is a welcome change in the history of historical thought to break with the cult of impersonality professed by historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Toynbee's struggle and his candid discussion of his own changing views, values and perspectives help us to understand that historians are not computers, anonymous recorders, or chapter-writers in a chronicle

of history, but are human participants in a human history and, like Everyman, they live in a continual struggle of partial answers, unclear but inescapable choices, and the need to understand the present in the light of the past.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The basic bibliographical guide for a study of historical method in Arnold J. Toynbee's A Study of History is Monica Popper's A Bibliography Of The Works In English Of Arnold Toynbee, 1910-1954 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955). This guide was carefully and exhaustively compiled with the support of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (where Toynbee served as Director of Studies from 1925 to 1955), and carries a foreward by Arnold J. Toynbee. It is structured chronologically and contains both published works and periodical articles, totaling two hundred and ninety-six entries. When it was compiled in 1955, Toynbee had already published the first three volumes of A Study of History in 1934, Volumes Four through Six in 1939, and the four concluding volumes in 1954. But his volume called Reconsiderations in which he re-evaluates his study in the light of contemporary criticism, was not published until 1961 as Volume Twelve. Although not all of Toynbee's publications since 1955 are significant for a study of his methodological problems in A Study of History, it is imperative to include his Reconsiderations (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) both for Toynbee's own reflections on his work and for the bibliography of critics appearing on pages 675 to 690.

Since the completion of A Study of History and the various lectures and books dealing with that project as noted in the Popper bibliography, Toynbee has continued his writing and publication in several fields. While his books on travel, East to West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958); Between Oxus and Jumna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); Between Niger and Nile (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); and Between Maule and Amazon (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) are of interest to the historian and the biographer of Toynbee, they are not essential to a study of his problem of historical method. Likewise, his books on religion, Christianity Among the Religions of the World (New York: Scribner, 1957); and his editing of Man's Concern With Death (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), and The Crucible of Christianity (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969) as well as his books on cities, Cities of Destiny, edited by Toynbee (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967) and Cities on the Move (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) may be regarded as peripheral to the problem of historical method. Two books which he started to write early in his career, Hellenism (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), and Hannibal's Legacy (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1965) are of limited value in ascertaining Toynbee's historical method. Several scholars have pointed out that his Hannibal's Legacy is an attempt to prove to his critics

that he could write history books in the more traditional mode.

One other group of Toynbee's post-Study books does interest the student of Toynbee's historical method. In 1963 Arnold and Philip Toynbee published Comparing Notes; a dialogue across a generation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963) which contains many interesting biographical insights into the formulation and writing of A Study of History, and the reactions of Toynbee to the hostile critics of the 1950s and 1960s. His Change and Habit; the challenge of our time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) and Surviving the Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) are essentially efforts to review the problems of our time and the historical precedents which might suggest a solution. As such they serve as an interesting basis of comparison to the problems which Toynbee outlined in A Study of History. Two autobiographical books, Acquaintances (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Experiences (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) have been harshly received by the critics but contain many valuable references to the historians who influenced Toynbee, and to the personal and methodological struggles which shaped A Study of History.

Popper's Bibliography of the primary sources should be supplemented by the unpublished materials of Arnold J. Toynbee as well as by the above mentioned published works

from 1956 to the present. Much of the unpublished material for A Study of History was purchased for a private collection in this country and is to be released for public use upon Toynbee's death. It is described by Toynbee as the "Debris" of Parts I through XIII, and consists of large folders containing extensive notes, letters from various scholars who were consulted on that particular section, various lectures, and many undated scraps of paper on the topic under consideration. The most valuable part of the large collection of materials for a study of Toynbee's changing method is the collection of early outlines of A Study of History. There are two drafts of Toynbee's "first conscious attempt" to write the Study in the summer of 1920 as he describes it in the preface of Volume Seven. The first draft of thirty-four pages is written in ink and has the note "(done at Galscombe, [sic] in the cottage, summer of 1920)." The second draft of thirty-eight pages contains many word changes but remains substantially the same in content and appearance. Another of the early outlines appears to be an expansion of the draft written on the Orient Express enroute from Constantinople to England on Saturday, September 17, 1921, and is dramatically described in the Preface to Volume Seven as the beginning of his thirty-year intellectual journey to write A Study of History.

There is also an abortive draft called "Outline I,"

consisting of twenty-nine pages of hand-written materials in pencil, written sometime after 1925, and probably absorbed in the large outline of 1927-29. The major document for a tracing of Toynbee's historical method is a five hundred and forty-eight page outline, written in pencil throughout except for a later correction in ink, and entitled "Outline of June 1927 to June 1929." It appears to be the crucial set of notes that Toynbee had sent to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in 1939 for safe-keeping during the second World War, and which enabled him to resume his writing seven years later.

With reference to the secondary sources two developments have occurred which are invaluable for a study of Toynbee's method, and contemporary methodological debate. In 1960 the journal History and Theory was established to encourage studies in the philosophy of history, and is the only international journal devoted to questions of the methodology of history. It brought together an outstanding editorial committee and has provided scholarly contributions from many countries of the world on the general problems of historiography. In addition to the advancement and clarification of problems in the field, the journal has published important bibliographies in the Toynbee controversy and in the philosophy of history.

In 1965, John C. Rule and Barbara S. Crosby published

a very comprehensive "Bibliography of Works on Arnold J. Toynbee, 1946-1960," History and Theory 4 (1965), 212-233. Although it deliberately excludes the books and articles published in the non-Western languages and the very brief newspaper and periodical reviews, it contains the major materials for a critical study of Toynbee from the time he began to emerge into international prominence in 1946 until the abatement of the Toynbee controversy in 1960. During that fourteen-year period Rule and Crosby record three hundred and thirty critical articles on Toynbee's work and forty-nine books which gave major, if not complete, attention to Toynbee.

As a further aid in what has been one of the most rapidly growing fields of study in the last two decades History and Theory began to publish a very extensive bibliography in philosophy of history. It has covered the years from 1945 to 1968 and has limited itself to books and articles in Western languages. To date it has appeared as Beihefte of the journal under the heading Bibliography of Works in the Philosophy of History 1945-1957 (Beiheft 1, 1961) with Supplement thereto (Beiheft 3, 1964) by John C. Rule; 1958-1961 (Beiheft 3, 1964) by M. Nowicki; 1962-1965 (Beiheft 7, 1967) by Lewis D. Wurgaft; 1966-1968 (Beiheft 10, 1970) by Lewis D. Wurgaft and others, with A Supplement to Bibliography of Works in the Philosophy of History 1962-1965. This general

bibliography has included the new Toynbee material since the end of the special Toynbee bibliography in 1960.

Since the publication of the bibliography up to 1968, several books have appeared on the problem of identifying and analyzing civilizations, thus renewing the debate on Toynbee's comparative method of historical study. Matthew Melko's The Nature of Civilization (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969) attempts to supersede earlier primitive efforts by setting up a model for the comparative study of civilizations, and Roger Wescott's "The Enumeration of Civilizations" History and Theory 9:1 (1970) seeks to reconcile the various lists of civilizations as advanced by Spengler, Toynbee, Danilevsky and others. But it is Talcott Parsons' Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966) that may offer a more successful analysis of societies by providing a more adequate distinction between culture and society than Toynbee was able to do. On a related problem in Toynbee it is interesting to note the appearance of Robert A. Nisbet's Social Change and History (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) because it represents a contemporary effort by a prominent American sociologist at the University of California to revive the views of Frederick J. Teggart in an analysis of a Western theory of development. Also not yet on the printed bibliographies is a brief but judicious treatment of Toynbee in The

Heritage and Challenge of History (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1971) by Paul K. Conkin and Roland N. Stromberg. It attempts to place Toynbee's writings in the framework of the twentieth century's "crisis of historiography," and in the wider setting of this century's "anarchy in the world of knowledge." Roland Stromberg promises to further develop this theme in a forthcoming book on Toynbee (Southern Illinois University Press).